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FROM THE EDITORS
On 2 March 2011, the Type 054A Jiangkai II–class guided missile frigate Xuzhou
arrived off the coast of Libya after transiting the Suez Canal to oversee the evacuation of the thousands of Chinese civilians working in that country’s oil industry. This was evidently the first time a Chinese warship had ever entered the
Mediterranean. There is thus a particular timeliness to our lead article, Daniel J.
Kostecka’s “From the Sea: PLA Doctrine and the Employment of Sea-Based
Airpower.” Through an analysis of doctrinal and academic writings on this subject, the author explores current Chinese thinking concerning the production
and employment of aircraft carriers and large-deck amphibious vessels of several types for the projection of power far from China’s own shores. He argues
that the increasingly firm Chinese commitment to procuring such capabilities
has little to do with any Taiwan-related scenario but reflects primarily China’s
determination to protect what it now insists is its “core” national interest in the
South China Sea and, to a lesser but nevertheless significant extent, its desire to
develop options for asserting a Chinese naval presence in distant seas for a range
of contingencies such as counterpiracy, humanitarian assistance and disaster relief, and the protection of Chinese citizens abroad.
The acquisition of aircraft carriers has long been a matter of controversy for
not only the Chinese but the Japanese as well. In “A New Carrier Race? Strategy,
Force Planning, and JS Hyuga,” Vice Admiral Yoji Koda, Japan Maritime SelfDefense Force (JMSDF) (Ret.), surveys the prehistory of efforts by the JMSDF to
develop carrier-like through-deck destroyers for antisubmarine warfare
(ASW)—a politically sensitive issue for Japan and its neighbors, given memories
of the offensive role of the Japanese carrier fleet in World War II. The author describes in detail the interplay of operational, strategic, and political factors that
contributed to the development and procurement of Japan’s first through-deck
helicopter ASW destroyer, JS Hyuga, commissioned in March 2009. He argues
that this new class of warship should be understood as a logical evolution of
long-standing Japanese thinking about the vital ASW mission rather than as a
radical new departure. Vice Admiral Koda was commander in chief of the Japan
Maritime Self-Defense Fleet prior to his retirement in 2008. His most recent
contribution to this journal was “The Emerging Republic of Korea Navy: A Japanese Perspective” (Spring 2010).
Published by U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons, 2011
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Next, Lieutenant Alaina M. Chambers, USN, and Steve A. Yetiv, in “The Great
Green Fleet: The U.S. Navy and Fossil-Fuel Alternatives,” review the ambitious
steps the U.S. Navy is in the process of taking, under the leadership of Secretary
of the Navy Ray Mabus, to reduce the dependence of the sea services on traditional fossil fuels. The current unrest throughout the Middle East and North Africa and the rising price of oil globally only underline the importance of this
initiative.
The Navy continues to pay close attention to the regime of international maritime law and regulations, particularly in the context of the continuing disputes
between China and its neighbors over territorial claims in the South China Sea.
Andrew J. Norris, in “The ‘Other’ Law of the Sea,” provides a detailed overview
of the lesser-known international maritime conventions that supplement and
support the framework provided by the United Nations Convention on the Law
of the Sea (UNCLOS). Commander Norris, USCG, is on the faculty of the International Law Department at the Naval War College.
This year marks the one-hundredth anniversary of the birth of U.S. naval aviation. Robert F. Dunn, in “Six Amazing Years: RAGs, NATOPS, and More,” looks
back to the early years of jet aircraft in the Navy and traces the organizational innovations the service introduced in order to standardize pilot training in this
new and challenging type of airplane as well as to reduce the extraordinarily
high accident rate that plagued the carrier jet force at this time—a subject also
explored by Robert C. Rubel (“The U.S. Navy’s Transition to Jets”) in the Spring
2010 issue of the Review. Vice Admiral Dunn, USN (Ret.), is a former Deputy
Chief of Naval Operations for Air Warfare.
War gaming is a perennial topic for the Review, given the place of honor this
discipline holds at the Naval War College’s Center for Naval Warfare Studies. In
their “Why Wargaming Works,” veteran war-game designers Peter P. Perla and
ED McGrady make an intriguing argument for the value of at least certain kinds
of serious gaming, using insights derived from an unorthodox array of sources,
from literary theory to cognitive science. They locate this value in war gaming’s
ability to construct a “narrative” that can have a “transforming” effect on an individual’s relationship with real-life experience.
Finally, George H. Quester, in his essay “The Last Time We Were at ‘Global
Zero,’” in our Commentary department, explores the prospect—apparently embraced by the Obama administration—of a world without nuclear weapons, by
way of comparison with a world on the brink of the nuclear era in the late 1930s
and early 1940s. The result is a fascinating thought experiment that helps us
weigh the merits of this once unthinkable transformation of the global strategic
environment.
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FROM THE EDITORS

5

IF YOU VISIT US
Our editorial offices are now located in Sims Hall, in the Naval War College
Coasters Harbor Island complex, on the third floor, west wing (rooms W334,
334, 309). For building-security reasons, it would be necessary to meet you at the
main entrance and escort you to our suite—give us a call ahead of time
(841-2236) or use the phone at the main Sims Hall entrance (1-2236).
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Rear Admiral James “Phil” Wisecup became the
fifty-second President of the U.S. Naval War College on
6 November 2008. He most recently served as Commander, Carrier Strike Group 7 (Ronald Reagan Strike
Group), returning from deployment in October 2008.
A 1977 graduate of the U.S. Naval Academy, Rear
Admiral Wisecup earned his master’s degree in international relations from the University of Southern California, graduated from the Naval War College in 1998,
and also earned a degree from the University of Strasbourg,
France, as an Olmsted Scholar, in 1982.
At sea, he served as executive officer of USS Valley Forge
(CG 50) during Operation DESERT STORM. As Commanding Officer, USS Callaghan (DDG 994), he was
awarded the Vice Admiral James Stockdale Award for
Inspirational Leadership. He served as Commander,
Destroyer Squadron 21 during Operation ENDURING
FREEDOM after 9/11.
Ashore, he was assigned to NATO Headquarters in
Brussels, Belgium; served as Force Planner and Ship
Scheduler for Commander, U.S. Naval Surface Forces,
Pacific; and served as action officer for Navy Headquarters Plans/Policy Staff. He served as a fellow on the Chief
of Naval Operations Strategic Studies Group; as Director, White House Situation Room; and as Commander,
U.S. Naval Forces Korea.
Rear Admiral Wisecup’s awards include the Defense
Superior Service Medal, Legion of Merit, Bronze Star,
and various unit, service, and campaign awards.
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PRESIDENT’S FORUM

This is the last President’s Forum I will have the privilege of
writing.

I have made clear my
view that the need for this school has never been greater. That has
not changed; if anything, it has increased in this time of significant budget pressure. The earthquake and tsunami in Japan and the upheaval throughout North
Africa and the Middle East tell us that the rapid pace of change in the world has
not and will not subside in the near term, making what we are doing in Newport
all the more important. I really believe this. Chester Nimitz, in a lecture here in
1960, stated that the war plans he inherited at the beginning of World War II had
indicated an intention to shutter the Naval War College.* He, on the contrary,
felt that it needed to be expanded, since he would need to increase the size of the
officer corps fifteen times—which is what he proceeded to do.
During a recent meeting, as we looked at the day’s “press pull,” we noticed
that the Naval War College had some connection with each of the top stories, either through research we had in progress, gaming we were doing, or books and
articles that faculty or, in some cases, students were publishing. In this edition of
the Naval War College Review we look at People’s Liberation Army doctrine, carriers in world navies, the U.S. Navy and alternative energy, the history of naval
aviation, the law of the sea, and war gaming.
Here are some simple highlights of accomplishments I’ve been privileged to
witness—most of them involving significant support from the Naval War College Foundation:
IN MY PREVIOUS COLUMNS IN THIS JOURNAL

• Receipt of funds to endow the first of six regional-studies chairs, the John
A. van Beuren Chair of Asia-Pacific Studies, and selection of Professor
Toshi Yoshihara as its first chair holder
* Fleet Adm. Chester W. Nimitz, “An Address” (lecture, Naval War College, Newport, R.I., 10 October
1960), CD-ROM in MP3 format, recording VR 2290, Naval War College Library.
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• Refurbishment of the historic Mahan Reading Room
• Technological upgrade and major renovation of Spruance Auditorium
• Development of a major maritime history prize (for a major contribution
to the advancement of the study of maritime history)—the Hattendorf
Prize, awarded to Dr. N. A. M. Rodger, All Souls College, Oxford; the inaugural prize and check is to be awarded in the fall, later this year

• Deployment of faculty to Afghanistan to help U.S. Marine Corps generals
in their analysis of operations

• Establishment of a Board of Advisors, with leading citizens and academics.
With the Foundation’s help, the Evening Lecture Series has seen some very interesting speakers, such as Lewis Simon, George Will, Robert Kaplan, Sylvia
Earle, and Dr. Robert Ballard.* The Naval War College has certainly felt the impact of the Foundation’s first-ever year of million-dollar support. The edge that
the Foundation provides has never been sharper.
All in all, the Naval War College has certainly benefited from the support not
only from the Naval War College Foundation and Navy leadership but also from
the staff and faculty of the College. You all have my lasting thanks.
This is the last President’s Forum I will have the privilege of writing. It will be
prepared for press just as I leave the Naval War College; by the time you read it, I
will be in Washington, D.C. I will sorely miss the fine friends and stimulating experiences I have gained at the Naval War College. I look forward to a continuing
association with the College and with all of you.

JAMES P. WISECUP

Rear Admiral, U.S. Navy
President, Naval War College

* George Will’s evening lecture is available on the College’s website, at www.usnwc.edu/Events/Evening
-Lectures/Evening-Lecture---George-Will---The-Political-Argume.aspx. A C-SPAN2 video of
Robert Kaplan's lecture is available at www.booktv.org/Watch/12050/Monsoon+The+Indian
+Ocean+and+the+Future+of+American+Power.aspx.
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Mr. Kostecka is a senior analyst for the U.S. Navy. In
addition to working for the Navy, Mr. Kostecka has
worked for the Department of Defense and the Government Accountability Office; he was an active-duty
Air Force officer for ten years and still serves in the Air
Force Reserve, with the rank of lieutenant colonel. Mr.
Kostecka has a master of liberal arts in military and
diplomatic history from Harvard University, a master
of arts in national security policy from the Patterson
School of Diplomacy and International Commerce at
the University of Kentucky, and a master of science
in strategic intelligence from the National Defense Intelligence College. Mr. Kostecka is also a graduate of
Squadron Officer School and the Air Command and
Staff College and is currently a student in the Air War
College distance learning program.
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FROM THE SEA
PLA Doctrine and the Employment of Sea-Based Airpower
Daniel J. Kostecka

Aircraft carriers symbolize a country’s overall strength. They are also the
core of the navy’s combined-arms sea operations. Building carriers has all
along been a matter of concern for the Chinese people. To modernize our
national defense and build a perfect weaponry and equipment system, we
have to consider the development of carriers.
ADMIRAL LIU HUAQING, MEMOIRS OF LIU HUAQING (AUGUST 2004)

D

espite an impressive naval modernization over the past two decades, the
People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) currently possesses little in the way
of force-projection capabilities.1 The development of force projection through
the acquisition of such platforms as aircraft carriers and amphibious assault ships
is essential if PLAN forces, as they modernize and mature, are to engage in the
full spectrum of traditional and nontraditional operations needed to protect
Chinese interests, regionally and abroad. At this point, the most visible manifestations of the PLAN’s desire to possess this type of force-projection capability
are its Type 071 amphibious transport dock (LPD), commissioned in November
2007; a second Type 071 hull now under construction; and, most significant, the
ongoing refurbishment of an incomplete, Soviet-built, Kuznetsov-class aircraft
carrier at Dalian. These ships represent core elements of the PLAN’s future forceprojection requirements. Along with follow-on platforms, they will provide the
capability to employ sea-based airpower and conduct expeditionary operations
beyond the range of older and less capable amphibious vessels, as well as that of
land-based air cover.
However, China’s desire to possess modern force-projection capabilities for its
navy is also the source of considerable speculation and misunderstanding. This
is particularly true for China’s aircraft carrier program. Speculation runs from
forward-leaning predictions that by the early 2020s China could have as many
as five aircraft carriers, including two nuclear-powered hulls, to a recent prediction from an Australian policy research think tank that despite evidence to the
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contrary the Chinese are not serious about building aircraft carriers, because it
would be “dumb for them to do so.”2
China’s LPD program has not generated anything like the controversy accompanying the aircraft carrier. However, it has received a significant amount of attention, if for no other reason than the type represents a modern, long-range
expeditionary platform that—unlike most of China’s other naval acquisitions of
the past two decades—seems to have been designed from the outset for missions
other than supporting an attack on Taiwan. Also, while smaller and much less
capable than a true aircraft carrier, China’s single Type 071 LPD is the PLAN’s
first true deck-aviation ship, in that unlike destroyers and frigates, it can operate
a larger number and more diverse mix of helicopters against a larger set of missions. Modern force projection is essential for China to have a sustained naval
presence away from Chinese waters, whether in the South China Sea, the Indian
Ocean, or anywhere else. Additionally, authoritative publications from the PLAN,
as well as the People’s Liberation Army’s (PLA’s) National Defense University and
Academy of Military Sciences, provide clues regarding how the navy intends to
employ these platforms in both traditional and nontraditional ways. It is necessary to understand China’s future force-projection capabilities, in light of PLA
doctrine, to predict the types of missions that Chinese aircraft carriers and large
amphibious vessels are likely to be given.
AIRCRAFT CARRIERS
Probably the most commonly cited example of China’s desire to expand its naval
power beyond Chinese coastal waters is Beijing’s pursuit of aircraft carriers capable of operating conventional fixed-wing fighter aircraft.3 The PLAN has been
interested in acquiring aircraft carriers for decades, but financial, technological,
political, and strategic constraints have prevented serious progress. Outside of
China, discussion of this issue is highly polarized, to say the least. To some, China’s pursuit of aircraft carriers represents a direct challenge to the United States
and clearly indicates that China seeks to project naval power into the Indian
Ocean and western Pacific. To others, China’s aircraft carrier program is nothing more than a quixotic exercise in national vanity; in their view, any Chinese
carrier would be nothing more than a nationalistic showpiece, with very little
operational value.
Further confusing the situation is Beijing’s own obfuscation. Despite years of
interest in aircraft carriers and, evidence indicates, experimentation with aircraft
carrier technology, as late as 2004 Chinese officials, including General Xiong
Guangkai, then deputy chief of the General Staff, stated that China did not plan
to build carriers.4 One year later, the unfinished Soviet Kuznetsov-class aircraft
carrier Varyag, which China had purchased from Ukraine in 1998, went into dry
dock at Dalian Shipyard, in northern China, for an extensive refit that continues
https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol64/iss3/21
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at this writing. Today anyone with access to the internet can track the extensive modifications to the ship in photographs posted on a number of blogs and
websites. Five years after the ship first entered dry dock, even the most skeptical
observers are convinced that China intends to put the ship into operation in the
not-very-distant future.
Roughly coincident with work on Varyag, Chinese rhetoric on this issue has
shifted considerably, with officials and the media discussing aircraft carriers with
increasing candor.5 These include positive statements in April 2009 regarding aircraft carriers by Defense Minister Liang Guanglie and Admiral Wu Shengli, commander of the PLAN, as well as a March 2010 editorial in the English-language
version of the Global Times stating that it was time for the world to prepare for a
Chinese aircraft carrier.6 Earlier, in November 2008, Major General Qian Lihua
of the PLA had asserted China’s right to possess an aircraft carrier: “The question
is not whether you have an aircraft carrier, but what you do with your aircraft
carrier. . . . Even if one day we have an aircraft carrier, unlike another country, we
will not use it to pursue global deployment or global reach.”7
In addition to Varyag, China is also developing the aircraft that will compose
the ship’s air wing. Press and internet reports claim China is producing a Chinese
carrier fighter based on the Russian Su-33 Flanker D, designated the J-15; according to one website, the first prototype of this aircraft made its maiden flight on 31
August 2009 and its first takeoff from a land-based “ski jump” (runway ending in
an upward ramp) on 6 May 2010.8 While the exact dates of these flights cannot
be confirmed, recent internet pictures show a Chinese Flanker-variant prototype
in flight with the same canards and shortened tail stinger as the Russian carriercapable Su-33; a video of the prototype flying is also on the web. While externally
the J-15 appears to be a near copy of the Su-33, internally it likely possesses the
same radar and avionics as China’s domestically produced land-based Flanker,
the J-11B. It will probably be capable of employing a full suite of China’s most advanced air-to-air and air-to-ground munitions, including the PL-12 active-radarhoming, medium-range, air-to-air missile.9
As an airborne-early-warning (AEW) platform, China may acquire, according
to the Russian press, nine Ka-31 AEW helicopters. However, internet photographs
indicate that China has fielded a prototype AEW variant of the Z-8 medium-lift
helicopter.10 It is unknown which will be chosen as the primary AEW helicopter
for the PLAN’s aircraft carrier force. It is possible the PLAN sees an indigenous
platform based on the Z-8 as a long-term solution, with Ka-31s from Russia as
gap fillers. Alternatively, the Z-8 prototype could also be a test bed for an AEW
variant of a more modern helicopter, such as the developmental Z-15.11 Any of
these would be much less capable than a fixed-wing AEW platform, such as the
America E-2C Hawkeye.
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PLA THEORY AND AIRCRAFT CARRIER EMPLOYMENT
How the PLAN would employ an aircraft carrier is open to speculation; these
versatile platforms can perform a variety of missions. The development in China
of a theoretical construct of how the PLAN would employ aircraft carriers dates
back to at least the early 1970s, when Liu Huaqing led a feasibility study on the
construction of aircraft carriers. Later, as the service’s commander (from 1982 to
1988), Admiral Liu pushed for the serious study of aircraft carrier design, asserting that given China’s more than three million square kilometers of sea territory,
aircraft carriers were necessary to safeguard the nation’s rights and interests at sea,
enhance national prestige, and add to the nation’s peacetime deterrent posture.12
In 1987, Admiral Liu directed the establishment at the Guangzhou Naval Vessels
Academy of a course to train PLAN pilots to command surface combatants; the
first class of nine officers graduated with bachelor’s degrees in ship command in
1991.13 Apparently, the PLAN has chosen to follow the American model of selecting its aircraft carrier commanding officers from the naval aviation community.
After commanding the PLAN, Admiral Liu served as vice chairman of the Central
Military Commission (from 1989 until retirement in 1997); there he continued
to argue the case for aircraft carriers.14
More recently, authoritative PLA publications on this issue, including 战役
学 (Science of Campaigns, in 2000 and 2006 editions) and 战役理论学习指南
(Campaign Theory Study Guide), provide clues into Chinese thinking on this issue. It is possible, by studying these and other publications, to glean insights into
how the PLAN is thinking about employing aircraft carriers operationally.
It is in the South China Sea that one should expect first to see the PLAN employ
aircraft carriers. While China’s military modernization is primarily geared to deterring independence-minded forces on Taiwan, the only combat that the PLAN
has actually engaged in over the past forty years has been in the South China Sea.
These clashes occurred in 1974, when Chinese forces captured the Paracel Islands from South Vietnam; in 1988, when PLAN forces captured Johnson Reef in
the Spratly Islands and sank three Vietnamese supply vessels; and in 1995, when
PLAN forces occupied Mischief Reef, claimed by the Philippines.15 Recent statements from Beijing—in response to expressions of concern from Washington
over competing maritime claims there and the potential threat to navigation—
regarding China’s sovereignty over islands and surrounding waters in the South
China Sea have brought new and increased international attention to this area of
key Chinese national interest.16 China claims a substantial portion of the South
China Sea as its territorial waters, and competition is growing among the nations of the region over fishing waters and potential oil and natural-gas deposits.
Accordingly, the PLAN has a need for an ability to project force and to employ
sea-based airpower against enemy-held islands and reefs. PLA doctrine clearly
https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol64/iss3/21
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lists providing air cover to landing operations as a primary wartime mission, a
mission the Chinese see for PLAN aircraft carriers. Both editions of Science of
Campaigns discuss the importance of aircraft carriers in providing air cover to
amphibious invasions against islands and reefs beyond the range of land-based
aircraft, a clear reference to their potential use in the South China Sea. The 2000
edition points to the employment of USS Independence (CV 62) in this role during Operation URGENT FURY, the 1983 invasion of Grenada.17
Science of Campaigns also clearly states that three-dimensional attacks are essential to executing the PLA’s “coral-island-assault campaign” (对珊瑚岛礁进攻
战役) against islands and reefs in the South China Sea during a regional conflict.
The 2006 edition of the book, which first detailed this campaign, discusses requirements for effective seaborne
command and control, threeOverall, it is likely that China views the pridimensional encirclement, and the
mary role of its carriers as regional in nature
complex logistics support required
—defending China’s maritime claims in
for assaults on coral islands and
East Asia.
reefs far from the mainland.18 An
aircraft carrier, with its fighter and rotary-wing aviation assets and commandand-control facilities, would be tailor-made for the purpose. Additionally, even
one or two carriers would be sufficient to enforce China’s territorial claims in
the South China Sea against such competitors as Vietnam, the Philippines, or
Malaysia, should Beijing attempt again to acquire territory as it did in 1974, 1988,
and 1995.
A similar analysis appears in a book published in 1998, Winning High-Tech
Local Wars: Must Reading for Military Officers. It asserts that amphibious forces
engaged in “long distance” landing operations should be protected by one or two
aircraft carrier groups stationed 100–150 nautical miles from the shore of the
objective. In this discussion it is apparent the authors had in mind non-Taiwan
landing operations, since the Taiwan Strait is only about one hundred nautical
miles wide.19 Royal Navy aircraft carriers in the Falklands War in 1982 (despite
their small and austere air groups) and British and French carriers in the 1957
Suez crisis (notwithstanding air wings less capable than those of contemporary
U.S. carriers) demonstrated that even limited carrier-based airpower can be crucial in regional conflicts beyond the range of effective land-based air cover.20
Campaign Theory Study Guide discusses the employment of aircraft carriers to protect sea lines of communication (SLOCs) in a “sea-traffic-protection
campaign.” As evidenced by the ongoing deployment of PLAN warships to the
Gulf of Aden, this campaign is increasing in importance for the Chinese. In its
support, Campaign Theory Study Guide argues that the PLA should develop a
mixed fleet, with an aircraft carrier, missile destroyers, and nuclear-powered
Published by U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons, 2011
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attack submarines. The guide describes a number of missions to be executed for
sea-traffic protection, including air defense and antisubmarine and antishipping
warfare, all capabilities that an aircraft carrier could bring to the campaign. A
carrier group could also control designated sea areas to ensure the safe passage
of merchant ships and air forces are considered a key component of what the
authors term “zone cover” forces.21 Additionally, while the sea-traffic-protection
campaign is described as defensive, all PLA defensive campaigns have offensive
components. In this case, PLA doctrine describes the importance of organizing
sea and air forces to attack enemy elements that pose a threat to sea transport.22
While carrier-based aviation would not carry sole responsibility for such offensive operations, it could provide a valuable supplement to surface ships, submarines, and land-based aircraft, depending on the type of threat and the proximity
of operating areas to Chinese bases.
Beyond specific mentions of aircraft carriers in PLA doctrine, books like Science of Campaigns and Campaign Theory Study Guide are replete with references
to the employment of air forces for air defense and offensive strike, including
in a Taiwan contingency. In the latter scenario, the missions discussed for both
the PLA Air Force (PLAAF) and PLAN aviation can likely be handled with landbased aircraft. However, in non-Taiwan contingencies fought in the maritime domain farther from the Chinese mainland, it may be necessary to meet air requirements at least in part with sea-based aviation. Science of Campaigns discusses the
employment of naval air forces for both strike and air-superiority missions in
the antiship and counter-sea-traffic campaigns. Additionally, Air Raid and Anti–
Air Raid in the 21st Century (2002) discusses the importance of long-range fleet
bomber and fighter forces in counterstrike operations in the joint anti-air-raid
campaign, specifically in attacking sea-based flight decks and in providing air
defense for warships.23 While none of these references refers specifically to seabased aviation, the stated requirement for naval aviation in these campaigns can
be seen as an implicit reference to aircraft carriers, due to the limitations of landbased airpower in long-range maritime operations.
Overall, it is likely that China views the primary role of its carriers as regional
in nature—defending China’s maritime claims in East Asia. This is consistent
with PLA doctrine, which envisions the use of carriers in providing air cover
to long-distance landing operations, primarily in the context of scenarios in the
South China Sea. Discussion of the employment of aircraft carriers in the seatraffic-protection campaign is applicable to a wider set of scenarios. However,
it is in the South China Sea, with its disputed maritime claims and potential
threats to Chinese shipping even in regional conflicts in which China is neutral,
that aircraft carriers would most likely be employed to protect China’s SLOCs. A
primarily regional role for aircraft carriers is also consistent with the theme in
https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol64/iss3/21
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official and unofficial Chinese media of the need for carriers to protect China’s
extensive maritime territory in the East and South China Seas. As one Shanghaibased military expert states, “Our carrier will definitely not engage with powerful
U.S. aircraft carrier fighting groups. But it is enough to be a symbolic threat among
neighboring countries like Vietnam, Indonesia, and the Philippines who have territorial disputes with China.”24 This line of discussion is also consistent with Admiral Liu Huaqing’s primary argument for aircraft carriers.25 Rear Admiral Zhang
Zhaozhang elaborated in April 2009:
The Chinese navy does not need to fight in the Atlantic Ocean, the Indian Ocean
or at the center of the Pacific Ocean. The Chinese navy follows a proactive defense
strategy. However, in order to defend the security of the national territory, marine
territories, and the waters within the First Island Chain, this proactive defense strategy does not mean that our navy only stays within the First Island Chain. Only when
the Chinese navy goes beyond the First Island Chain, will China be able to expand its
strategic depth of security for its marine territories.26

It is highly unlikely for three reasons that China will seek to use its carriers to
assert U.S.-style sea dominance in the Indian Ocean or elsewhere in what Chinese sources term “far-seas operations.”27 First, current estimates are that China
is going to build three or four carriers. Since it is highly unlikely that all of them
will be combat ready at the same time, they would find themselves outnumbered and outgunned by the Indian Navy. India itself is looking to field a force
of three aircraft carriers, but in the Indian Ocean they would be supported by
land-based airpower, including AEW and intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance platforms. They could call on India’s fleet of submarines for additional
support. China’s carriers, by contrast, would be operating beyond the support of
land-based airpower, with at best minimal support from China’s small force of
nuclear-powered attack submarines.28 This also does not even address the possibility of American involvement, which would only make the situation less tenable
for PLAN carrier groups operating in the Indian Ocean in wartime. Additionally,
even if all of China’s carriers were combat ready, security concerns nearer home
would likely preclude the PLAN’s surging all of its carriers and their escorts into
the Indian Ocean, leaving the PLAN significantly weakened vis-à-vis powerful
East Asian competitors.
Second, there is also the question of just how much combat capability PLAN
carriers will bring to a traditional force-on-force conflict. It can be safely assumed
that at the very least the PLAN’s first two carriers (to include ex-Varyag), and
possibly later ones, will employ a short takeoff but arrested recovery (STOBAR)
—that is, a ski-jump design. This represents a significant limitation, because
ski-jump-equipped carriers are far less capable than U.S. Navy–style catapultassisted takeoff but arrested recovery (CATOBAR) ships, which employ powerful
Published by U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons, 2011

Kostecka.indd 17

23

4/19/2011 2:03:23 PM

18

Naval War College Review, Vol. 64 [2011], No. 3, Art. 21

N AVA L WA R C O L L E G E R E V I E W

steam catapults to launch heavily laden fighter and strike aircraft. STOBAR carriers are forced to operate rotary-wing AEW platforms, which are far less capable
than fixed-wing AEW aircraft in terms of range, operating altitude, and the size of
the radars they can carry, thereby severely inhibiting the situational awareness of
a battle group. For regional operations (e.g., in the South China Sea) this would
not be as much of a problem, because PLAN carriers could count on support
from land-based AEW aircraft like the KJ-2000 and KJ-200, now in service in
the PLAAF. In the Indian Ocean this would likely not be the case. Recent internet
reporting claims China has fielded a prototype fixed-wing AEW platform based
on the twin-engine Y-7 transport, which is at least superficially similar to the U.S.
E-2C, indicating the potential for future carrier use.29 This raises the possibility
that China is looking to field CATOBAR carriers in the future and that its carrier
force will ultimately include a mix of CATOBAR and STOBAR ships. However,
the Y-7 is considerably larger than the E-2C, itself a challenging aircraft to operate off the U.S. Navy’s large carriers. This means that if China is going to field a
carrier-capable AEW platform based on the Y-7, the airframe will likely require
significant modifications before it is ready for employment at sea.30
Third, although the J-15 itself may be able to employ a wide variety of air-toair and air-to-surface munitions, fighters operating from STOBAR carriers are
limited in the fuel and weapons they can carry and so primarily defend their
battle groups, rather than acting offensively. Again, in a regional conflict where
land-based strike aircraft (such as the JH-7A, H-6G, J-11B, and Su-30MKK/MK2)
can be called upon for offensive strikes, this is not a big problem. Outside of East
Asia, however, China could not use land-based strike aircraft without air bases in
foreign nations.31 STOBAR carriers, for their part, cannot generate as many sorties as CATOBAR carriers, because they cannot simultaneously launch multiple
aircraft, and the Kuznetsov and similar designs cannot carry air groups as large as
those of American carriers.32
These disadvantages, however, are not crucial for regional force projection,
because land-based airpower would be available. PLAN carriers, therefore, would
likely operate against opponents like Vietnam, in a supporting role—antishipping,
island seizure, and sea-traffic protection—as opposed to serving as the centerpiece
of offensive fleets deployed thousands of miles beyond Chinese waters.
VERTICAL ASSAULT: AMPHIBIOUS AIRPOWER
With approximately sixty ships of the type displacing over a thousand tons, including twenty-six landing ships, tank (LSTs) of over four thousand tons, as well
as numerous smaller craft, the PLAN possesses one of the world’s largest amphibious assault forces. However, it has very little capacity for vertical assault, due
to a lack of deck-based aviation. Modernization of this force over the past two
https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol64/iss3/21
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decades has been steady, with the arrival of Type 072II and 072III LSTs and Type
073IV landing ships, medium (LSMs). However, since most of the new ships have
replaced older and less capable ships, overall lift capacity has not increased significantly; it is currently no more than two divisions’ worth of troops (depending
on the combat loadout).33 This is nowhere near enough to execute an amphibious assault against Taiwan, which would have to be a combined-arms landing on
a scale similar to that of the Normandy invasion of June 1944. However, China
could employ its current force of LSTs and LSMs in island-assault scenarios, such
as the seizure of one of Taiwan’s offshore islands (perhaps Jinmen or Matsu) or
of small islands in the South China Sea in a conflict with Vietnam
How the PLAN would employ an aircraft
or the Philippines. However, their
carrier is open to speculation; these versatile
shallow draft and lack of aviation
platforms can perform a variety of missions.
facilities (LSTs have helicopter
landing pads but not hangars) make them less than ideal for assault operations
beyond China’s littoral, such as in a coral-island campaign, and wholly unsuited
for long-range expeditionary operations beyond East Asian waters or for nontraditional security operations, such as humanitarian assistance and disaster relief
(HA/DR).34 An article in the July 2010 edition of 舰船知识 (Naval and Merchant
Ships) states that large amphibious assault ships are necessary for contemporary
distant-sea operations, HA/DR, and amphibious missions against islands far
from naval and air bases, where such ships would serve as platforms for smaller
amphibious vessels, vertical assault, and command and control.35
China’s intention to address the gap in the PLAN’s modern long-range expeditionary capability was first made public on 22 December 2006, with the launching
of the Type 071 Kunlunshan (LPD 998).36 The Type 071 LPD offers a significant
increase in lift capacity and, just as important, the capability to employ a small
but flexible air group of helicopters in assault and attack roles. With its long range
and large capacity, the Type 071 LPD can operate far from China’s shores, engaging in a wide range of missions, from amphibious assault and vertical envelopment (the insertion of troops by airdrop or air landing) to humanitarian aid to
areas stricken by natural disasters and evacuation of Chinese citizens trapped in
war-torn nations.37 However, with only one ship operational and a second under
construction, long-range assault capability is still quite limited. It is unknown
how many LPDs the PLAN intends to build, with estimates ranging from two
ships to eight.38
In addition to the Type 071 LPD, the press reports that China plans to build
the Type 081 LHD (helicopter assault ship), similar in size and capability to the
French Mistral-class LHD, or approximately half the size of the U.S. Navy Wasp
class. In June 2007, American defense analyst Richard Fisher, of the International
Published by U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons, 2011
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Assessment and Strategy Center, reported that Chinese sources at an international maritime trade show in Singapore (IMDEX-07) claimed that the Type 081
LHD would displace approximately twenty thousand tons, have the capacity to
transport five hundred troops, and be configured for helicopter-based vertical
assault.39 A three-part series of articles in the Chinese journal 当代海军 (Modern
Navy) asserts the importance of developing a balanced force of amphibious assault ships of both the LPD and LHD types, due to their complementary capabilities, citing the U.S. Navy’s force of LPDs, LSDs, and LHA/LHDs as an example.40
Chinese authorities, including Admiral Liu, have also speculated on the utility
of helicopter carriers, either as versatile platforms in themselves or as steppingstones to aircraft carriers proper.41
Beyond press speculation, very little is known about the Type 081 program
in terms of how many platforms the PLAN will acquire (if any) or what capabilities they would possess. Chinese sources at IMDEX-07 stated that China had
the capability to construct a helicopter assault ship of the type. This is no doubt
true, given likely similarities in hull design between the Types 071 and 081. The
July 2010 Naval and Merchant Ships article already mentioned calls for a Chinese
LHD that would approximate the USS Wasp class in size (approximately forty
thousand tons) and capability (up to forty helicopters and one thousand troops)
but without the specialized facilities to operate fixed-wing aircraft (for Wasp, the
V-22, AV-8B, and F-35, or Joint Strike Fighter).42 In any case, China has yet to begin
construction on such a platform, much less integration into its force structure.43
FUTURE EMPLOYMENT OPTIONS
The highest projections for modern Chinese amphibious assault ships are for
eight Type 071 LPDs and six Type 081 LHDs, but American, Indian, and Taiwanese defense analysts have all assessed that the PLAN will acquire six Type 071s and
three Type 081s. Fisher claims that China intends to build three amphibious task
groups, each based around one Type 081 and two 071s.44 It is possible (perhaps
likely) that these analysts obtained their information from the same source—they
may even be quoting one another—and that the projection of three Type 081
LHDs and six Type 071 LPDs probably represents a high-end estimate for the
Chinese navy’s future long-range amphibious force. A force of this size would
permit the PLAN to field something akin to three American-style expeditionary strike groups, if it desired to organize its forces in such a manner. While this
sounds impressive, in reality it represents enough lift for only between 4,500 and
6,500 troops, about one of the South Sea Fleet’s two marine brigades. Moreover,
that estimate assumes that all of the ships are operational and fully mission capable at the same time, a rare occurrence in any navy. It should also be noted
that such a force could employ in total between forty and seventy helicopters of
https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol64/iss3/21
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various types, depending on mission requirements. Yet the PLAN only has about
thirty-five rotary-wing aircraft of all types, most of which are smaller Z-9 and
Ka-28 helicopters, geared toward antisubmarine warfare and search and rescue.45
The PLAN’s current inventory of fifteen Z-8 medium-lift helicopters is wholly inadequate to support an expanded force of amphibious-assault vessels. The PLAN
needs to address this weakness if it is to field a robust vertical-assault capability.
The entrance into service of additional Z-8s, a more modern heavy-lift design
reported to be in development, or a militarized version of the modern medium
utility helicopter, the Z-15, currently in codevelopment with Eurocopter, might
help in this regard.46
While some analysts speculate that one of the primary missions of China’s future fleet of oceangoing amphibious vessels would be to contribute to an invasion
of Taiwan (providing a credible means to assault Taiwan’s east coast), it is unlikely
the PLAN envisions a Taiwan scenario as the primary mission for LPD 998 or
any future vessels of similar capacity. First, while the notion of employing such
vessels against Taiwan’s exposed eastern side is intriguing at first glance, it would
mean deploying a significant number of the PLAN’s most modern warships
—not only its most modern assault ships but also escort vessels—into the Philippine Sea, where they would be highly vulnerable to U.S. attack submarines. Second, as stated above, even three LHDs and six LPDs would be able to carry only
about a brigade of marines. The Chinese would need far more, as well as the necessary supplies, in order to present a credible threat and sustain operations once
a bridgehead was established. The lift that would be needed is far beyond even
the most forward-leaning estimates of China’s intentions. Third, it is unlikely the
PLAN would be willing to risk these vessels as part of a more conventional assault across the narrow confines of the Taiwan Strait, where they would be at risk
from Taiwan navy fast attack craft and coastal-defense antiship cruise missiles.
Fourth, the fact that LPD 998 is in not the East Sea Fleet but the South Sea Fleet
(based almost twice as far from the Philippine Sea, where it would need to operate to assault Taiwan’s east coast) is highly suggestive of the platform’s roles and
missions. Future ships in this class could be based with the East Sea Fleet, but the
operational problems stated above would still apply.
As with aircraft carriers, for the missions of the Type 071 LPD and similar future
platforms one needs to look to the South China Sea and not to Taiwan. Campaign
Theory Study Guide, Science of Campaigns, and Winning High-Tech Local Wars
all discuss the use of rotary-wing forces in the vertical-envelopment role. While
China’s military modernization is primarily aimed at deterring independenceminded forces on Taiwan, it is to the three-dimensional assault role in the PLA’s
coral-island-assault campaign, beyond the range of land-based helicopters,
that large assault ships such as LPDs and LHDs are best suited.47 Their aviation
Published by U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons, 2011
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capabilities, large troop- and cargo-carrying capacity, and command-and-control
facilities are ideal for this sort of campaign.48 In November 2008 and June 2009,
for instance, LPD 998, in the company of destroyers, frigates, and supply ships,
conducted long-distance patrols of the disputed waters in the Spratly Islands;
PLAN marines carried out at least one island-seizure exercise. This is suggestive
of the primary operational orientation of this warship.49
China could employ aircraft carriers in a similar way. It is unlikely that the
PLAN, apparently planning an LHD type, views vertical-assault operations as a
primary mission for an aircraft carrier. Nonetheless, vertical assault represents a
legitimate and proven use for carriers. The U.S. Navy has often employed them
in this role. Notable examples include the launching of helicopters from USS
Nimitz (CVN 68) in 1980 for Operation EAGLE CLAW, the failed mission to rescue American hostages in Iran; RESTORE DEMOCRACY in Haiti in 1994, when
USS Dwight D. Eisenhower (CVN 69) embarked soldiers and helicopters from the
10th Mountain Division; and the early stages of ENDURING FREEDOM in 2001,
when USS Kitty Hawk (CV 63) served as the “afloat forward staging base” for U.S.
Army and Air Force special-operations troops and helicopters.50 The author of
“How Big a Role Do Aircraft Carriers Play in Noncombat Operations?,” published
in 2009, discusses the role of Eisenhower off Haiti in 1994, arguing that it is sometimes necessary to reorganize a carrier’s air group for nontraditional security missions, removing some or all of its fixed-wing aircraft to make room for additional
helicopters.51
Additionally, there are references in Campaign Theory Study Guide to the use
of helicopter-carrying vessels (e.g., converted merchant ships, as mentioned in
the sea-traffic-protection campaign) to conduct a variety of missions.52 Amphibious assault ships, particularly LHDs, with their rotary-wing aviation capabilities,
could represent valuable supplements to aircraft carriers and other surface combatants engaged in SLOC protection. The recent deployment of LPD 998 to the
Gulf of Aden for counterpiracy operations with a mix of Z-8 and Z-9 helicopters
specially fitted with gun and rocket pods was an excellent example of such a use
of an assault ship in sea-traffic protection. Throughout the PLAN counterpiracy
mission, helicopters have been crucial for shuttling special-operations forces to
merchant ships and in warding off suspicious boats.53 LPD 998, employing Z-8s,
can accomplish these missions more effectively than destroyers and frigates employing smaller Z-9s and Ka-28s.
NONTRADITIONAL SECURITY MISSIONS FOR SEA-BASED AIRPOWER
In addition to combat missions in regional conflicts, it is likely that China views
aircraft carriers and large assault ships as important platforms for nontraditional security missions. As stated above, the best example so far is the decision to
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deploy LPD 998 on counterpiracy duty in the Gulf of Aden as part of China’s
sixth counterpiracy rotation. Other nontraditional missions include maritime
antiterrorism, prevention of maritime transportation of weapons of mass destruction, maritime peacekeeping, HA/DR, and noncombatant evacuation operations (NEOs). While it is unlikely that the PLAN views such missions as primary
roles, these are tasks that navies often find themselves engaged in on a day-today basis. Nontraditional security missions also provide a useful occasion for the
PLAN to operate in East Asian waters and beyond in a manner that does not inflame “China threat” rhetoric. In fact, they would present China as a responsible
state that takes international-security issues seriously and is willing to promote
cooperation and stability.54 These missions also provide useful on-the-job training for the PLAN; Captain Xu Ping writes in the influential journal 中国军事科
学 (China Military Science) that nonwar military actions are becoming one of the
best forms of training, testing, and enhancing the core military functions that are
necessary for winning local wars under “informatized” conditions.55
A significant example is humanitarian assistance and disaster relief. It is
known that China was embarrassed in the aftermath of the 26 December 2004
Indian Ocean tsunami when the PLAN was obliged by a lack of suitable platforms
to stand on the sidelines as several other countries, including the United States,
Japan, India, and Thailand, deployed naval forces to provide humanitarian relief.
As China develops its force of amphibious assault ships and eventually aircraft
carriers, it is likely that they will be employed in HA/DR in East Asia and outside
China’s regional seas in areas such as the Indian Ocean. One Chinese article discussing the role of naval forces in disaster relief specifically names Cyclone Nargis
(which struck Burma on 27 April 2008). An article on the 2004 tsunami, which
struck Indonesia primarily, points out that the tidal waves also hit India and Sri
Lanka.56 The deployment of a task group built around one or more assault vessels
to the Indian Ocean to provide disaster relief could go a long way in quieting fears
of a growing regional Chinese military presence. Participation in HA/DR operations in the Indian Ocean would also allow the PLAN to establish an increased
presence in the region in a nonintrusive, even friendly, manner that would likely
find approval within the international community. Additionally, like the ongoing
counterpiracy deployments, such missions would provide valuable experience in
operating in close proximity to other major naval forces.57
While aircraft carriers lack some of the specialized support and logistics capabilities of amphibious assault ships for HA/DR operations, China will still likely
employ its carriers for this mission in East Asia and possibly farther abroad. Chinese commentators have noted the important role that USS Abraham Lincoln
(CVN 72) played in relief operations after the Indonesian tsunami in 2004. The
participation of the light carrier USS Saipan (CVL 48) in disaster relief in the
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Caribbean and Mexico in 1954 and 1955 is also discussed.58 While the launching
of even a single, refurbished, Soviet-era aircraft carrier will cause some to point
to a growing China threat, the positive news of the deployment of a PLAN aircraft
carrier to a coastal disaster area in East Asia will be a diplomatic counterweight
to all but the most extreme trepidations. As Professors Andrew Erickson and Andrew Wilson of the U.S. Naval War College state, “The aftermath of the 2004
tsunami has convinced many Chinese that good carriers make good neighbors
and they are a necessity if China’s force structure available for deployment to
Southeast Asia is to match and complement its diplomatic initiatives.”59
Beyond HA/DR, aircraft carriers and modern amphibious assault ships are well
suited to a variety of other nontraditional security operations as well. The October 2008 issue of Modern Navy featured a spirited debate among three Chinese
naval experts (including Senior
Captain Li Jie of the Navy Military
Modern force projection is essential for China
Studies Research Institute) regardto have a sustained naval presence away from
ing the advantages of amphibious
Chinese waters, whether in the South China
assault ships over aircraft carriers.
Sea, the Indian Ocean, or anywhere else.
The discussion revolves around
the suitability of amphibious assault ships in such operations as maritime antiterrorism, counterpiracy, prevention of maritime transportation of weapons of
mass destruction, and maritime peacekeeping, Li arguing that using an aircraft
carrier to execute such missions is like using an “ox cleaver to kill a chicken.”60
Li also points out that amphibious assault ships appear far less threatening than
aircraft carriers, while providing greater flexibility afforded by their air and seabased assault capabilities and extensive medical facilities.61 Another article in the
same published debate states, “Amphibious warships are able to shoulder or accomplish most of the tasks done by mid to small-size aircraft carriers, and are
even able to engage in tasks that some of the carriers are unable to do.”62
It is in nontraditional security missions that China would likely employ aircraft carriers and amphibious assault vessels in “far seas” operations. There is no
evidence that China is developing sufficient force projection to launch a major
offensive against another state; the level of capability it is likely seeking would be
sufficient for a variety of other missions. Since late December 2008 the PLAN has
maintained two warships (destroyers or frigates) and one supply ship in the Gulf
of Aden in counterpiracy patrol, as well as, recently, LPD 998. These ships have
escorted a substantial number of merchant vessels and deterred some pirate attacks, but they lack the capability to take firm action against pirate bases ashore
should they be called upon to do so. United Nations Security Council Resolution
(UNSCR) 1851, passed unanimously in December 2008, authorizes operations
against pirate bases on land in Somalia.63 No nation has taken such action under
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UNSCR 1851, but should the Chinese decide to do so, the small helicopters and
modest special-operations troops now deployed with the destroyers and frigates would be insufficient. LPD 998, with its larger Z-8 helicopters and LCACs
(landing craft, air cushion), would make a PLAN group capable of acting under
UNSCR 1851. Should the international community attempt to address piracy in
Somalia by deploying a multinational force for peacekeeping and nation building, PLAN amphibious assault ships could offer transportation and logistics support to PLA soldiers involved.
Protecting Chinese citizens in nations bordering the Indian Ocean is another
task that PLAN expeditionary units could carry out. It is estimated that over five
million Chinese citizens live and work overseas, including forty-five thousand
in Nigeria, twenty-four thousand in Sudan, ten thousand in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, and ten thousand in Pakistan. Chinese citizens living in
unstable countries like these are increasingly at risk. In April 2007, seven Chinese
oil workers were killed in Ethiopia; another five were abducted and murdered in
Sudan in 2008. In 2004 three Chinese engineers were murdered in Gwadar, while
in 2007 a busload of Chinese construction engineers was bombed in southwestern Baluchistan, killing several policemen.64 Most recently, in July 2010 Chinese
oil workers staying at a hotel in Gwadar were subjected to a rocket attack.65 Also,
about half of the approximately two thousand Chinese soldiers currently deployed on UN peacekeeping missions are in Sudan and the Democratic Republic
of the Congo, nations where future instability could lead to a requirement for
sea-based support.66
In May 2007 China’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) established a division
of consular protection within the Department of Consular Affairs, MFA’s largest department, with 140 staff in Beijing and more than six hundred at overseas
consulates. Although diplomatic channels have secured the release of kidnapped
Chinese citizens, including nine people in Nigeria in 2007 and twenty-five Chinese sailors on the pirated coal carrier Dexinhai (released in December 2009 after payment of a four-million-dollar ransom), growing Chinese nationalism and
confidence in the military could put pressure on Beijing to take more muscular
action in the future.67 A naval task group built around one or more large amphibious vessels would be crucial in conducting a NEO or in providing over-thehorizon support to Chinese peacekeepers. Amphibious assault ships would bring
a wide range of capabilities to such a task, including diverse air wings, made up
of transport, rescue, and attack helicopters; task group command and control;
medical facilities; and marines and soldiers supplemented by specialists such as
engineers and medical personnel.
The February and March 2011 deployment of a single PLAN frigate and four
PLAAF Il-76 transports to support a Chinese NEO in war-torn Libya are excellent
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examples of the PLA’s need for greater expeditionary capability. While this mission represents the first time China deployed military forces to support a NEO,
the PLA’s contribution to the mission was unimpressive. By the time PLAN and
PLAAF forces arrived in theater, over 90 percent of the approximately thirty-five
thousand Chinese citizens in Libya had already been evacuated, using chartered
commercial ferries and aircraft. The mission generated a great deal of positive
publicity for the PLA in the largest evacuation of Chinese citizens from a foreign country since the founding of the People’s Republic, and it demonstrated
the PLA’s ability to respond quickly to execute its mission. However, the small
role played by China’s military forces in this operation highlights its lack of substantive long-range expeditionary capabilities. That said, an indicator of a more
robust role for the PLA in this type of mission is this March 2011 statement
from Major General Luo Yuan of the Academy of Military Sciences in the Chinese newspaper Xinhua: “If there’s an emergency and there are a huge number of
overseas Chinese needing to be evacuated, then it’s quite necessary for the army
to step in and help the government get them out.”
Given the likelihood that the primary focus of China’s future aircraft carrier fleet will be regional, any deployments of Chinese carrier groups outside the
western Pacific will probably be to support nontraditional security missions or
establish a peacetime presence. While not as useful as large amphibious assault
ships for NEOs, counterpiracy, support to peacekeeping, and the like, carriers
could provide air cover or rotary-wing support to Chinese forces engaged in
these missions were it necessary. A carrier group deployed near a nation where
Chinese citizens were threatened could also serve as a powerful instrument of
diplomacy. Further, if the commitment elsewhere or unreadiness of other forces
required, a carrier (though not ideally suited to the role) could put assault forces
ashore against pirate lairs. The use of Kitty Hawk as an afloat forward staging base
in 2001 for special-operations forces is instructive in this regard. China could
also deploy carrier groups to the Indian Ocean periodically on goodwill cruises
and bilateral or multilateral exercises. That peacetime presence might support
nations important to China’s position in the region, such as Pakistan and Sudan,
or effectively assert to regional actors that China’s interests and concerns are not
to be ignored.
China’s navy currently possesses only a modest long-range force-projection capability. However, between now and 2020 the acquisition of aircraft carriers and
additional amphibious assault vessels will give it a robust capacity for expeditionary and force-projection operations in East Asia. It will also give the PLAN the
ability to engage in small or medium-sized missions of these kinds both in and
beyond East Asia—particularly in support of nontraditional security missions,
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such as counterpiracy, support to peacekeeping forces, noncombatant evacuation, humanitarian assistance and disaster relief, and peacetime presence. While
the PLAN’s overall expeditionary potential will likely be closer to that of the British and French navies than that of the U.S. Navy, its aircraft carrier and amphibious forces will still likely be the most powerful of any East Asian nation. A force
of this size will not be sufficient to project force beyond East Asian waters, but it
should be enough to protect China’s regional maritime interests and contribute
significantly to Chinese diplomacy outside East Asia.
While it cannot be predicted with certainty how China will seek to employ its
aircraft carriers and modern amphibious assault ships, authoritative open-source
publications offer important insight into the potential operational roles of these
platforms in both wartime and peacetime. More important, these writings clearly
show that the Chinese military is aware of the flexibility of aircraft carriers and
modern assault ships and likely views them as more than simply “one mission”
platforms. Instead, they suggest, it will seek to employ them in a variety of traditional and nontraditional security missions in order to accomplish “diversified
military tasks.”68
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A NEW CARRIER RACE?
Strategy, Force Planning, and JS Hyuga
Vice Admiral Yoji Koda, Japan Maritime Self-Defense Force (Retired)

O

n 18 March 2009 JS Hyuga (DDH 181) was commissioned and delivered to
the Japan Maritime Self-Defense Force (JMSDF). The unique characteristic of this ship is its aircraft-carrier-like design, with a “through” flight deck and
an island on the starboard side. Hyuga was planned in the five-year Midterm Defense Buildup Plan (MTDBP) of 2001 and funded in Japanese fiscal year (JFY)
2004 as the replacement for the aging first-generation helicopter-carrying destroyer (DDH), JS Haruna (DDH 141), which was to reach the end of its service
life of thirty-five years in 2009. The second ship of the new class, JS Ise (DDH
182), of the JFY 2006 program, was commissioned 16 March 2011. A third DDH,
an improved sister of the Hyuga-class ships, was funded in the JFY 2010 budget.
The fourth and last DDH, most likely to be a second ship of the improved type, is
to be built in the next five-year program, from JFY 2011 to 2015 (see figure 1 and
sidebar).
Vice Admiral Yoji Koda is a graduate of Japan’s National Defense Academy, the JMSDF Officer Candidate
Several navies have built ships of this type since the
School and Naval Staff College, and, in 1992, the U.S.
mid-1990s. These ships and their navies include HMS
Naval War College. As a vice admiral he commanded
the Fleet Escort Force (2003–2004), later serving as DiOcean (L 12) of the Royal Navy, the Mistral (L 9013)
rector General of the Joint Staff Office, commandant of
and sisters of the French navy, Cavour (C 550) of the
the Sasebo JMSDF District, and as Commander in
Italian navy, Rey Juan Carlos I (L 61) of the Spanish
Chief, Self-Defense Fleet, from 2007 until his retirement
in 2008. He has written widely on history and security
navy, and two amphibious assault ships (LHDs) of the
in both Japanese and English; his most recent EnglishCanberra class in the Royal Australian Navy. In addilanguage article appeared in the Spring 2010 issue of
tion, the Republic of Korea Navy also operates Dok-do
this journal. His “Japanese Perspective on China’s Rise
as a Naval Power” appeared in the Winter 2010 issue of
(LPH 6111), which clearly belongs in this category,
the Harvard Asia Quarterly.
and it is reported that two more of the class will be
built.
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FIGURE 1

Hyuga (left) and improved sister ship
Sekai no Kansen

There are also aircraft carrier programs of other types in various navies.
These other carriers are intended more for the strike mission than for other military roles. It is reported that the Royal Navy and French navy are jointly pursuing
a new carrier program. At the same time both the People’s Liberation Army
Navy of China and the Indian navy are on track to build their own strike carriers.
This article focuses on multipurpose through-deck carriers—not strike carriers, which will not be discussed here. Specifically, it examines the related maritime and naval strategy and force-planning concept of the JMSDF, using JS
Hyuga as the focus of the analysis.
Hyuga realizes a long-lasting dream and goal of the JMSDF, which has wanted
to be a truly capable maritime force, with escort—that is, antisubmarine warfare
(ASW)—carriers. As we will see, the concept of “escort carrier” in the JMSDF
changed several times in the process that led to the construction of Hyuga.
In 1952, seven years after the end of the Second World War, the Japan Maritime Guard (JMG) was established as a rudimentary defense organization for
the nation. The leaders of the JMG were determined that the organization would
be a navy, not a reinforced coast guard. Most were combat-experienced officers
(captains and below) of the former Imperial Japanese Navy, and they had clear
understanding of the difference between a coast guard–type law-enforcement
force and a navy. Two years later, the JMG was transformed into the JMSDF, and
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with leaders whose dream to build a force that had a true naval function was
1
stronger than ever. However, they also knew the difficulty of rebuilding a real
2
navy, in light of strict constraints imposed by the new, postwar constitution.
Nonetheless, the JMSDF has built its forces and trained its sailors vigorously,
with this goal in view, and it is today one of the world’s truly capable maritime
forces in both quality and size. The commissioning of Hyuga represents another
step in its growth during the fifty-seven years since its origins in the JMG. The ship
also reflects the service’s strategy, the rationale of its force planning, and the operational concepts of its well-balanced fleet. As background, it is necessary to understand the relationship between the defense strategy of Japan and the JMSDF.
THE DEFENSE STRATEGY OF THE JMSDF
Since the founding of the Japan Self-Defense Force (JSDF) and within it the
JMSDF, in 1954, the defense strategy of Japan has been based on the JapaneseU.S. alliance. This posture was clearly established by article 4 of Japan’s Basic
Policy for National Defense, which was adopted by the National Defense Council and approved by the cabinet on 20 May 1957.3 The three major defense policy
documents that have appeared since then—National Defense Program Outlines
of 1977 and 1996 and the National Defense Program Guideline of 2005—have
all confirmed that the bases of Japan’s national security and defense are the capa4
bility of the JSDF and the Japanese-U.S. alliance.
SELF-DEFENSE FORCE BUILDING PROGRAMS
Four years after the foundation of the Self-Defense Force, the government of
Japan began midterm defense buildup programs to provide for systematic
force building and transparency for Japanese taxpayers. Data through 2009
are drawn from Boei Handbook of 2009 [Handbook for Defense 2009] (Tokyo: Asagumo Shinbunshya, 2009), pp. 17–146.
1954–57: four single-year budgets
1958–60: First DBP (three-year program)
1961: Single-year budget
1962–66: Second DBP (five years)
1967–71: Third DBP (five years)
1972–76: Fourth DBP (five years)
1977–79: Three single-year budgets (Post–Fourth DBP)
1980–84: 1978 Five-year JDA draft (not government program; to be reviewed
at the fourth year, 1983)
1983–87: 1981 Five-year JDA draft (not government program, to be reviewed
at the fourth year, 1986)
1986–90: 1986 MTDBP (five years)
1991–95: 1991 MTDBP (five years; amended in 1993)
1996–2000: 1996 MTDBP (five years; amended in 1998)
2001–2005: 2001 MTDBP (five years; amended in 2005)
2005–2009: 2005 MTDBP (five years; amended in 2009)
2010: Due to the political situation in Japan, a single-year budget was accepted by the cabinet on 17 December 2010, together with a 2010 National
Defense Program Guideline, in lieu of a five-year (2011–2015) MTDBP.
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Fully complying with this concept, the military strategy of the JSDF has been
to build and maintain the defense posture of the nation through cooperation
with U.S. forces under the alliance. Exceptions would be the outbreak of military
conflict or limited aggression against Japan, in which case the JSDF would be
solely responsible for appropriate military measures. Thus the operational concept of the JSDF with respect to the U.S. armed forces has been one of complementary mission-sharing, in which U.S. forces concentrate on offensive
operations, while the JSDF maximizes its capability for defensive operations. In
other words, the two forces form what is known as a “spear and shield”relationship.
For instance, under this policy the Japan Ground Self-Defense Force (JGSDF)
remains on Japanese territory and prepares for enemy invasion, while U.S. Army
and Marine Corps forces prepare for and conduct expeditionary operations
against enemy forces outside Japan. In case of an invasion, these three ground
forces would fight together on Japanese soil.
Similarly, the Japan Air Self-Defense Force (JASDF) is to be engaged solely in
the defense of Japanese airspace, providing overall safety and security to the Japanese people and to U.S. forces in Japan. Thus the JASDF relieves the U.S. Air
Force of the heavy burden of defense around Japan. This enables Air Force units
to allocate extra assets for strike and other operations conducted against the
enemy.
As for maritime operations, ensuring the safety and security of the waters
around Japan is the most important mission of the JMSDF. In this way the
JMSDF ensures that Japan can receive American reinforcements from across the
Pacific Ocean, guarantees the safety of U.S. naval forces operating around Japan,
and enables U.S. carrier strike groups (CSGs) to concentrate on strike operations against enemy naval forces and land targets. At the same time, for Japan, as
a country with few natural resources and little domestic food production, the
safety of merchant shipping is a matter of national survival in crisis or wartime.
All of these operations are grouped under the heading of protection of sea lines
of communication (SLOCs) in the northwestern Pacific. The JMSDF has accepted these simple realities as the essence of its strategic objectives.
Proceeding from this defense strategy, the main missions of the JMSDF have
consistently been defined as the protection of SLOCs and the defense of the
homeland in case of direct invasion. In support of this defense strategy and its
two main missions, in turn, the JMSDF has set antisubmarine warfare as its
main task. The operational concept under the Japanese-U.S. alliance is that in
case of a national or regional contingency, the U.S. Navy would deploy CSGs
into the seas surrounding Japan, to provide the strike capability lacking in the
JMSDF to oblige the enemy to give up its intention of invading Japan or attacking its SLOCs. It would be necessary to exclude firmly the enemy’s submarines,
https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol64/iss3/21
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which could pose the greatest threat to CSG operations in Japanese waters and to
the safety of the SLOCs around Japan. As a result of this logic, ASW was made
the main pillar of JMSDF missions. Even in the present security environment,
twenty years after the end of the Cold War and the threat of invasion from the
Soviet Union, two factors are unchanged—the Japanese-U.S. alliance and Japan’s dependence on imported natural resources. Therefore the protection of
SLOCs has continued to be a main mission of the JMSDF.
Homeland defense, of course, remains as a mission as well, however unlikely
its occurrence. It is based on the assumption of a direct invasion into Japan by an
enemy ground forces. This would certainly be a state of national emergency, and
each branch of the JSDF would do its best to repel the enemy. At the same time,
homeland defense operations would involve many unforeseeable factors, such as
how and where enemy forces invade and how U.S. forces would assist the JSDF;
projecting countermeasures and courses of action for all possible cases is complicated. In any case, certain operations associated with the protection of
SLOCs—for example, establishing and maintaining conditions necessary for
U.S. forces arriving in the waters around Japan—contribute also to homeland
defense.
In other words, it is inappropriate to consider separately the operations required for each mission. Accordingly, the JMSDF has made it a basic policy to
address the homeland-defense mission by giving full priority to the warfare capabilities, especially ASW, required for the SLOC-protection mission, in the belief that it can best contribute to Japan’s homeland security by defeating
invasion forces at sea.
SHIPBORNE HELICOPTERS, DESTROYERS, AND FRIGATES OF
WORLD NAVIES
In addition to the JMSDF defense strategy, some discussion of the historical development of naval helicopters, destroyers, and frigates generally is necessary to
understanding the rationale of JMSDF’s force buildup, especially in destroyers
and helicopters.
Various navies paid close attention after World War II to the improvement of
submarine capabilities, numbers, and quality, as well as to the development of
helicopters. They made sustained efforts to combine helicopters and surface vessels in order to improve antisubmarine effectiveness. Various combinations
were tested, notably with helicopter-capable surface vessels, mainly in the
United Kingdom, by the Royal Navy. Directly and indirectly influenced by such
efforts, many European navies started in the 1960s to operate small helicopters
on board destroyers (DDs) and the smaller, more specialized frigate (FF) type.
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The biggest issue was to limit the movement (mainly rolling) of surface ships
of only two or three thousand tons—a typical size in those years—enough to
make it possible to handle and operate helicopters on board. The Royal Navy had
developed successful fin stabilizers for ship’s hulls, and their use spread very
quickly. As for the shipboard helicopter, small aircraft like the Wasp and Bell 204
were used initially, followed by the Bell 212 and Lynx, with their improved performance. In recent years, however, the growth of the submarine threat and the
diversification and complexity of navy missions have led naval force planners to
recognize the limitations of small helicopters, such as poor endurance and insufficient combat systems. Therefore, most world navies are today introducing
helicopters of medium to large size, like the EH-101 and NH-90. Simultaneously, the Royal Canadian Navy has undergone a unique process in this area.
In the 1960s, it developed a concept for the embarkation of a large helicopter, the
HSS-2 (later redesignated in the U.S. Navy as the SH-3), a cutting-edge aircraft in
those days, on board its 2,500-ton destroyers. Even with fin stabilizers, a destroyersized ship could not safely handle, launch, or recover the larger HSS-2 in rough
seas. An engineering team from Canada’s navy and industry produced an onboard helicopter-handling/arresting system called Beartrap, which became indispensable. In the 1970s, the Canadian navy built four Iroquois-class DDHs of
4,500 tons, larger than previous Canadian destroyers; each could carry two
HSS-2s. This class underwent modernization in the 1990s, and three units, aged
5
more than thirty-five years, remained in active service as of December 2010.
The U.S. Navy, in contrast, did not for a long period after World War II form a
clear concept of combining DD/FF types with helicopters for antisubmarine
warfare. Instead, in 1960s and 1970s it used Essex-class aircraft carriers as ASW
carriers (CVSs), with S-2 antisubmarine maritime-patrol aircraft and HSS-1
(later known as the H-34) and HSS-2 helicopters on board. This was a superb
ASW capability, but as the Soviet Union’s submarine threat became increasingly
prominent, the U.S. steadily endeavored to strengthen its ASW capability, especially that of surface ships in conjunction with P-3 aircraft and state-of-the-art
technologies. By the early 1960s, U.S. Navy ships could project Mark 44 homing
torpedoes as far as ten thousand yards away, using the ASROC (antisubmarine
rocket) system. To extend this range to match longer detection distances, the
Americans developed the radio-controlled DASH (drone antisubmarine helicopter); however, the system was abandoned due to technological limitations
6
and poor reliability.
With the failure of DASH, the U.S. Navy started to embark small, multipurpose, manned helicopters on surface vessels. The Navy also introduced the
AN/SQR-18A variable-depth-sonar towed-array sonar system (VDS-TASS) and
added it to the existing AN/SQS-35 VDS system to detect the relatively noisy
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first-generation Soviet nuclear-powered attack submarines (SSNs)—for example, the Hotel, Echo, and November classes—and snorkeling, conventionally
powered boats. By this time the Mark 46 torpedo, with substantially improved
performance over the previous Mark 44, had become operational too.
The U.S. Navy’s concept of ASW operations was now to get initial acoustic
(“passive,” or listening) contact by VDS-TASS on board destroyers or frigates
and then develop the approximate position of the target submarine by continuous tracking. The passive-detection range of TASS is in general much greater
than that of a ship’s hull-mounted sonar used in an active mode, but also several
times greater than the maximum firing range of the ASROC. It thus gives surface
units the safety of greater distance, but without an appropriate attack weapon,
they cannot take advantage of this long-range detection. It was for this reason
that the concept of pairing ships with light helicopters was developed in the U.S.
Navy.
In a tactical ASW situation, a surface unit deploys helicopters against the contact to determine whether it is really a submarine. If it is, the helicopter fixes its
position using sonobuoys; if the submarine is identified as an enemy, the helicopter attacks it with a Mark 46 torpedo. A new helicopter was developed for not
only this sequence and type of operation but also antisurface surveillance and
targeting, search and rescue, and transport—the Light Airborne Multi-Purpose
System (LAMPS), of which the SH-2 became known as the “Mark I.”
Due to its size, the LAMPS Mark I was equipped not with dipping sonar but
with magnetic-anomaly-detection (MAD) gear, along with sonobuoys, to fix the
location of a submerged boat. Other than ASW systems, the Mark I was also
equipped with surface-surveillance radar. This radar system made LAMPS indispensable for over-the-horizon targeting of the new Harpoon surface-to-surface
missile (SSM), which had just become operational in the U.S. Navy.
The operational record of the LAMPS Mark I was highly satisfactory. All
forty-six frigates of the Knox (FF 1052) class, initially planned for DASH, were
converted to LAMPS, through redesign of their hangars and installation of
sonobuoy data-processing systems. These ships were a mainstay of American
ASW through the 1970s and 1980s.
The successor to LAMPS I, known as LAMPS Mark III, was based on the
SH-60 helicopter, a standard helicopter in all U.S. services at the time. More than
140 surface vessels embarked the SH-60, ranging from Oliver Hazard Perry–class
guided-missile frigates to “Flight IIA” Arleigh Burke–class guided-missile destroyers (DDGs), and to aircraft carriers. On board Aegis guided-missile cruisers and DDGs equipped with the Aegis combat system, the SH-60 is an
indispensable asset. It supports the AN/SQQ-89 comprehensive ASW system,
which in turn combines the AN/SQR-19 Tactical TASS (TACTASS), the
Published by U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons, 2011
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AN/SQS-53 hull-mounted sonar, and ASW-related software. The SQQ-89 is
considered to be the most advanced surface-ship ASW system in the world
today.
HELICOPTER OPERATIONS IN THE JMSDF: THE MID-1950S AND
1960S
Naval helicopters were introduced in 1953, one year after the foundation of the
JMG. In those days, all efforts were focused on obtaining a large number of surface vessels, such as the World War II–vintage patrol frigates and landing support ships, transferred from the U.S. Navy. Emphasis was also placed on training
shipboard personnel to meet the rapidly growing requirements of this force.
However, consideration was also given to maritime aviation, in order to pave
the way for its future development. This was a legacy from the Imperial Japanese
Navy, whose naval aviation force had been the second-largest in the world during World War II but had totally disappeared by the end of the war. In addition to
fixed-wing aircraft, such as PV-2s, TBMs, and PBYs—all of which were also of
World War II vintage—initial attempts to introduce several types of helicopters,
including the Bell 47, were made. This was the period of the Korean War, so it
was difficult for the JMG to get helicopters from the U.S. Navy. Therefore, secondhand S-51 and S-55 helicopters were imported from the United Kingdom.
These two types were mainly used for pilot training and for establishing operational concepts for the future helicopter force. Later, two squadrons were established, each equipped with eight HSS-1 and nine night-capable HSS-1N
helicopters, then cutting-edge U.S. Navy aircraft. Finally the helicopter force of
the JMSDF was ready for missions, but its inventory was still very small. At that
time, the deployment concept for helicopters in the JMSDF envisioned the defense of vital local areas, such as major ports, straits, and channels; it presumed
operation from shore air bases—not from ships.
Beyond these practical matters of force planning and building during its early
days, the JMSDF had an independent strategic concept, an ambitious plan to
build an innovative ASW group, formed around a helicopter carrier. In outline,
that concept recognized that surface vessels have natural limitations in antisubmarine warfare; submarines, whether conventionally or nuclear powered, maneuver cunningly and aggressively to avoid detection by surface units before
attacking, and nuclear submarines can retreat at high speed after attacking. The
inherent limitations of surface ships against these “invisible adversaries” include
low probability of detection, difficulty of classification and identification of
contacts, short detection range relative to that of a submarine against a surface
ship, and the submarine’s tactical advantages in tactical use of the ocean environment. To make up for these handicaps, JMSDF planners considered it
https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol64/iss3/21
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indispensable to employ helicopters, with their prominent ASW capabilities, in
combination with surface ships. The abilities of helicopters to conduct widearea surveillance and search and to detect and track fast and hard-maneuvering
contacts were especially attractive characteristics. In addition, if a surface force
could conduct ASW by helicopters at a distance, its own safety and survivability
would substantially increase.
So, on the basis of this thinking, the JMSDF devised a concept for an ASW
—or “hunter/killer” (HUK)—group, a small-to-medium-sized ASW helicopter
carrier with escort destroyers. To realize this concept, the JMSDF Maritime Staff
Office (MSO) in Tokyo developed a plan for two variants: “CVH-a,” of twenty
thousand tons, with eighteen helicopters and four to six S-2 fixed-wing maritime patrol aircraft; and “CVH-b,” of ten thousand tons, with eighteen helicopters (see figure 2).
It was decided that CVH-b would be more suitable for the JMSDF, and the Japan Defense Agency (or JDA, the predecessor of the present Ministry of Defense) decided to request one CVH-b in the JFY 1961 budget. But this decision
was caught up in political turmoil originating from stiff opposition to the revision of the Japanese-U.S. Security Treaty in 1960. This political friction, caused
by relatively minor opposition groups, escalated into nationwide social chaos. In
order that this controversial CVH not become a symbolic target for these opponents, the JDA withdrew its proposal. At the same time, due to the chaotic situation, the second of the JDA’s Defense Buildup Plans (DBPs) was postponed by
one year; to fill the one-year gap, an independent, single-year budget, for JFY
FIGURE 2

The CVH-b (conceptual image)
Sekai no Kansen
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1961, not part of a five-year DBP, was requested. CVH construction was not included and was never discussed again in later years. This was the first demise of
7
the JMSDF helicopter carrier.
In the late 1950s and early 1960s, the JMSDF started receiving the seven destroyers of the Ayanami class (2,200 tons, ASW, three-inch guns) and the three
sisters of the Murasame class (2,400 tons, antiair warfare [AAW] and antisurface
warfare, five-inch guns). These were the JMSDF’s first generation of DDs,
planned from 1955 to 1958. Construction of its first state-of-the-art DDG, of
4,500 tons, with the Tartar surface-to-air missile (SAM) system, was approved in
the 1961 JDA budget. For the JMSDF, a DDG was too expensive to build in large
numbers, so the JMSDF traded quantity for its superb AAW capability. This request was regarded as something of a “leap in the dark,” one that might have
eaten up the other shipbuilding programs. Only one, JS Amatsukaze (DDG 163),
was built, and it took the JMSDF ten years to request a second Tartar DDG.
These were the realities of Japan and the JMSDF around 1960. In retrospect,
in those days of the infancy of the force buildup, if the CVH had been approved,
whatever its cost, it would certainly have caused serious negative impacts upon
almost all sections of the JMSDF. It might have become a hard-to-remove (and
self-imposed) obstacle for future force planning. Additionally, if we take into account the performance and quality of helicopters around 1960 and the state of
passive acoustic sensors in the JMSDF at that time, it is doubtful if this HUK
group could have achieved its mission.
Having said that, however, the point here is that the idea of a CVH, or some
form of helicopter carrier, had become a feature of JMSDF force planning and
would remain so through the coming decades.
THE THIRD AND FOURTH DBPS AND THE FIRST STANDARD
TACTICAL UNIT
In 1964 the JMSDF started introducing U.S.-developed HSS-2 ASW helicopters.
But the operational concept of helicopter force still remained the same—local
vital-area defense, conducted from air bases ashore.
It was during its preparatory study for the Third DBP (1967–71) that the
MSO concluded that helicopters were indispensable assets for the ASW operations of surface forces. The presumed threat at that time was a conventional submarine (SS) attempting a torpedo attack against a surface force. The threat from
the air was, in those early Cold War days, considered to be scattered air raids,
mainly free-fall bombing by small numbers of long-range bombers. Of course,
SSNs, SSMs, and air-to-surface antiship missiles (ASMs) were examined as well;
however, in the mid-1960s, in the northwest Pacific, these threats were estimated
to be secondary.
https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol64/iss3/21

NWC_2011SummerReview.ps
\\data1\john.lanzieri.ctr$\msdata\Desktop\NavalWarCollege\NWC_2011SummerReview\NWC_2011SummerReview.vp
Tuesday, April 19, 2011 11:14:50 AM

46

Color profile: Disabled
Composite Default screen

War College: Summer 2011 Review

KODA

41

The JMSDF conducted extensive mathematical operations-research analyses
of these threat scenarios and came to the following conclusion: a surface force of
eight destroyers with six shipboard ASW helicopters would be the most effective
against a single SS attempting to make torpedo attacks, supported by sporadic
bombing by long-range bombers.
The six ASW helicopters in total—four available for operations at any one
time—were to be used as “reaction assets”—that is, to investigate contacts
gained or to conduct counterattacks. They were not considered to be primary
search assets against the enemy SS. Instead, once contact was gained, the four
were to be sent to the contact area to track the submarine and eventually to kill it,
when tactical conditions were met.
One issue to be resolved in this concept was how to embark the six helicopters. The JMSDF thought it impracticable to embark the large HSS-2 on board
2,500-ton DDs. The options left were to build either two helicopter-carrying destroyers of seven thousand tons full load (FL), which would carry three helicopters each, or a single, larger DDH, of nine to ten thousand tons, capable of
carrying all six. The latter would most likely be a through-deck design, but that
was too controversial politically. It was still too early to make a serious argument
for a ship that looked something like an attack carrier, even if it was in fact simply an ASW helicopter platform. Thus the decision was made to build two
seven-thousand-ton DDHs, conventional destroyers with large hangars for
three ASW helicopters, and wide flight decks extending from the midsection to
the stern.
On this basis, the JMSDF’s antisubmarine warfare concept was reflected in
the composition of a new type of “escort flotilla”: one DDG, with the Tartar
SAM, to be responsible for force air defense; two DDHs, each of 6,500 tons and
carrying three ASW helicopters; and five DDs for general operations. Two DDHs
were included in each of the next two DBPs, the third and fourth, for a total of
four. One of the technical premises for this concept was, needless to say, the successful development and diffusion of Beartrap and of fin stabilizers.
The escort flotilla, whose main mission was ASW, was expected to improve
8
the fleet’s antisubmarine capability substantially. Its conceptual composition,
as described above, was implemented: the escort flotilla of eight ships and six an9
tisubmarine helicopters became a standard tactical unit for the first time. There
had been escort flotillas in the JMSDF before, but those were, in general, the
spiritual descendants of the traditional destroyer flotillas of the Imperial Japanese Navy, which had been used as heavy torpedo-assault forces, without aircraft
and without a thought-out operational concept.
The first DDH was Haruna (see figure 3), commissioned in February 1973;
in November 1974, when the second, JS Hiei (DDH 142), was commissioned,
Published by U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons, 2011
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FIGURE 3

JS Haruna (DDH 141)
Sekai no Kansen

Escort Division 51 was organized; Hiei and Haruna joined its Escort Flotilla 1.
The third DDH, of a slightly larger (seven-thousand ton) class, was JS Shirane
(DDH 143), commissioned in March 1980; with the commissioning of the
fourth, JS Kurama (DDH 144), the next year, Escort Division 52 was formed, and
the two Shirane-class DDHs were assigned to its Escort Flotilla 2.
So by 1981 the JMSDF had four flotillas, of which two had completed the
transition to an eight ships/six helicopters composition. The other two flotillas
remained in a premodernized state at that point. One thing to be noted here was
the time elapsed from the concept’s original development, in 1965, to its realization
—it had taken over fifteen years to realize the concept, and then only halfway. This is
the reality of the time-consuming nature of naval force building.
POST-FOURTH DBP AND A NEW CONCEPT
Due to the fourth Middle East war, in October 1973, a quick and substantial
jump in the price of crude oil, the “oil shock,” hit the world. Its negative effects
were felt in almost all sectors of the economy in Japan and led to unprecedented
and rapid inflation. Japan’s defense industry was no exception, and some disruption, like the cancelations of several shipbuilding contracts for new vessels,
was proposed by industry and reluctantly accepted by the government. In this
situation, the midterm financial estimate, the basis for next five-year DBP, became unclear. As a result, the government and the JDA gave up formulating a
new DBP; instead, three consecutive single-year budgets were adopted. This interval, from JFY 1977 through 1979, where no defense buildup plan was in effect,
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was called the “Post–Fourth DBP” (P-4) period. Eventually, and ironically, the
P-4 period had a remarkable significance for the JMSDF. In these years, in the
middle of the Cold War, the JMSDF developed a new operational concept to
meet growing threats. This concept became the centerpiece and theoretical main
pillar of JMSDF force planning, and it remains so today, over thirty years later.
The new concept was to form large tactical units of eight DDG/DDs and eight
antisubmarine helicopters.
During the P-4 period, the MSO recognized the limits of a surface flotilla
with eight ships and six ASW helicopters against the Soviet Union’s increasing
numbers of new-generation SSNs and its growing naval aviation arm. An SS
with torpedoes remained a fearsome opponent, but now SSNs with an SSM capability posed a new and serious threat to surface forces. As for the air threat,
air-to-surface missile attack had totally replaced conventional bombing. The
tactics of air attack had also switched, from scattered bombing to controlled and
repeated assaults by waves of ASM-loaded bomber formations, over waters distant from the mainland of the USSR. In general, new intelligence on Soviet naval
capabilities changed the threat perception of the JMSDF quickly and substantially. It was full recognition of these changes in the threat that led the MSO to
review the existing concept of eight ships with six helicopters.
With regard to ASW, coping with highly maneuverable SSNs, with their great
submerged speed and endurance, requires detection, tracking, and attack at
longer ranges from surface units. That made the shipboard passive acoustic sensor
—the tactical towed-array sonar—essential. Together with TACTASS, the passive
sonobuoy was thought to be effective in initial search against SSNs. For this reason, two more helicopters were added to the original six, for reactive operations.
As for AAW, one Tartar DDG was considered insufficient to protect the unit
against fierce ASM and SSM attacks, delivered in volume. So the number of DDGs
was increased to two, replacing one of the DDHs, and a domestically developed,
short-range SAM, which would launch the NATO-developed Sea Sparrow, was to
be installed on all the unit’s DDHs and DDs for point defense. As a result of this
10
review, a new “eight ships with eight helicopters” initiative was adopted.
There was a further attempt to improve the ASW capability of the JMSDF. It
was obvious ASW by surface units, even with helicopters, had limitations, so in
addition to the eight ships/eight helicopters concept, the JMSDF decided to obtain a hundred P-3C maritime patrol aircraft. Of these, eighty would be allocated to wide-area surveillance and twenty for direct support to surface units.
This integrated antisubmarine warfare posture has been the real force-building
rationale of the JMSDF since 1980.
The biggest issue was embarking an ASW helicopter on a four-thousand-ton
destroyer; each of the flotilla’s five DDs (of a new class, to be designed for the
Published by U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons, 2011

NWC_2011SummerReview.ps
\\data1\john.lanzieri.ctr$\msdata\Desktop\NavalWarCollege\NWC_2011SummerReview\NWC_2011SummerReview.vp
Tuesday, April 19, 2011 11:14:51 AM

49

Color profile: Disabled
Composite Default screen

44

Naval War College Review, Vol. 64 [2011], No. 3, Art. 21

NAVAL WAR COLLEGE REVIEW

purpose) would have to carry one. To meet fully the operational requirement of
the new concept, each aircraft would need sonobuoy and dipping-sonar systems, as well as MAD. Additionally, a surface surveillance radar would be desirable. However, the small-to-medium-sized helicopters suitable for DDs were
limited to the U.S. Navy’s SH-2 and the Royal Navy’s Lynx, which were both too
small and had too little payload. The idea of two different types of helicopters
—large and small helicopters, for DDHs and DDs, respectively—was abandoned as operationally inefficient. Only a large helicopter could meet the need,
but it had to be small enough to be stored in a hangar and to take off from and
land on the flight deck of a four-thousand-ton DD.
After intensive and in-depth research, the MSO concluded that only the
HSS-2, which was in current use, could meet these conflicting requirements. But
the HSS-2 was equipped only with a dipping-sonar system. At that time, the U.S.
Navy had had a similar idea (except for use on carriers) and had started development of a new HSS-2 variant—what would become the SH-3H—but the JMSDF
learned of difficulties in that program.
For this reason, the JMSDF decided to install domestically developed equipment on the existing HSS-2. The development effort went well, and a new member of the globally popular HSS-2 family—with a completely different
capability, including a surface-search radar in an extendable “radome”—was
introduced into the JMSDF, the HSS-2B (see figure 4). Given this success in developing the HSS-2B, the JMSDF was finally able to design and build the new destroyer to handle it, the Hatsuyuki (DD 122) class. Eventually the Hatsuyuki class
paved the way to the realization of the eight ships/eight helicopters concept. The
JMSDF now started forming its escort flotillas anew; each would be composed
of one DDH with three ASW helicopters, five destroyers with one helicopter
each, and two Tartar DDGs.
Since then, destroyer-borne helicopters in the JMSDF have switched to the
new-generation SH-60J (1989), followed by the improved and enlarged SH-60K
(2003). Equipment has also been improved, together with technology and tactics. For instance, later production models of the SH-60J were equipped with a
forward-looking infrared system and a chaff/flare dispenser for self-defense.
The SH-60K has a ship-landing guidance system, for operations in poor visibility. Provision is also made for installation of a machine gun and short-range
air-to-surface missile. However, their basic operational concept, originating
with the HSS-2B, has remained the same. In the same way, more modern and
larger destroyers have appeared—Asagiri class (4,500 tons, eight ships), the
Murasame class (6,300 tons, nine ships), then the Onami class (6,500 tons, five
ships)—but their operational concept is that associated with the first-generation
Hatsuyuki class.
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FIGURE 4

HSS-2B with MAD and radome extended
JMSDF

In the eight ships/eight helicopters composition, only one aircraft was embarked on each DD. However, to provide operational flexibility, the enlargement
of their hangar bays to accommodate two ASW helicopters (a type known generically as HS) was attempted; the hangar on board JS Asagiri was modified
during construction. That attempt was not satisfactory; however, in the next
class, beginning with JS Murasame, provision was made in the design phase to
accommodate two SH-60J/Ks at one time. This is officially known as the “one
HS embarked and one HS carried” design, and it greatly improved flexibility in
missions in the Indian Ocean (supporting ENDURING FREEDOM) and off the
coast of Somalia (antipiracy). However, these operations are considered to be variations, adaptations of the fundamental eight ships/eight helicopters concept.
THE MID-1980S: “AT-SEA AIR-DEFENSE POSTURE STUDY” AND
THE DDV
In response to the growing threat posed by Soviet Long-Range Aviation in the
late 1970s and 1980s, the JDA in 1986 launched an intra-agency research project
called the At-Sea Air-Defense Posture Study.11 This study, which continued until
1987, was conducted in a period of sharp confrontation between the West and
East, the final years of the Cold War. The MSO proposed two systems: the
“DDV” (a through-deck carrier for air-interceptor fighters) and an Aegis DDG.
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It estimated the Soviet naval-aviation threat as one of concentrated ASM attacks
by bombers like the Tu-22M Backfire, in about three groups, each aircraft carrying two AS-4 or AS-6 long-range missiles. The proposed Aegis DDG would be
able to shoot down large numbers of incoming ASMs but would be unable to
deal with the bombers themselves, attacking from beyond the maximum range
of the SM-2 surface-to-air missile of the JMSDF’s Aegis system. For this reason,
if the tempo of combat increased or the campaign was prolonged or repeated,
the bombers would survive and their attacks would continue forever, in theory,
while surface units would suffer accumulated losses to missiles “leaking
through” in every assault and might ultimately be destroyed completely.
The JMSDF strongly felt the need for an adequate antibomber (that is, anti–
ASM platform) asset. One idea was to operate short-takeoff/vertical-landing
(STOVL) interceptor fighters from a mother ship, a DDV. That concept envisioned a through-deck ship of fifteen to twenty thousand tons with about ten radarequipped Sea Harrier all-weather interceptors and about four airborne-earlywarning aircraft. However, on New Year’s Day in 1988, a sensational article titled
“JMSDF to Build Light Aircraft Carrier” was front-paged by nationally circulated
12
newspapers and became somewhat controversial politically.
The MSO turned down the DDV concept due to the negative resonance of the
phrase “aircraft carrier” for political and public opinion and within the study
panel itself. Then, the senior leaders of the JMSDF decided to focus on the Aegis
DDG; after heated discussions about funding, the ship was included in the JFY
13
1988 budget. The feeling within the MSO was bittersweet: the JMSDF finally
obtained the most advanced antiair-warfare ship but had had to trade away, in
14
the DDV, its long-hoped-for air-capable ship.
At least the JMSDF had been able to put a carrier-like combatant—though far
different from the once-envisioned ASW helicopter carrier in task and mission
—on the agenda again. So this, the second demise of the carrier in the JMSDF,
became another important milestone along the road to JS Hyuga. The CVH and
DDV had been only JMSDF concepts, not government-approved programs, and
so had ended as mere dreams. However, it was a stark reality that replacements
for the Harunas would have to be laid down in the first decade after 2000, when
they would reach the end of their service lives.
THE OOSUMI-CLASS LST: A SIGNPOST TO THE FUTURE
A ship somewhat related to the Haruna-class DDH follow-on—known as the
Next-Generation DDH, or Next DDH, program—was a new transport ship in
the JFY 1993 budget, JS Oosumi (LST 4001). Oosumi was a fundamental departure
from the previous Miura-class LST (landing ship, tank).15 Its operational requirement, which called for a maximum speed of more than twenty knots,
https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol64/iss3/21
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inevitably narrowed its design. The traditional, World War II design based on a
bow door and ramp for direct beaching was abandoned, and a narrower,
higher-speed hull form was introduced. At the same time, in order to fulfill the
basic requirement for beach landing, as military transport, the MSO decided to
embark on this ship what was at the time a cutting-edge amphibious vehicle, the
U.S. Navy’s Landing Craft, Air Cushion (LCAC).
The MSO also looked into the possibility of conducting landing operations
by helicopters from this ship. However, there was some tacit resistance within
the JDA regarding carrier-like through-deck designs, so the MSO had to be careful on this point. The MSO argued the necessity of a through-deck design for the
safety of helicopter operations and efficiency of embarkation and debarkation
of troops. After heated discussions within the JDA, the MSO finalized Oosumi
(see figure 5) as a through-deck transport, designating it as an LST. The JMSDF
did not adopt the traditional concept of amphibious assault, in which the ship
would operate helicopters in a combat environment. Instead, the JMSDF introduced a substantially different idea, “Maritime Operational Transport.”16 The
MSO strongly advocated the through-deck design in support of such a capability. Needless to say, however, the crux of the debate was whether to adopt a
FIGURE 5

JS Oosumi (LST 4001)
Sekai no Kansen
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through-deck structure. Ultimately the design was accepted by the JDA and the
government of Japan.
All this time, during these heated JDA discussions, there was a strong awareness in the minds of officers in the MSO that the Next DDH project was waiting
in the wings.
THE NEXT-GENERATION DDH
A complicated, two-year-long effort produced a new, five-year Midterm Defense
Buildup Plan (the 2001–2005 MTDBP). In it, for 2001, was the Next DDH (see
figure 6), a “destroyer with sophisticated command and communication capability, as well as improved helicopters operational capability.”17
Operational Concept
As one proposed configuration for this vessel, the JDA had released to the mass
media a conceptual picture of a ship with a superstructure amidships and a divided forward-and-aft flight deck. This seems to have been done to offset poten18
tial public objections rooted in the offensive image of aircraft carriers.
This ship was planned as a replacement for the existing DDHs for the new
JMSDF eight ships/eight helicopters concept, based on a threat perception of
SSNs/SSs and ASM-equipped bombers. The concept was considered an optimum
posture, based on the enormous amount of mathematical operations-research
FIGURE 6

Next DDH (conceptual image)
Sekai no Kansen
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analysis conducted since the Post–Fourth DBP. What the analysts tried to determine was the best composition of a JMSDF flotilla to survive intensive enemy
air-to-surface attacks while continuing effective antisubmarine warfare for a
certain duration of time.
When the MSO started to develop the operational concept for the Next DDG,
the force-planning rationale of ASW as the main mission of the JMSDF was still
a given. It followed that SSM-capable submarines and ASM-carrying bombers
were (and remain) the most relevant and realistic threats. In other words, the
JMSDF thought then, thinks today, and expects to think in the future that the
“best” surface force is one that has true capabilities against air-to-surface and
surface-to-surface missiles and against submarines.
Here, the importance of continuity of defense concept should be emphasized.
The eight-ship/six–ASW helicopter concept of the Third DBP was only partially
realized, even fifteen years after its initial development. At that point, only two
out of four flotillas conformed to it. This, as noted, reflects the time-consuming
nature of assembling a surface force, building at the rate of only one or two vessels per year. Frequent changes of defense or operational concepts would have
brought few positive results and caused confusion and ultimately meant failure
to achieve force-building objectives. Accordingly, since the Post–Fourth DBP
period no fundamental change that could reverse the premises of the estimate
has been accepted; the eight ships/eight ASW helicopters concept has been upheld for about thirty years. By 1998, about twenty years after this composition
was formulated, all four JMSDF destroyer flotillas were organized in line with it:
one DDH, five DDs, two DDGs, with eight HS aircraft. These flotillas, in turn,
have been the rationale for modernization. Today the JMSDF has four fully organized flotillas that are probably second in quality only to the U.S. Navy—
world-class surface units with the most capable helicopters. This is a result of
more than a quarter-century of continuity in defense concept within the JMSDF.
A Carrier-like Ship
In line with that defense concept, the MSO decided that the basic characteristic
of the Next DDH, its bottom line, would be an ability to operate three helicopters. However, though it was committed to the eight ships/eight helicopters concept, extensive fleet experience eventually convinced the MSO that even three
helicopters would not meet real-world ASW needs.
The operations-research mathematical model used in the development of
eight ships/eight helicopters had postulated broad and universal conditions, assuming a simplified scenario of ASW against one submarine (nuclear or conventional) whose presence in an area had been confirmed. The model’s output,
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then, answered to this specific condition, which had been the basis for the doctrine then existing. The gaps between the force-planning rationale and the reality of widely diverse operational environments and conditions are obvious. The
JMSDF has long and wisely exercised flexibility, especially at the fleet level, to
bridge this gap.
Commander in Chief, JMSDF Fleet (CinC SDF) normally forms flotillas with
compositions most suitable to achieve given missions in given situations. For example, where a flotilla’s mission is relatively uncomplicated mission, CinC SDF
may allocate fewer ships to its commander—and, of course, the reverse is also
true. In the case of a difficult mission requiring larger forces than the standard,
CinC SDF may reinforce the flotilla.
Most ordinary training, exercise, and operations are carried out with the normal eight ships/eight helicopters organization. But practical fleet ASW experience has taught an important lesson—that the number of ASW helicopters on a
single DDH and in an entire flotilla is insufficient. In a real-world scenario, ships
and helicopters may gain several contacts at once and have to categorize each as a
submarine or a false detection. Then the real submarines, or most submarinelike contacts, are tracked and identified as friendly or enemy; finally, adversaries
are attacked. In short, actual ASW engagements start with large numbers of uncertain contacts, to which the flotilla commander should be able to project helicopters to investigate. In fact, the MSO postulated a simultaneous projection of
three or four helicopters for each contact.
Additionally, for other roles, the MSO also decided to add one MCH-101 helicopter, for airborne mine countermeasures and transport. But three ASW helicopters on board the Next DDH was a bottom line; the ship was to represent a
concentrated helicopter capability in various tactical ASW situations. Thus, a
rationale for the maximum number of aircraft on the Next DDH was developed
based on the thinking that as a member of a flotilla of eight ships and eight ASW
helicopters, the ship would normally carry three ASW and one mine-warfare/
transport helicopters—that is, three HS and one MCH. To cope with real-world
ASW operations, in fact, the ship might need to embark about ten HS.
All this made it natural and reasonable for the MSO to adopt a carrier-like
hull design, with a through flight deck, a starboard island structure, and a large
hangar bay under the flight deck. The design accommodated three HS plus one
MCH under normal conditions and about ten HS in case of expanded helicopter
operations.
However, as Next DDH development continued, another problem arose. In
the past, the JMSDF had fielded four antisubmarine helicopter squadrons for
shipboard operations—one for each flotilla—and four squadrons for vital/localarea defense from air bases. The shipboard squadrons each had twelve aircraft,
https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol64/iss3/21
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enough to deploy eight to the ships in a flotilla. The land-based HS squadrons
were not intended or fully trained for shipboard operations. So there were
forty-eight HS helicopters, with about a hundred aircrew teams, available for
shipboard operation in all. In order to allow embarkation of as many as ten HS
aircraft on the Next DDH, additional HS strength would be necessary.
The MSO decided to make all land-based HS squadrons shipboard capable.
Concrete measures were implemented in the JFY 2007 program, as part of a reorganization of the JMSDF decreasing the number of destroyers but increasing
the number of helicopters to be embarked on board both DDs and the Next
DDH. A gradual transition of land-based squadrons from land to shipboard operation got started. It is now estimated that by around 2015, all HS helicopters in
the JMSDF—that is, about eighty aircraft—will become shipboard capable. This
number is considered to be right to meet the requirements of maximum shipboard operations in case of necessity.
Another reason as well drove the MSO strongly toward the through-deck design. That was an operational requirement for simultaneous takeoffs by multiple
ASW helicopters, preferably at least three. This would solve a limitation of the
first-generation DDHs, from which only one helicopter could take off at one
time. Thanks to the Beartrap (in later years, the Recovery Assist Securing Traversing, or RAST, system), the time needed for the second aircraft to take off was
acceptable, to some extent, but it really took a long time for the third. The problem was the constrained size of the flight deck, which occupied only one-third of
the ship’s overall length, and the limited number of arresting-traverse systems
—that is, two RASTs for three helicopters. The same was also true for landings.
The MSO was afraid that this inherent handicap might become a serious problem in a real-world multicontact environment. To the MSO, the best (and only)
way to resolve it was to adopt a through-deck design for the Next DDH.
Additionally, the MSO placed emphasis on the importance of an elevator that
would lift an SH-60 helicopter with its rotors unfolded and of sufficient height
in the hangar to allow rotor-related work on an MH-53E, the largest helicopter
in service. The JMSDF especially wanted such an elevator in the Next DDH, because a traditional destroyer-type hangar does not allow repair work on a helicopter whose rotor cannot be folded. The only option in such a case is to send the
helicopter to a land base and embark a replacement. This meant not only a temporary decrease in the number of HS on board and in the flotilla, but also, in
some cases, a destroyer off its station, while it rushed to a point that placed the
air base within the endurance arc of the aircraft. This posed a far greater restriction on force operations than previously thought, and therefore the JMSDF particularly sought a suitable elevator in the Next DDH.
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Command and Control
The Next DDH was planned not only as one of the eight ships in a flotilla but
also as the flotilla commander’s flagship. It would need a sophisticated Flag Information Center (FIC) in addition to an ordinary Combat Information Center
(CIC). Provisions of various sorts would have to be made to accommodate a
larger number of staff officers and enlisted men and women than before, to fully
carry out a wide range of missions, from operations other than war to the con19
ventional and fierce combat at sea. The MSO planned to provide optimum
space and state-of-the-art equipment and systems for the FIC, taking full account of the lessons learned in the four-ship Kongo (DDG 173) and two-ship
Atago (DDG 177) classes of Aegis DDGs, which were equipped with the first
generations of the FIC. The latest improvements were incorporated into the
Next DDH.
A new requirement for joint operations also emerged in the planning phase.
In 2002 the JDA launched an intra-agency, preparatory study on how to change
the JSDF from an independent, service-driven, operational posture to a joint
operational one. It was subsequently decided to shift to the new joint posture in
March 2006. Since the budget request for the ship was projected for JFY 2005,
the JMSDF had to make some provision in its design for joint operations, especially for embarkation of a joint task force (JTF) headquarters, or JTFHQ. It
would be inappropriate to have the JTFHQ and FIC in the same compartment,
because the JTFHQ would command on a strategic level, while the FIC would
mainly focus on tactical command of the flotilla. For this reason the MSO
planned a JTFHQ space, separate from the FIC. The MSO designated it as a
“multipurpose compartment,” envisioning its use also as a command post for both
military and civilian elements sectors in humanitarian-assistance and disasterrelief operations, in Japan or abroad. The multipurpose compartments reflected
these diverse requirements.
With respect to communications, especially antenna locations, the ship
would have a large number of various types of antennas, including for satellite
communications and different radiofrequency bands. The MSO sought optimum positions, expecting that the larger size of the Next DDH would ease competition. Placing antennas had been a common problem in destroyer designs.
Weapons Systems
JS Hyuga, as the first ship of the Next DDH program, employs the FCS-3 (with
surveillance and fire-control functions), the Mark 41 Vertical Launching System
(VLS), and the Evolved Sea Sparrow Missile as its antiair weapon systems. It has
two sets of the 20 mm close-in weapons that are standard on other JMSDF ships.
The FCS-3 is a state-of-the-art fire-control system, with four sets of phased-array
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multifunction radars. It also has a combat-direction capability to support the
ship’s CIC and FIC.
Antisubmarine warfare, however, is of course the ship’s primary mission. The
biggest issue when the eight ships/eight helicopters concept was first discussed
was the role of the first-generation DDH in ASW—that is, whether it should devote itself to being a command ship, with its own operational capabilities limited
to those of its three helicopters, or should conduct prosecution of contacts along
with other ships in the formation. The first-generation DDH was a large ship
(seven thousand tons) but retained the general characteristics and capabilities of
ordinary destroyers. So this problem was resolved then quite easily. This time the
story was a little more complicated. Since the Next DDH was a large, carrier-like
combatant (twenty thousand tons), with enhanced helicopter operations capability and improved command functions, its role could be considered to be similar to
that of nuclear-powered aircraft carriers (CVNs) of the U.S. Navy.
But the main missions of a U.S. Navy CSG are strike and power projection,
not antisubmarine warfare. If a CSG gains an ASW contact, its CVN is supposed
to leave the area to continue its mission. Carrier-borne helicopters, destroyers
and frigates with antisubmarine helicopters on board, and a supporting SSN
may take measures against the contact, but the remainder of the force leaves the
area to protect the CVN. In contrast, the main mission of the JMSDF is ASW;
when a flotilla gains contact, designated ships, whether DD, DDG, or DDH, rush
to the detection site and conduct a prosecution, together with HS assets. Needless to say, no JMSDF unit, including the Next DDH, has the luxury of leaving a
contact site to other ships’ aircraft. The missions of the Japanese and U.S. forces
are completely different. In the most severe case, in fact, a JMSDF flotilla might
send two or three groups of destroyers to multiple contacts (two to three ships
each), together with their helicopters, and the Next DDH would have to operate
alone, or nearly so, in the possible proximity of an enemy submarine.
For this reason, the ASW weapons systems of Hyuga are similar to those of a
DD. These are a hull-mounted, very-low-frequency sonar (active/passive) as the
primary sensor, ASROC (launched vertically in the Mark 41 VLS), two sets of
triple torpedo tubes, and countermeasure systems. Of course, its optimum role
on a submarine contact spot, in a real operation, would be support of the flotilla
commander. In fact, it has been asked since the start of the program, “Is there really a need to install short-range triple torpedo tubes on the Next DDH, which is
substantially a light carrier?” But if we compare the mission of a JMSDF flotilla
with that of a U.S. Navy CSG, the answer is very clear.
The table gives orders of battle, showing what has changed and not changed
in JMSDF ASW flotillas and their destroyers from the days of the original eight
ships/six helicopters concept to today.
Published by U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons, 2011
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JMSDF ESCORT FLOTILLAS

DDH

8 Ships/6 HS

8 Ships/8 HS

8 Ships/8 HS (Hyuga)

2 ships (3 HS each)

1 ship (3 HS)

1 ship [3 HS + 1 MCH + (10)]
JTFHQ compartment
Flag Information Center
through flight deck
CIWSs
ESSM (V)
active/passive hull sonar
SDPS
ASROC (V)/TT
30 knots

5-inch guns
active hull sonar
ASROC/TT
32 knots
DD

5 ships (2 types, no HS)
3-inch guns/5-inch guns

active hull sonar
ASROC/TT
27 knots/32 knots
DDG

1 ship
3- or 5-inch guns

5 ships (1 HS)
3-inch guns
CIWSs
Sea Sparrow SAM
Harpoon SSM
active hull sonar
TACTASS/SDPS
ASROC/TT
30 knots

5 ships [1 HS + (1)]
3-inch guns/5-inch guns
CIWSs
Sea Sparrow (V)/ESSM (V)
Harpoon/SSM-1
active hull sonar
TACTASS/SDPS
ASROC (V)/TT
30 knots

2 ships

2 ships
Flag Information Center
5-inch guns
CIWSs
Aegis (SM-2)
Harpoon/SSM-1
active hull sonar
TACTASS/SDPS
ASROC (V)/TT
30 knots

active hull sonar

5-inch guns
CIWSs
Tartar (SM-1)
Harpoon SSM
active hull sonar

ASROC/TT
32 knots

ASROC/TT
32 knots

Tartar (SM-1) System

HS

5-inch guns/CIWSs
Sea Sparrow SAM
active hull sonar
SDPS
ASROC/TT
32 knots

SAR
transport

SAR
transport

ASW: active dipping sonar
sonobuoy
radar/ESM
MAD
torpedo
ASST: radar/ESM
ASUW: Hellfire ASM
30 cal. machine gun
Self-protection: chaff/flares
SAR
transport

2 of 4 flotillas completed

All 4 flotillas completed

All 4 flotillas to be completed

ASW: active dipping sonar

torpedo

ASW: active dipping sonar
sonobuoy
radar/ESM
MAD
torpedo
ASST: radar

Key: ASST: antisurface surveillance and targeting; ASUW: antisurface warfare; CIWS: Close-In Weapon System; ESM: electronic support measure; ESSM: Evolved
Sea Sparrow Missile; SAR: search and rescue; SDPS: sonobuoy data processing system; SSM-1: domestically developed SSM; TT: torpedo tube; (V): vertical
launch.
Note: As of December 2010 there were six Aegis DDGs and two Tartar DDGs in the JMSDF Fleet. Expected remaining service life of the two relatively young Tartar
DDGs is about 10 more years. So it is right to estimate that the DDG force of the JMSDF will remain the same until the early 2020s.

ISSUES TO SOLVE
When planning the Next DDH, now Hyuga, the MSO had studied various options, such as a deck-edge elevator, a port-side exhaust for the port gas-turbine
https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol64/iss3/21
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power plant, and airflow deflectors on the flight deck. Give the limitations of
cost and size, the MSO came to the conclusion that the current configuration of
Hyuga was the best. However, the following issues remain for the future.
Multiple Functions. One of the important characteristics of JS Hyuga is its multipurpose command functions—for JTF command and humanitarian-assistance/
disaster-relief coordination, as well as ASW flotilla operations. Since before its
commissioning, some publications in Japan have emphasized Hyuga’s potential
goodwill function. In fact, however, the ship’s “multipurpose” characteristics,
which were added onto its original maritime combat capability, refer to its
adaptability as a large, carrier-like combatant for a variety of situations. For instance, it is reported that the JSDF Joint Staff Office and other services of the
JSDF have requested that additional accommodation for combat vehicles and
troops be built in.
In general, the Hyuga-class ship is large enough to accomplish most new tasks
that are proposed, even now that its specifications have been determined. However, from a force-planning and operational-requirement viewpoint, precise
consideration should be given. Hyuga is built as part of the eight ships/eight helicopters concept; its fundamental requirement should be developed under that
framework—its capabilities as a flotilla flagship, as a platform for extensive ASW
helicopter operations, and as an ordinary combatant capable of ASW and
self-defense AAW. New tasks proposed by other services that tend to change the
Hyuga-class DDH from a combat-oriented destroyer variant to a primarily multipurpose ship, that could trade its original war-fighting capabilities for others,
should be carefully examined and if necessary declined. An appropriate balance
is necessary.
An Aircraft Carrier? Some say: “If the JASDF employs F-35B [the STOVL version of the Lockheed Martin Lightning II, formerly the Joint Strike Fighter]
fighters in the future, Hyuga and its sisters should operate them and so achieve
any capability as a STOVL aircraft carrier, or ‘STOVL-CVX.’” That would be justifiably supported in terms of full exploitation of resources on hand. It is natural
for any armed force to plan for the maximal use of its existing systems—in this
case, STOVL fighters and through-deck HS carriers that are large enough to operate them. This is the true charm of military planning and execution. In any
case, such flexibility is necessary for joint missions. If a military organization
cannot so operate when necessary, it cannot be said to possess military expertise.
Service personnel cannot and should not say no to a mission that is given
them—they have to carry it out, fully utilizing all assets currently available.
Having said that, however, it was quite uncertain whether the JASDF would introduce the F-35B at all. As of December 2010, the JASDF has only made requests
Published by U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons, 2011

NWC_2011SummerReview.ps
\\data1\john.lanzieri.ctr$\msdata\Desktop\NavalWarCollege\NWC_2011SummerReview\NWC_2011SummerReview.vp
Tuesday, April 19, 2011 11:14:53 AM

61

Color profile: Disabled
Composite Default screen

56

Naval War College Review, Vol. 64 [2011], No. 3, Art. 21

NAVAL WAR COLLEGE REVIEW

to the United States and other nations in the joint development group for release
of F-35 information necessary for future decisions on next-generation fighters.
So, it is fair to say that though JASDF would most likely try to introduce the conventional F-35A for its own mission, it still is unclear whether it and the government will ultimately decide to do that. So the dream of JASDF F-35Bs on the Next
DDH remains an improbable one.
And after all, Hyuga is primarily an antisubmarine combatant, planned under the eight ships/eight ASW helicopters concept. It is essentially different from
an aircraft carrier built for strike or air defense. In the future, should Japan, in a
changed security environment, need a (light) aircraft carrier within the scope of
the nation’s constitution, it should build one. Even then, the government and the
JMSDF would be obligated to explain thoroughly its necessity to the Japanese
people, to gain their full consensus and support. In terms of healthy civilian control, the introduction of a new system or ship of such significance as a (light) aircraft carrier should be accompanied by thorough and public discussion.
Terminology. Recently, an old, and yet new, naval term, hachi-hachi kantai (eight/
eight fleet), has been widely spreading within the JMSDF and the Japanese media.
The ostensible reason seems to be simply that hachi in Japanese means
“eight.” But this phrase designated a force-planning concept of the Imperial Japanese Navy in the 1910s—the days of sixteen-inch guns, such as those on the
20
battleship Nagato and carrier (converted battle cruiser) Akagi. This was a period of tonnage and gun-caliber arms races among the major naval powers. This
eight/eight fleet concept was to build up a formation of eight battleships and
eight battle cruisers as a core of the Combined Fleet. Eventually, the plan was
abandoned under the terms of the Washington Naval Treaty of 1922.
But today’s basic tactical unit of the JMSDF, while superficially similar in the
numbers involved, is based on the JMSDF’s operational concept and so is completely different from hachi-hachi kantai posture of the Imperial Japanese Navy.
Thus the term hachi-kan hachi-ki taisei—eight ships/eight helicopters posture—should be used instead. When the author served at sea in the early days of
this posture—as a combat systems officer on board a brand-new Hatsuyukiclass DD (1984–86, as a lieutenant commander) and commanding officer of a
ship of the class (as a commander, 1990–91)—the expression hachi-hachi kantai
was strictly prohibited in the JMSDF—as was thought required by a proper understanding of, and respect for, the naval history of Japan.
AN INDISPENSABLE ELEMENT OF SECURITY
The road to Hyuga originated in the CVH concept immediately after the foundation of the JMSDF in 1954. It passed the milestone of the first-generation
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DDH, then the DDV of the At-Sea Air Defense Posture Study, and the efforts
that followed. Finally, fifty-seven years after the foundation of the Japan Maritime Guard, Hyuga was realized as a carrier-like helicopter destroyer. Since its
commissioning, expectations for Hyuga have been increasing inside and outside
of the JMSDF. Also, criticism of Japan’s possession of an “aircraft carrier” has
been made by several surrounding nations. Yes, it is true that this ship has a
through-deck and is the largest combatant in the JMSDF’s history, but it still is a
helicopter destroyer, planned and built under the long-standing operational
concept of the JMSDF, and it is not almighty. Hyuga is not, for reasons described
in this article, a carrier in a traditional sense.
Also, the seemingly stubborn, even inflexible, nature of force building in the
JMSDF might be questioned. Is the ASW-oriented rationale that the JMSDF has
so long maintained still good enough? Does it meet today’s complicated security
environment and its diverse and challenging missions? My answer is yes. Except
for power projection and strike, which require specialized assets (such as U.S.
Navy–style CSGs or amphibious forces), antisubmarine warfare is the most sophisticated and difficult kind of maritime operation. Any navy or maritime
force capable of ASW as its primary mission is necessarily able to carry out other
missions as well, ranging from traditional at-sea combat to counterpiracy or humanitarian assistance and disaster relief. In other words, a naval force built upon
high-end concepts can manage a wider range of missions than can one built
upon low-end doctrine. In practice, the JMSDF is able to deal with almost all of
the maritime missions, threats, and warfare areas that have emerged during the
last two decades. The JMSDF has augmented its capabilities with various new
disciplines, such as special operations, cyber warfare, and ballistic-missile defense, beyond the scope of antisubmarine warfare alone.
Over and above all this, the strategic concept of the JMSDF is to maintain a
complementary relationship with U.S. naval forces. The current nature of regional submarine forces makes ASW still vital to the security and safety of U.S.
naval forces in the area. Even with continuous and uninterrupted effort—operating on a “24/7” basis, in war, contingency, crisis, or peace—we can barely manage to maintain a favorable ASW environment. There is no specific remedy for
the submarine threat. As an ally and partner of the United States and its navy, the
JMSDF bears a heavy burden in this task, which has been an indispensable element of security of the region and will remain so in the future.
It is important to remember that a characteristic of maritime operations is flexibility. The JMSDF, like many other navies, can organize any type of force for any
given mission by combining ships of the most appropriate types. A JMSDF force
composed of some optimal combination of ships—perhaps Hyuga, the Aegis DDG,
other destroyers, an Oosumi-class LST, or a Mashyu-class fast combat support
Published by U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons, 2011
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ship—could complete almost any possible mission in any waters on the planet. In
Hyuga and its sisters the JMSDF has a world-class capability. The key for the future
is to make this type truly capable, and to establish an optimal operational posture.
The flood of construction of carrier-like multipurpose ships, like JS Hyuga,
in the world’s navies may cause concern about a new “carrier arms race.” However, as we have seen, each navy must formulate, like the Japan Maritime SelfDefense Force, its own strategy and force-planning rationale for this type of
ship, taking account of contemporary security circumstances and the tendency
toward expanded naval missions. Through-deck multirole ships—not the
strike-oriented carriers of several navies—are the most suitable for deepening
international coordination and collaboration among navies.

NOTES

This article represents the personal opinions
of the author and not any official position of
the JMSDF or the government of Japan. The
author expresses special appreciation to Mr.
John Niemeyer, a special adviser to the Commander, U.S. Naval Forces Japan, for substantial contributions to the English text of
this article.
1. The Japan Maritime Guard (JMG) was established in the Japan Coast Guard on 26 April
1952. On 1 July 1954, the JMSDF was inaugurated within the Japan Defense Agency, together with the ground and air self-defense
forces. Boei Hakushyo [Defense Whitepaper:
Defense of Japan], English-language version
(Tokyo: Ministry of Defense of Japan, 2008),
pp. 542–43.
2. The new constitution of Japan, which replaced the Meiji constitution, came into effect on 3 May 1947 in occupied Japan. Article
9 prohibits Japan from having armed forces:
“Aspiring sincerely to an international peace
based on justice and order, the Japanese people forever renounce war as a sovereign right
of the nation and the threat or use of force as
means of settling international disputes.
“In order to accomplish the aim of the preceding paragraph, land, sea and air forces, as
well as other war potential, will never be
maintained. The right of belligerency of the
state will not be recognized.” Available at
www.kantei.go.jp/.

The government’s interpretation of article 9
is that the constitution bans “wars of aggression,” not “wars of self-defense.” Accordingly, the JSDF—designed to act only in the
defense of the nation if it is attacked—is
purely a constitutional entity; collective view
of the Hatoyama cabinet, submitted 22 December 1954, reprinted in Boei Handbook of
2009 [Handbook for Defense 2009] (Tokyo:
Asagumo Shinbunshya, 2009), chap. 12, “Position of Government of Japan on Defense of
Japan,” p. 604.
3. Ibid., “MTDBP (2001–2005),” document
I-1-(4), p. 17.
4. Ibid., pp. 19–50.
5. Canadian Navy, www.navy.forces.gc.ca/.
6. The first assignment of the author as a newly
commissioned ensign in the JMSDF in 1973
was as main propulsion assistant on board JS
Mochizuki (DDA 166), which carried two
DASH aircraft. One of the ship’s DASH officers called himself an “ace” because he
crashed three of them in accidents during his
tour (apparently considering three friendly
drones in exercises equivalent to the five enemy aircraft destroyed in combat traditionally required for that honorific). This gives a
good indication of the poor reliability of the
system in those days.
7. Hiroshi Nagata, “Kaijojieitai DDH unyokoso
no hensen” [History of the DDH Operational
Concept in the JMSDF], in Sekai no Kansen
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[Ships of the World] (Tokyo: Kaijin-shya,
July 2001), pp. 69–71.
8. Ibid., pp. 71–72.
9. See Yoji Koda, “Jieikan no Genyu Seiryoku to
Shyorai Tenbo” [The Present and Future of
JMSDF Ships], in Sekai no Kansen (January
2009), p. 125.
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enemy has already landed but that is still under Japanese control. The point is that the
landings would be on Japanese territory, not
foreign soil. So, in theory, this concept does
not involve amphibious assault. The tempo
of helicopter transport and the types of helicopters required would be very different from
those in an assault amphibious landing.

10. Ibid., pp. 125–26.

17. Boei Handbook of 2009, p. 128.

11. Boei Hakushyo [Defense Whitepaper: Defense
of Japan] (Tokyo: Ministry of Defense, 1987),
p. 193.

18. The author was director general of the Operations and Plans Department in the MSO
(having been assigned in January 2001, only a
month after the MTDBP was approved). The
cabinet decision had fixed only characteristics
and numbers, not the ship’s design—the
through-deck was just one of the JDA’s ideas.
The government, the JDA, and the MSO
agreed that the design would be decided only
later, at the time of the budget request. “This
irks me!” I told myself; “By all means we will
realize the through-deck ship, which has been
the long lasting goal of the JMSDF.”

12. Yomiuri Shinbun, 3 January 1988.
13. The Asagiri-class DD (JFY 1985) cost 43 billion yen, the newest Tartar DDG (in 1983)
about 69 billion yen. In comparison, the cost
of the first Aegis DDG, when requested in
JFY 1988, was estimated to be 122 billion yen,
2.8 times that of a conventional destroyer and
1.8 times that of a Tartar DDG—a very expensive project for Japan and the JMSDF.
14. When the JFY 1988 budget was passed by the
Diet, a captain responsible for plans, policy,
and programs within the JMSDF said (the
author, then a commander and an action officer in the Aegis DDG program, recalls this
remark as if it were yesterday), “This does not
mean our loss. It is our great victory to have
been able to secure budget for a first Aegis
DDG. The next chance will surely come fifteen years from now when JMSDF will replace our first DDH Haruna. A lot will be
expected of younger generations who are
now from lieutenant to captain.”
15. The LSTs of the Miura class (2,500 tons fully
loaded, three ships) and the smaller Atsumi
class (1,800 tons, three ships) were designed
to a World War II concept and were built in
Japan. Their main characteristic was their
ability to beach. This capability facilitated
loading and unloading of vehicles and personnel, at the cost of extremely slow speed.
These ships’ design maximum speed was
fourteen knots; however, their cruising speed
was actually about ten knots, due to their flat
bottoms. JMSDF LSTs are officially designated “transport ships.”
16. See Koda, “Present and Future of JMSDF
Ships,” p. 129. The concept of Maritime Operational Transport is to deliver JGSDF reinforcement units to an area where an enemy
landing is possible or probable, or where an

59

19. The authorized personnel strength of flotilla
headquarters was calculated on the basis of
flotilla operations as a training force in peacetime. In particular, the number of flag
watch-standers needed for long-term operations was not considered—only that required
for exercises and training evolutions of limited duration. This reality reflected the position and policy of the government until the
end of the Cold War—that is, not to deploy
the JSDF on any real-world missions other
than responses to direct aggression against Japan. With the end of the Cold War, the government reviewed its policy and started
deploying forces on various international
missions. Even so, due to shrinking budgets
and a difficult recruiting environment, only
slight increases in flotilla staffs could be managed. To address this gap, the JMSDF decided
to form mission-oriented headquarters for
each real-world deployment, such as support
operations in the northern Indian Ocean/
Arabian Gulf and antipiracy off the coast of
Somalia. Extra staff members would be
added, depending on the given task. Nonetheless, the above-mentioned deployments
involved only one or two destroyers and an
oiler; the Combat Information Center of a
destroyer is adequate for the commander of a
force that size. Next DDH is the first ship to
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have a “king size” FIC for full-scale flotilla
operations.
20. For a widely read Western account, see David
C. Evans and Mark R. Peattie, Kaigun:

Strategy, Tactics, and Technology in the Imperial Japanese Navy, 1887–1941 (Annapolis,
Md.: Naval Institute Press, 1997), esp. chap.
6.
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THE GREAT GREEN FLEET
The U.S. Navy and Fossil-Fuel Alternatives
Lieutenant Alaina M. Chambers, U.S. Navy, and Steve A. Yetiv

O

n 16 December 1907 President Teddy Roosevelt launched the deployment
of sixteen brand-new, glistening white, steam-powered battleships on a
1
fourteen-month circumnavigation of the globe. Later known as the “Great
White Fleet,” the armada demonstrated America’s new ability to project its
power abroad and represented a turning point in global power politics. The
cruise is still widely recognized as an important achievement for the U.S. Navy.
In the century since then, in which the United States has emerged as the world’s
sole superpower, its navy has made some strides in transforming itself for the
purpose of dealing with new and emerging global threats. It continues to face
such challenges, and it remains to be seen how effecLieutenant Chambers is a master’s student in the Gradtive it will be with its ongoing transformation.
uate Program in International Studies at Old DominThe complexities of projecting American power
ion University, in Norfolk, Virginia. She holds a BS in
political science from the University of Tennessee at
abroad have been compounded by an array of costs
Chattanooga. She has served as a member of the Bataan
that are increasingly associated with the use of fossil
Expeditionary Strike Group and U.S. Joint Forces Comfuels. The American public and peoples around the
mand, completing deployments to the Persian Gulf and
Indian Ocean, Caribbean, and Afghanistan.
world are gradually recognizing that oil dependence is
Dr. Yetiv is University Professor of Political Science and
a major problem and that it is crucial to develop a seriInternational Studies at Old Dominion University. He
ous, long-term approach for dealing with it. The key
is author of The Absence of Grand Strategy (Johns
concerns related to oil use are now commonly expressed
Hopkins, 2008); Crude Awakenings: Global Oil Security and American Foreign Policy (Cornell University
—among them, that American oil dependence enPress, 2010); and Explaining Foreign Policy: U.S. Deriches and empowers some of its adversaries, includcision Making and the Gulf Wars (Johns Hopkins,
2011).
ing terrorists who use oil-related monies and states,
such as Iran, that fund their defense programs with oil
© 2011 by Alaina M. Chambers and Steve A. Yetiv
2
money; that reliance upon oil makes the United
Naval War College Review, Summer 2011, Vol. 64, No. 3
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States vulnerable to the vagaries of Middle East politics; and that oil consump3
tion contributes fundamentally to climate change. The use of alternative energies would also pose costs, but not the full array of these costs.
The American government as a whole and specifically the Department of Defense increasingly view fossil-fuel dependence as a national and international
security vulnerability. Their concerns not only revolve around the obvious issues of the costs of transportation and the protection of oil resources and infra4
structure but extend to broader problems as well. Thus, in 2007 the CNA
Military Advisory Board, made up of retired admirals and generals from across
the military services, issued a report that defined climate change as a key threat
to national security and world stability, a matter that required immediate atten5
tion. Expressing frustration with public reluctance to accept scientific findings
on climate change, a former Army Chief of Staff, General Gordon R. Sullivan,
addresses a core aspect of military decision making: “We never have 100 percent
certainty. . . . If you wait until you have 100 percent certainty, something bad is
going to happen on the battlefield. That’s something we know. You have to act
with incomplete information. You have to act based on the trend line. You have
6
to act based on your intuition sometimes.”
From a different perspective, the U.S. Joint Forces Command’s Joint Operating Environment, 2010 describes various threats posed by developing countries
like China, which is racing to acquire oil resources around the world as its de7
mand for oil rockets. The document, which speculates on global trends that
could impact future joint military forces, addresses significant concerns about
the destabilizing effects of American oil dependence. After all, future violent
conflicts and humanitarian disasters will be directly in the purview of the U.S.
military, whether caused by the stresses of climate change or an “arms race” over
8
natural resources.
Meanwhile, the Pentagon is struggling to identify the true cost of its 300,000
barrel-per-day consumption, factoring in the logistical costs of supplying de9
ployed units in Iraq, Afghanistan, and elsewhere. Estimates range from a hundred to six hundred dollars per gallon, depending on whether the fuel is trans10
ported in peaceful or hostile areas and by truck, aircraft, or helicopter. Delivery
11
to a ship at sea can cost from five to fifty times the market price. The cost of
transporting fuel in convoys to remote forward operating bases in hostile-fire
zones includes the loss of lives to roadside bombs or enemy attacks. Would
transporting alternative liquid fuels present similar logistical challenges? At
least one difference is that where electricity can replace fossil-fuel use through
innovative technologies (for example, in electric vehicles), it can be delivered in
safer ways and even be generated closer to the area of need. In any case, determining the “fully burdened cost of oil,” though not a hard science, takes into
https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol64/iss3/21
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account all of these realities and is a fundamental force behind the military’s
push for alternative energy.
{LINE-SPACE}
Though its 300,000 barrels per day represents less than 2 percent of total American oil consumption, the Defense Department is the single largest consumer in
12
the country. Of the services, at least 25 percent is allocated to the Navy, the second13
largest service consumer. The Army and Air Force have their own “green” energy initiatives, but this article focuses on the Navy’s diverse and important measures to tackle the problem of fossil-fuel dependence. Secretary of the Navy Ray
Mabus’s October 2009 energy vision addresses the Navy’s mission areas at sea,
ashore, and in the air. In the transformative spirit of the Great White Fleet, it envisions a “Great Green Fleet,” made up of nuclear carriers, hybrid electric
biofueled surface ships, and biofueled aircraft, supported by shore-based instal14
lations that run largely off renewable electricity. In spite of budget efficiency
reviews and realignments in 2010, the Navy is pressing ahead with energy projects.
This article makes two basic arguments. First, the U.S. Navy is engaged in what
appears to be a serious move away from oil dependence. The American military
is not generally viewed as a bastion of environmentally conscious innovation
—quite the contrary. The popular idea is that the military tends to be conservative and not progressive; for their part, specialists in national security and world
affairs tend not to think of the U.S. Navy as seeking novel ways to decrease oil dependence. They are more likely to view it as expending oil copiously and without
great concern for the implications of doing so.
In fact, however, like some other sectors of the military, the Navy is transforming itself in an attempt to break away from the conventional, fossil
fuel–driven energy market. Its developments in this arena should challenge perceptions of the military as conservative and behind the times. Secretary Mabus
freely acknowledges that the politically controversial topics of climate change,
“peak oil” (projections of when global petroleum extraction will reach a maximum and begin an inevitable decline), and green investment are the driving
forces behind his strategic plan. He and other Defense leaders have expressed
deep concern over the implications that reliance on fossil fuels could have on national security. The 2010 Quadrennial Defense Review declares, “Climate
15
change, energy security, and economic stability are inextricably linked.” The
report stresses that the effects of climate change are already being felt and that
16
they demand proactive engagement and collaboration. Among other effects,
rising sea levels, intensifying weather patterns, and the shrinking of arctic ice
caps all potentially affect the operating patterns of Navy maritime and expeditionary forces.
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Second, this article makes the argument that the Navy’s approach to the question of oil dependence merits attention. The U.S. government as a whole, as well
as international governments and companies, should be interested in the Navy’s
approaches, and increased cooperation among these actors would make eminent sense.
THE MABUS VISION
As we will see, the U.S. military has over decades taken steps to cut its dependence on foreign oil and move toward cleaner technology, but the low cost of oil
has heretofore limited incentives for doing so in a consistent and sustained manner. However, the high oil prices of 2008, which reached around $147 per barrel,
spurred greater interest in this regard, as did the election of President Barack
Obama, who has put energy and the creation of “green jobs” at the top of his
agenda.17 His Secretary of the Navy, the Honorable Ray Mabus, assuming the
role in June 2009, immediately accelerated the service’s shift to alternative energy. The Navy’s plan is highly ambitious.
The Navy appears to be moving in the right direction so far. In October 2009,
USS Makin Island (LHD 8), aptly nicknamed the “Prius of the Seas,” was commissioned as the first amphibious assault ship equipped with gas-turbine en18
gines and all-electric auxiliary machinery. On 22 April 2010, Earth Day, the
Navy publicly demonstrated a test “Green Hornet” variant of its most capable
fighter jet, the F/A-18 Super Hornet, powered by a fifty/fifty blend of biofuel and
19
conventional jet fuel. These technologies had been in development before Secretary Mabus’s appointment, but they represented major steps toward his goals.
Secretary Mabus’s naval energy plan comprises five key targets to be reached
in the next decade. First, half of all Department of the Navy (DoN) energy consumption ashore and afloat is to come from alternative sources by 2020. Second,
by 2020 half of all naval installations are to be “net zero” energy consumers,
producing electricity from renewable sources, such as solar, wind, ocean, and
geothermal power, even supplying excess energy to the civilian grid. Third, by
2012 the Navy is to have developed a “green” strike group, made up of nuclearpowered carriers, hybrid-electric-driven surface ships (their oil supplemented
by biofuel), and biofuel aircraft. By 2016, the force will begin an out-of-area deployment as the first strike group of a future “green fleet.” Fourth, by 2015 the
Navy is to cut by half the use of petroleum in its fifty-thousand-vehicle fleet of
cars, trucks, etc., by incorporating hybrid and electric vehicles.
Finally, the Navy is reforming its acquisition process. This initiative, which
addresses the Navy’s challenge of rising contracting costs generally, is to incor20
porate the lifetime cost of fuel in the consideration of new contracts. The acquisition process underwent intense scrutiny in 2010, especially the shipbuilding
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programs. While the fiscal year 2011 Defense Department budget increased,
some high-profile programs were cut due to increasing costs, including the pro21
jected next class of guided-missile destroyers, the DDG-1000. The Defense Department is now thoroughly reviewing budget efficiency and reallocating
money away from certain costly programs. Nonetheless, energy security and climate change remain key priorities. According to Secretary Mabus, the DDG1000’s hybrid-electric propulsion system will be backfitted into the existing
22
Arleigh Burke (DDG 51) class.
Though some may question whether the acquisition-reform initiative could
damage its predictability as a customer, the Navy will still be attractive to potential contractors. Its current budget allots about $200 million to energy projects
23
and research and development. Secretary Mabus has stated that DoN has “4.4
million acres of land, 72,500 buildings, 50,000 commercial vehicles, 3,800 air24
craft, 286 ships, and more than 900,000 employees.” Each ship requires about
ninety thousand barrels of fuel annually.
The required technology for becoming less dependent on oil exists but is not
fully developed. Some of this technology is designed for increasing the ability of
electricity to offset the use of fossil fuels, which, at present, is not significant. Increasing this ability translates chiefly into replacing oil with electricity where
most of the world’s oil is used—in transportation. Moving to a fleet of electric
and hybrid vehicles could accomplish this goal.
Also, if history is any indication, the “technological curve” should produce
higher-quality, lower-cost technologies over time. That has certainly been the
case with semiconductor-based consumer products and with internet routers
and switches. That is important because as long as oil remains relatively cheap,
such technologies may not be feasible to pursue without government subsidies
or market “triggers,” such as higher taxes on fossil fuels. This is where a customer
like DoN could play a role, serving as a predictable customer of green technolo25
gies, with a long-term demand. Even a comparatively small amount of money
could help stimulate a growing industry, especially with other branches of the
military following suit. Gradually larger military orders could drive innovation
and foster economies of scale. Once capable of filling bulk orders at competitive
cost, these burgeoning industries would be in a position to bid for private-sector
fuel contracts.
The Defense Energy Support Center (DESC) is the organization responsible
for acquiring and providing various types of fuel to the services, at standard
prices intended to provide some degree of protection against wild swings in the
26
market. The standard price, however, is subject to some fluctuation; from 2004
27
to 2005, it was adjusted ten times. In fiscal year 2008, when oil hit $147 per barrel, the Navy and Marine Corps consumed about 38.5 million barrels, with 38
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percent going to aviation, 25.5 percent to maritime forces, 31 percent to expedi28
tionary forces, and 5.5 percent to shore-based services. DoN’s fuel cost in29
creased from $1.2 billion to five billion per year, in one year. With further
instability in global oil markets looming, the pursuit of alternatives grows more
imperative for the Navy.
REVOLUTIONIZING ENERGY TECHNOLOGY TO POWER TACTICAL VEHICLES
“Tactical vehicles” are air, land, and sea-based “vehicles”—including, that is, aircraft, ships, and craft—that directly conduct or support military operations.
They represent the overwhelming majority of Navy and Marine Corps fuel consumption and present special challenges in terms of finding reliable alternative
fuels. Biofuels represent one of DoN’s most promising sources, but with current
technology they require extensive land and water resources to produce. For this
reason, Secretary Mabus is adamant that DoN sources of biofuel are not to compete with food crops, as has corn-based ethanol. This policy puts the Navy on
stronger political footing in developing biofuels.
Naval assets rely heavily on three types of fuel oil: JP-8 jet fuel, for shore-based
aircraft; JP-5, which has a higher flash point, for carrier-based aircraft; and F-76, a
maritime distillate fuel oil, for ships. Contracts have been let to pursue camelina,
a weedlike plant related to mustard, as an alternative to JP-5.30 Algae-based fuels
31
have proved promising as alternatives to JP-8 and, especially, F-76.
Unlike oxygenated fuels like ethanol, vegetable-based fuels, such as those derived from camelina, behave exactly like traditional jet fuel but cut “cradle to
32
grave” carbon emissions by 84 percent. The Green Hornet test flight on Earth
Day in 2010, burning a fifty/fifty mix of vegetable-based and traditional fuel,
demonstrated how far the technology has come—the Hornet “hardly knew the
33
difference.” Camelina-based fuel now costs about sixty-seven dollars per gallon, but with enough demand the cost could eventually be comparable to that of
34
fossil fuel. In 2009 DESC awarded the Sustainable Oils Company a $2.7 million
contract for forty thousand gallons, with the option to acquire an additional
35
150,000. This is a small amount of the Navy’s overall oil consumption but a
huge production goal for the infant industry. Camelina requires a fraction of the
water and fertilizer needed by other crops. It can be grown in marginal lands or
produced as a rotation crop with wheat, to prevent overexpansion of cultivated
36
land.
Navy contracts are being extended for algae-based biofuel as well. While
camelina has been more rapidly deployed, algae could be an able competitor.
Through a contract with Solazyme, in southern California, the Navy will allocate
$8.5 million toward 1,500 gallons for aircraft testing and twenty thousand for
https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol64/iss3/21
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maritime use, significantly more money per gallon than it will spend on the
37
camelina option. DoN accepted a delivery of twenty thousand gallons from
38
Solazyme in 2010 and extended a new order for 150,000 gallons. Like camelina,
algae do not compete with traditional food crops. Algae can be grown on brack39
ish, saltwater, or nonarable desert land, reducing the need to divert freshwater.
A skeptic might point to the sheer scale of the Navy’s biofuel goals. In order to
supply the Navy’s entire current demand for aviation fuel with algae, an estimated five hundred square miles of land would be required to grow the plants.
To bring the cost down to two dollars a gallon, carbon dioxide would have to be
40
transported from nearby conventional power plants; otherwise the cost jumps
41
to forty-four dollars. Similarly, without a program to manage land and infrastructure for biofuels, camelina grown in the amounts necessary to meet DoN
demand would require an area equivalent to between a quarter and a third of the
42
state of Montana. At present, these obstacles are prohibitive, as they are for
other forms of green energy. However, they could be surmounted as technology
progresses and economies of scale emerge. Advances, for instance, in battery
technology have allowed for a variety of electric and hybrid vehicles to gain traction in the market—a development that would not have been possible a decade
ago.
The Department of the Navy is not alone in its attempts to develop and test algaeand camelina-based fuels and bring down the costs of production. As jet fuel accounts for half of the Defense Department’s fuel consumption, the Air Force is
43
testing similar technology to develop a JP-8 equivalent. Both services could
benefit from the other’s success, as could the aviation industry. Additionally, the
Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency has awarded a $34.8 million contract to two companies to find ways to reduce the cost of algae-based fuel to
44
three dollars per gallon. This effort has been met with skepticism, but the
agency’s methods have proved successful in the past—notably with the com45
puter mouse, the Global Positioning System, and the internet.
Biofuel development, however, is only a part of the Navy’s strategy to transform its tactical vehicle fuel consumption; new technology for the weapons systems themselves represents another initiative. Makin Island is the first
amphibious assault ship to employ more efficient gas turbines instead of the tra46
ditional steam boilers. Additionally, it can shift to full-electric propulsion at
47
low speeds, perhaps up to 75 percent of the time it is under way. The new, comprehensive machinery-control system also allows the ship to switch readily between gas-turbine and auxiliary power.48 While it still must burn fuel to generate
electricity, the ship represents a leap forward in efficiency and fuel consumption
in comparison to its predecessors in the Wasp (LHD 1) class.
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Among U.S. warships, the Wasps are second in size only to nuclear aircraft
carriers and provide a vital capability to transport Marines, equipment, and aircraft and send them ashore. They are tremendously capable platforms and workhorses in today’s global environment, which increasingly presents needs for
littoral capabilities, from disaster relief to command and control for forces
ashore. With growing missions and deployments comes concern over cost. On
its first voyage, from the outfitting yard in Mississippi to its home port in San
49
Diego, Makin Island saved nearly two million dollars in fuel costs. If fuel prices
50
remained constant, the ship could save $250 million over its lifetime. Here is a
potential for tremendous fuel savings, especially as the technology proliferates
—to, for instance, USS America (LHA 6), the first of a new class of slightly
51
smaller but similarly equipped amphibious assault ships.
As mentioned above, hybrid electric drive is being developed for incorporation into new and existing Arleigh Burke guided-missile destroyers. These
Aegis-fitted ships are also fleet workhorses and thus present real opportunities
for fuel-cost savings; refitting the older units with these more efficient engines is
expected to save 8,500 barrels per ship per year. However, the technology still has
52
a long way to go. The contract must be finalized with General Atomics before
the prototype propulsion system is expected in 2012 and a full production unit
is installed in an Arleigh Burke to be launched in 2014, in time to meet the
53
green-strike-group goal of 2016.
Another important energy alternative is nuclear power, which the Navy already successfully employs in the eleven aircraft carriers and seventy-seven sub54
marines (at this writing) of its 286-ship fleet. The department assesses that 16
55
percent of its energy use is supplied by nuclear fuel. The nuclear navy represents the core of the Navy’s strategic power projection capability. For over
fifty-five years, DoN has maintained an excellent safety record through its high
56
standardization and quality education and training.
The expansion of nuclear propulsion into other naval platforms has also been
considered. For instance, it was recommended for the “Next Generation
Cruiser,” or CG(X), program as a way of offsetting the ship’s immense procure57
ment costs while meeting the demands of its advanced systems. Retrofiting of
58
large-deck amphibious ships with nuclear energy has also been suggested. If oil
prices remain above eighty dollars per barrel, the improvements would pay for
59
themselves over the life of the ship. Nuclear technology, however, is still extremely expensive. The CG(X) program was cut from the proposed fiscal year
2011 budget as too costly.60 Further, the high cost of manpower must be accounted for in nuclear power programs. Senior leaders have also expressed concern that further development of the civilian nuclear-power-generation sector
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as public fears ease could make it more difficult, and expensive, to retain highly
61
skilled specialists in the service.
THE TRANSITION TO ALTERNATIVE-FUEL NONTACTICAL
VEHICLES
The Navy’s plan to reduce petroleum consumption in its “nontactical” vehicle
fleet seems much less advanced than in the maritime and aviation areas.
Nontactical vehicles are commercial-type cars, trucks, and other automobiles
for travel or transport on and off military installations. They number upward of
fifty thousand vehicles but account for less than 25 percent of DoN energy use.62
Commercial vehicles, classed according to size, are acquired independently or
through the U.S. General Services Administration (GSA), which supplies fleet
63
vehicles to government agencies.
The Energy Policy Act of 1992 mandated that federal agencies make “alternative fuel vehicles” (AFVs) 75 percent of their light-duty acquisitions. In 2008
the definition of AFVs was expanded to include fuel-cell and hybrid-electric64
powered vehicles, among others. In compliance with this guidance, GSA has
led a consistent effort to shift to AFVs, but much of its focus is on “flex fuel” vehicles, capable of running on an ethanol mix. Advances in hybrid electric and
hydrogen fuel-cell technology have opened new opportunities for these vehicles, but Navy acquisition complications remain. For instance, until recently
the majority of manufacturers that produced these vehicles were not eligible
65
for GSA contracts.
The Navy’s 2007 AFV strategy highlighted some of the difficulties of the department’s transition. Many of the issues are still being addressed: organizational alignment, communication of energy goals and successes, infrastructure
to support AFVs, availability of alternative-energy vehicles through GSA lease,
66
and efficient employment of vehicles. Organizational alignment seems to be a
particular difficulty; there is no single effort spearheading the way toward rapid
transition to AFVs and only an uncertain strategy as to which alternative technology should be employed.
However, large commands are making significant strides toward meeting the
secretary’s energy goal. Navy Recruiting Command, one of the highest-mileage
users of the nontactical vehicle fleet, has ordered 297 Ford Fusion hybrid cars,
with the intention of converting 75 percent of its 5,100 vehicles to hybrids by
67
2020. Naval Facilities Engineering Command began a massive effort to employ clean “Neighborhood Electric Vehicles” (NEVs) and solar-powered, slowmoving vehicles in place of conventional vehicles for flight lines, ports, material handling, public-works maintenances, and base security on installations
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worldwide. NEVs are smaller than conventional vehicles and not necessarily
a direct replacement for them, but they are significantly cheaper, available
through the GSA, require no infrastructure changes, and generate large reduc69
tions in fuel costs. According to DoN, San Diego bases were able to cut about
fourteen thousand gallons of petroleum per year by switching to NEVs in fiscal
70
year 2005. Smaller commands are introducing diesel-electric buses, capable
of running on biodiesel, and performing initial small-scale tests with fuel-cell
71
vehicles.
SHORE-BASED RENEWABLE ENERGY GENERATION
DoN movement toward adopting renewable energy is not restricted to vehicle
fuel. The department is innovatively pursuing ocean-centric renewable energy
sources. These sources will contribute to DoN’s target of half of its shore-based
installations reaching net-zero consumption by 2020. One of these emerging
technologies is the Kinetic Hydropower System (KHPS) in Puget Sound. The
Navy plans to complete design, installation, test, and evaluation of the system in
two phases.72 The KHPS is made up of a small group of turbines, rigged to the
seabed, that generate power as they are turned by the immense volumes of water
73
moving regularly with the tide. The technology is very similar to wind power
but has much better predictability. Phase 1 of the project began in 2008, with the
goal of selecting a site and studying its environmental suitability. Phase 2 of the
74
project will involve actual design, production, and testing. Similar tests are also
exploring the potential of harnessing wave power for electricity generation.
Scientists are grasping the incredible potential of harnessing the ocean for
power generation, and this knowledge may now be meshing with the Navy’s
strategic plans. For instance, the Lockheed Martin Corporation received an $8.1
million contract from the Navy in 2009 to support development of an offshore
power plant that uses the thermal energy trapped in the upper layers of tropical
75
seas to generate electricity. A subsequent $4.4 million contract was awarded in
2010 to advance the design; a pilot Ocean Thermal Energy Conversion (OTEC)
plant is expected to begin operations in 2012. Conceptual designs of OTEC resemble offshore oil-drilling platforms, but in fact it is an “extremely large heat
76
pump.” Warm ocean water on the surface would be used to heat a liquid, such
as ammonia, causing it to evaporate; the vapor would turn turbine generators,
77
producing electricity. In the last step, the cooled water would be pumped back
into the ocean at a depth with a comparable temperature, in order to prevent algae blooms and other environmentally damaging effects of tampering with the
78
delicate temperature balance of the ocean. Naval Station Pearl Harbor in Hawaii will host the first OTEC plant. Maturity of this technology could have
far-reaching impacts, not only for power generation on the Pacific, Gulf of
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Mexico, and southeastern Atlantic coasts but also for about eighty-five countries
79
in tropical climate zones across the globe that are within reach of the coast.
KHPS and OTEC are still years away from providing viable energy alternatives, but the Navy already runs installations that generate their own power
based in whole or in part from renewable fuels. Naval Station Guantanamo Bay,
Cuba, maintains wind turbines to supplement its power needs and is exploring
80
the possibility of incinerating landfill as a power source. Most notably, the
Navy’s geothermal facility at China Lake, California, has been supplying its own
power and selling its excess power back into the regional commercial grid since
1987, generating a total of $197 million from royalties and conserved-power
81
credit. The Navy has put much of that money back into geothermal research,
82
maintenance, and the preservation of “historic and natural resources.” From
1989 to 2003, China Lake spent about $125.7 million, two-thirds of its geothermal revenue, on twenty-seven irrigation and energy-conservation programs.
Among other projects, these funds were used to install a solar-energy system at
the Marine Corps Air Ground Combat Center, Twentynine Palms, California,
83
eliminating its dependence on the electric grid.
INCREASING EFFICIENCY
At least 220 of today’s Navy’s 286 ships will still be in service in 2020 as part of
the “Great Green Fleet.” In order to meet alternative-energy standards, they will
have to be retrofited with new power-generating equipment and hull alterations. Upgrades to hull design—reducing wave resistance, altering water flow,
and cutting drag—can be costly, but they can increase fuel efficiency tremendously, saving millions of dollars. Three of these technologies have been
retrofited to various surface ships during dry-dock availabilities: bulbous bows,
84
stern flaps, and propeller and hull coatings. A bulbous bow, or forefoot, looks
rather like a large finger extending from the bow of a vessel at the waterline. Bulbous bows are used widely in commercial shipping and can cut fuel consump85
tion on surface ships like destroyers by 3.9 percent. Stern flaps are small
extensions above the screws and rudders that lengthen the hull and alter the flow
86
of water, cutting fuel consumption by 6–7.5 percent. New “antifouling” hull
and propeller coatings prevent barnacle and marine growth that creates drag,
87
potentially saving up to $180,000 per year per ship.
The Navy has also reduced its energy use by implementing simple changes at
the unit and operational levels, such as acquiring high-efficiency light bulbs,
mandating electricity- and water-conservation measures, and raising general
awareness among service members. Such measures could be extended to the
public in general in many instances, saving significant amounts of energy.
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The Navy has also employed simulated, “virtual” training in lieu of live exercises, saving the cost of fuel. The Naval Sea Systems Command has spearheaded
the Incentivized Energy Conservation (I-ENCON) program to help raise energy
88
conservation awareness in the fleet. The program sends representatives to meet
with ship crew members about fuel saving and distributes monetary awards and
89
cash incentives to commands achieving the best results. The awards go to command discretionary funds, which can be used to acquire equipment for the ship
90
or contribute to morale, welfare, and recreation programs. In the first half of
91
2010 alone, I-ENCON conservation initiatives saved 386,000 barrels of fuel.
BROADER LESSONS AND SYNERGIES
DoN’s alternative-energy strategy has been criticized as overambitious. Some of
these criticisms deserve consideration. After all, some of the new energy technologies discussed here are still in their infancy and face significant technological hurdles; others are prohibitively expensive at present and are many years
away from being serious competitors to oil. Many of the alternatives, such as nuclear power, reduce carbon emissions but present environmental challenges of
their own, such as waste disposal. These impediments will, in the short term,
make a switch to alternative energies difficult without significant incentives and
visionary leadership. In any case, careful, comparative cost-benefit analyses are
necessary.
However, with these caveats in mind, the move toward green energies and alternative technologies appears to be quite positive. The U.S. Navy is a sensible
laboratory for testing and advancing these energies. Indeed, the American public is still divided on the subjects of climate change and fossil-fuel dependence,
and that makes it harder for Congress or the president to implement effective
market-stimulus measures. The U.S. military culture, though bedeviled by its
own bureaucratic politics, is somewhat insulated from civilian political deadlock and the demands of public opinion; at least, its officials do not have to seek
reelection.
The Navy is also known to be focused on preparing for national security
threats. Polling data imply that the American public broadly trusts the U.S. military and its leadership to make decisions that will protect national security. It
also expects the military to equip itself with the best, most innovative technology that money can buy. In the proposed fiscal year 2011 budget, the Department of Defense and Department of Veterans Affairs were two of only three
departments to see increases in funding. By contrast, start-up energy companies
are vulnerable to interest rates, limited cash flow, and other market factors.
Many of them cannot sustain profitable operations long enough to reach important results.
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One resounding message made by Navy and Defense Department leaders in
arenas like last year’s Quadrennial Defense Review process is that serious threats
to national security are arising from dependence on fossil fuel, especially on foreign oil shipped through dangerous sea-lanes from some of the world’s least stable regions. Although threats to the free flow of oil may have been exaggerated in
the past three decades, a range of such threats could arise at any time under difficult circumstances—terrorist attacks on oil infrastructure, war in the Persian
92
Gulf, and instability in key oil-producing states. Recent uprisings in the Middle East, for instance, have generated fears that the Suez Canal might be affected
by the turmoil or the spread of uprisings across North Africa and the Persian
Gulf.
The Navy and other services are setting good examples by actively seeking energy solutions, in spite of skepticism and political controversy. Their programs
can help spur similar efforts in other agencies and the private sector, but they
still only represent a small percentage of the country’s total consumption. Nonetheless, the Navy’s experience offers some broader lessons and synergies, beyond
oil dependence. For instance, as we have seen, DoN is innovatively pursuing renewable sources of electricity generation. Such power could produce needed
electricity in the future when demand outstrips supply; simply pursuing alternative fuels, as such, is counterproductive if it means increased dependence on
electricity generated by such sources as coal. The Navy’s pursuit of multiple avenues for not only alternative fuels but renewable energy technology merits
attention.
Electricity generated by sustainable methods could also help run a much
larger fleet of electric vehicles. Indeed, creating more electricity does little to decrease oil dependence, because, as noted, Americans (and others around the
world) put the bulk of their oil into their gas tanks. Electricity (whether solar,
wind, nuclear, coal, or whatever) does not do much to decrease fuel consumption. We can’t put electricity in a gas tank. However, studies show that a vehicle
fleet of “plug-ins” could achieve mileages over eighty-four miles per gallon,
compared to America’s present average of twenty-three. In this way, used to run
a national fleet of vehicles, electricity could in fact decrease oil consumption.
In terms of synergies, it may be that the Navy’s research into alternative energies
such as algae may dovetail with similar efforts under way in academic and business
circles. Indeed, the Navy is a great laboratory for testing the value of algae-based approaches. One challenge of such approaches is to reduce costs relative to oil, partly
by decreasing how much energy is used to operate them and partly by increasing
their energy output. Progress in both areas might be achieved more effectively
through greater cooperation among the Navy and academic and business actors.
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Clearly there are significant costs to transforming energy consumption, and
ultimately, without a major shift in the total population’s consumption behavior
the effect of individual shifts to alternative energy and technology will be minimal. But the progress made by the Navy and other services offers promise that
the obstacles are not impossible to overcome. In the long run, the benefits for the
United States include boosting the economy and the job market through investments in new energy industries and gaining strategic advantage in the global energy market as resources become scarce. In the meantime, the U.S. military
could maintain a globally deployable force, relatively isolated from fluctuations
in the oil market—an advantage over potential adversaries still dependent on
traditional fuels obtained from distant or unstable regions. Should those adversaries develop alternative power for their militaries first, the roles might be
reversed.
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THE “OTHER” LAW OF THE SEA
Commander Andrew J. Norris, U.S. Coast Guard

T

he 1982 United Nations Law of the Sea Convention (UNCLOS) is, quite understandably, viewed by many as the “be all, end all” statement and source of
the law of the sea. Not only does the convention’s name imply that it occupies the
field, so to speak, but its sheer size, scope, ubiquity, and near-universal acceptance support such a perception. Even the United States, which has not ratified
UNCLOS, considers most of its provisions to reflect, or to have achieved the status of, customary international law and thus to be binding on nations that do
not specifically decline to adhere to them.
The reality, however, is that while UNCLOS provides an overall framework
for legal governance of the world’s oceans and codifies such important principles as freedom of the high seas and flag-state primacy, it is by no means the single, definitive statement of the law of the sea. Other significant international
conventions are widely accepted and fill some gaps in the UNCLOS framework.
Importantly, many of these “other” sources of the law of the sea provide coastal
and port states like the United States substantial
Commander Norris originally served in the U.S. Navy
power and authority to safeguard vital safety, security,
(1985–89) as a Surface Warfare Officer. After graduation in 1993 from the University of Florida (JD with
and environmental interests within their maritime
honors) and commissioning in the U.S. Coast Guard,
zones, including the exclusive economic zone, contighe served in a variety of legal billets, most recently as seuous zone, territorial sea, and internal waters. The
nior attorney/adviser (staff judge advocate) for the
Fourteenth Coast Guard District. He is currently a
United States has ratified many of these conventions
member of the International Law Department in the
and incorporated their provisions into domestic law.
Center for Naval Warfare Studies at the Naval War
This article will discuss and analyze aspects of this
College. He is the author or editor of a number of articles and two textbooks used at the U.S. Coast Guard
supporting array of international maritime law. It will
Academy.
begin by examining UNCLOS to set out its basic
framework for governance of the world’s oceans. It
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will next discuss the particulars of less widely discussed sources of the law of the
sea in the vessel safety, security, and pollution realms, and demonstrate how they
add “fabric,” greater fidelity, to UNCLOS’s general framework. The article will
then discuss specifics of the American port-state control program—the means
by which the United States, as a coastal/port state, utilizes control measures
made available to it by these “other” sources of the law of the sea to ensure that
visiting foreign vessels adhere to minimal international standards. Finally,
through an analysis of U.S. port-state control program statistics and recent domestic case law, the article will assess the effectiveness of the legal regime prescribed by this “other” law of the sea.
UNCLOS
UNCLOS is, in many respects, an amazing treaty. Hailed as “possibly the most
significant legal instrument of [the twentieth] century,” UNCLOS strikes a delicate balance between freedom of navigation and utilization of the oceans on the
one hand, and on the other, sovereign rights and control over the ocean and its
resources.1 It solves long-standing issues that had proved to be intractable (e.g.,
the allowable breadth of the territorial sea) and creates new legal regimes to reflect evolving state practice (such as the exclusive economic zone). Against a
backdrop of overweening national self-interest, it achieves a remarkable degree
of consensus and compromise in areas that significantly impact national sovereignty and sovereign rights, particularly over resources—matters that have his2
torically caused nations to go to, or threaten, war.
The first major thing UNCLOS does is establish the limits of various maritime zones and delineate who can do what in each zone, in the airspace above
them, and with respect to the resources of the water column, the seabed, and the
3
subsoil within each zone. UNCLOS permits a coastal state to declare a territo4
rial sea that extends up to twelve nautical miles from its baseline; it further permits claims to, and exercise of, sovereignty over all waters shoreward of the
5
twelve-nautical-mile line. These waters, comprising the territorial sea and a
state’s internal waters (the latter term referring to all waters landward of the
baseline), are collectively known as “territorial waters.” The rest of the world’s
6
waters are known as “international waters” and are divided into three zones: a
“contiguous zone,” which can extend from the outer edge of a nation’s territorial
7
sea up to twenty-four nautical miles from its baseline; an “exclusive economic
zone” (EEZ), which can extend from the outer edge of a nation’s territorial sea
8
up to two hundred nautical miles from its baseline; and the high seas, which are
9
all waters seaward of declared EEZs. International waters are not “owned” by
any nation, though, as we shall see, UNCLOS does permit nations to exercise
limited sovereign rights in international waters.
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Second, UNCLOS codifies the doctrine of flag-state primacy. A “flag state” is
a nation that confers its nationality upon ships and grants such ships the right to
fly its flag. A ship has the nationality of the state whose flag it is entitled to fly; it
does not necessarily have the nationality of, for example, its owner or operator
(individual or corporate), crew, etc., unless any of the latter happen to be of the
10
same nationality as the flag state. Thus, a ship that is owned by an American corporation, operated by a Greek shipping company, crewed by a mixed-nationality
crew, and flagged in Panama is a Panamanian vessel. It is critically important for
vessels, especially those involved in legitimate international trade, to be flagged
by some nation. The alternative, not to be flagged by any nation, is to be without
nationality, stateless. Vessels without nationality are “international pariahs,”
without an internationally recognized right to navigate freely on the high seas
11
and subject to the exercise of jurisdiction and control by all nations. Clearly,
the benefits to owners and operators of having flag states—ensuring their vessels
can navigate freely, without being impeded by officials of non-flag-state nations
except in tightly limited circumstances—outweigh the burdens and costs of
flagging their vessels in particular nations.
But there are burdens and costs that come with permission to fly a nation’s
flag—paramount among them subjection to the law-enforcement and regulatory jurisdiction of the flag state. The term “jurisdiction” includes the right to
prescribe laws and regulations that are to apply aboard a particular vessel (that
is, “jurisdiction to prescribe”), the right to enforce those laws and regulations in
civil or criminal tribunals (“jurisdiction to enforce and adjudicate”), and an implied right to “interfere” with the vessel to the extent necessary to exercise that
12
jurisdiction. Not only do vessels flagged by a nation become subject to its criminal laws, but UNCLOS specifically grants flag states the authority and responsibility to assert regulatory control over their vessels as well. This control includes
the right and obligation to take regulatory measures designed to ensure safety at
sea with regard to, inter alia, the construction, equipment, and seaworthiness of
vessels; the crewing of vessels; and the ability of vessels to communicate effec13
tively to avoid collisions. Examples of such measures include periodic surveying of vessels and ensuring that adequate charts and navigational devices are
carried; that crews are of appropriate size, certification, and training; and that
crews observe “applicable international regulations” concerning safety and envi14
ronmental stewardship. In short, the flag state assumes, and owners/operators
15
accede to, full responsibility for, and jurisdiction over, vessels that fly its flag.
Having introduced UNCLOS’s maritime zones and the notion of flag-state primacy, we can now turn to the regime’s most important function—prescribing
(in the absence of superseding agreements to the contrary) who can do what,
16
where, on and in the world’s oceans. There are four classes of nation-states under
https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol64/iss3/21
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the UNCLOS scheme that have interests and equities in activities in and on the
oceans: flag states, port states, coastal states, and third-party states. The extent of
a nation’s interests and equities will vary, depending on which of the four classes
it falls into, the maritime zone at issue, the activities occurring within that zone,
and the nationality of the vessel engaging in them. Two equities are of particular
significance: first, the right to exercise authority, jurisdiction, and control over
17
vessels; and second, the right to control the utilization of resources, whether
living or nonliving.
To start with the high seas—vessels of all nations enjoy “freedom of the high
seas,” which includes, among other things, freedom of navigation and of fish18
ing. Though not specifically enumerated in UNCLOS, freedom of navigation
includes a freedom from interference—that is, the right of a vessel flagged by
19
one state to proceed unmolested by officials from another state. This idea is
codified in UNCLOS article 92, which states that on the high seas, flag states
have, with limited exceptions, exclusive jurisdiction over vessels that fly their
20
flags. In practical terms, this means—again, with limited exceptions—that
only flag-state officials may interfere with the free navigation of their flagged
vessels (by stopping and boarding them, for example) and take law-enforcement
action as warranted (including arrest and seizure, with a view toward prosecution) aboard them on the high seas.
When a vessel flagged by one state leaves the high seas and enters the maritime zones of a coastal/port state, however, the flag state’s jurisdiction over that
vessel, though it still exists in full force, is no longer exclusive. The coastal/port
state gains concurrent jurisdictional rights over that vessel, rights that increase
21
as the vessel gets closer to land. For example (moving shoreward from the high
seas), UNCLOS grants coastal states “sovereign rights” in their EEZ to “explore,
exploit, conserve, and manage” the resources, both living and nonliving, both
22
within the water column and on and below the seabed. Included within the
concept of sovereign rights is the right of the coastal state to exercise jurisdiction
so as to prevent and punish infractions by vessels, wherever flagged, of its resource23
related laws. Thus, a foreign vessel suspected of fishing in a coastal state’s EEZ
in violation of that state’s resource laws can be boarded and searched by officials
of the coastal state; further, it can be subjected to seizure and enforcement action
in tribunals of the coastal state if a violation is confirmed. These coastal-state
resource-related jurisdictional rights exist concurrently with flag-state rights;
in other words, the flag state could choose to prohibit resource-related infractions by its vessels in foreign EEZs and could punish such violations in its own
tribunals, in addition to whatever enforcement actions the coastal state takes.
The flag state retains exclusive jurisdiction over its vessels for any nonresource
24
infractions committed by or on board its vessels while in another nation’s EEZ.
Published by U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons, 2011
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The EEZ jurisdictional regime discussed above is wholly applicable within
the contiguous zone as well, as that zone is entirely contained within the EEZ. In
addition, UNCLOS empowers a coastal state in its contiguous zone to “exercise
the control necessary” to prevent or, in the case of a vessel departing its territorial waters, punish violations of its fiscal, immigration, sanitary, or customs
25
(known as FISC) laws. Thus, for example, the coastal state could exercise jurisdiction as necessary, including enforcement action in its tribunals, against a foreign vessel that was intercepted in the contiguous zone while attempting to
smuggle prohibited items from the coastal state (a customs violation). Again,
these coastal-state jurisdictional rights in its contiguous zone are exercised concurrently with those of the flag state, which retains exclusive jurisdiction over its
vessels in all other respects (i.e., for all nonresource, non-FISC violations) while
its vessels are in foreign contiguous zones.
A coastal state’s jurisdictional rights over a foreign vessel increase significantly once the vessel crosses from international waters into that state’s territorial waters (that is, as defined above, its territorial sea and internal waters).
UNCLOS provides a coastal state broad authority in its territorial sea to prescribe laws that apply to all vessels, including foreign vessels. Examples of what
the coastal state has the right to prescribe are its criminal, fiscal, immigration,
26
sanitary, customs, pollution, and navigational-safety laws and regulations.
There are only two explicit limitations in UNCLOS on the coastal state’s jurisdiction to prescribe. First, it may not prescribe laws relating to foreign vessel design, construction, manning, or equipment, unless they merely implement
international regulations; as we have seen, and pursuant to UNCLOS article 94,
27
such matters are the province of the flag state. Second, it may not prescribe laws
so burdensome that they have the practical effect of preventing vessels from exercising a fundamental navigational right in foreign territorial seas—that is, the
28
right of innocent passage.
UNCLOS defines “innocent passage” as a foreign vessel’s right to pass, in a
continuous and expeditious manner, through a coastal state’s territorial sea as
long as during the passage the vessel engages in no act that prejudices the peace,
29
good order, or security of the coastal state. The significance here of the right of
innocent passage is that a coastal state’s enforcement jurisdiction—whether
criminal or civil—over a foreign vessel that is legitimately in innocent passage is
limited to a certain degree. First of all, a vessel driven into territorial waters due
to distress or entering them to assist another vessel or aircraft is generally exempt
from coastal-state enforcement of its domestic laws that would otherwise have
30
governed that vessel’s entry. Second, the coastal state generally is prohibited
from arresting anyone aboard a vessel in innocent passage or from taking any
steps, including conducting a criminal investigation aboard the vessel, in
https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol64/iss3/21
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response to a criminal act that may have occurred before the vessel entered the
31
territorial sea. Finally, with respect to a violation occurring aboard a foreign
vessel during its innocent passage, if the vessel has no intention of calling at one
of its roadsteads or ports, the coastal state should not exercise its enforcement
jurisdiction over that vessel except in very limited circumstances: if the consequences of the violation extend to the coastal state; if the violation is of a kind to
disturb the peace of the country or the good order of the territorial sea; if the
master of the ship or a diplomatic agent or consular officer of the flag state has
requested the assistance of local authorities; or if enforcement proceedings are
necessary for the suppression of illicit traffic in narcotic drugs or psychotropic
32
substances. It is important to note that this limitation in coastal-state enforcement jurisdiction with respect to a violation occurring aboard a foreign vessel
during its innocent passage is “hortatory” only (“should not exercise its enforcement jurisdiction”)—that is, not mandatory under international law but a discretionary exercise of coastal-state comity.
A foreign vessel that is in a coastal state’s territorial sea but not in innocent
passage is subject to the full legislative and enforcement jurisdiction of the
33
coastal state; after all, it is in the state’s sovereign waters. Similarly, a port state
has full sovereignty over its internal waters and has plenary jurisdiction over foreign vessels while they are there (there is no right of innocent passage in internal
34
waters). The port state retains plenary jurisdiction over a foreign vessel passing
through its territorial sea after a call at one of the coastal state’s ports for offenses
35
committed there. With respect to a vessel transiting through its territorial sea
on the way to its internal waters, the port state has the right to take the necessary
steps—including denial of entry—while the vessel is still in the territorial sea to
prevent any breach of the conditions to which admission to internal waters is
36
subject.
Although under the UNCLOS framework a coastal/port state exercises increasing jurisdiction over a foreign vessel as the vessel approaches that
state—particularly when the vessel intends to call on the state—UNCLOS is deliberately devoid of specifics in many areas. For example, while, as discussed
above, UNCLOS permits a coastal state to adopt pollution laws and regulations
applicable to foreign vessels in its territorial sea, the regime provides no guidance as to the nature and scope of such laws and regulations, other than that they
must be “in conformity with the provisions of [UNCLOS] and other rules of international law.”37 Also, again as discussed above, under UNCLOS the flag state
is principally responsible for vessel design, construction, manning, and equipment; coastal/port states may not apply their laws to foreign vessels in this realm,
“unless they are giving effect to generally accepted international rules or stan38
dards.” But UNCLOS provides no guidance as to what such “generally accepted”
Published by U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons, 2011
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standards are, nor does it purport to set or adopt any. As the following section
will show, UNCLOS does not need to do so; these standards are set by other
widely accepted multilateral maritime treaties—the “other” law of the sea.
THE “FABRIC” OF THE UNCLOS FRAMEWORK
UNCLOS relies for these purposes on dozens of such conventions, but this article will focus on five that are particularly significant and wide-ranging: the International Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea (the SOLAS Convention);
the International Management Code for the Safe Operation of Ships and for Pollution Prevention (ISM Code); the International Convention on Standards of
Training, Certification and Watchkeeping for Seafarers (STCW Convention);
the International Convention for the Prevention of Pollution from Ships
(MARPOL Convention); and the International Ship and Port Facility Security
Code (ISPS Code).
Before turning to the specifics, however, a few background topics need to be
discussed. The first of these is the “organization that has probably had the most
substantial direct effect on the law of the sea”—the International Maritime Organization.39 The IMO is the “United Nations’ specialized agency with responsibility for the safety and security of shipping and the prevention of marine
40
pollution by ships.” The convention establishing the IMO was adopted in 1948
and came into effect in 1958; the IMO’s first meeting was held in 1959. Most of
its work is done in committees, including the Maritime Safety Committee, the
Marine Environment Protection Committee, and the Legal Committee. These
bodies identify needs for new conventions or for amendments to existing ones.
All of the important conventions to be discussed in this section were adopted
under the auspices of the IMO, which today oversees the process of keeping
these conventions abreast of developments in maritime and related industries.
The second preliminary point is the role of nongovernmental entities in helping flag states carry out their responsibilities. These entities fall into two categories: “recognized organizations” (in this context, classification societies) and
“recognized security organizations” (RSOs). A classification society is an organization that “establish[es] and appl[ies] technical standards in relation to the
design, construction and survey of marine related facilities including ships and
41
offshore structures.” An RSO is an entity that an ISPS signatory state may authorize to undertake certain security-related activities on its behalf, including
approval of Ship Security Plans or amendments thereto; verification and certification of ships’ compliance with ISPS requirements; and conduct of Port Facil42
ity Security Assessments. The significance of these nongovernmental entities,
of both kinds, is that the extent to which any given foreign vessel is likely to be selected for safety or security examination depends on the demonstrated,
https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol64/iss3/21
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historical performance not only of its flag state but also of the nongovernmental
entity to which those responsibilities have been “subcontracted.”
Finally, the “other” law of the sea, like UNCLOS, consists of treaties that are
notionally binding only on signatory states. Thus, theoretically, nonsignatory
nations do not have to comply with their standards, and coastal/port states cannot formally utilize the specific provisions of these treaties when taking, or anticipating the need to take, control actions aboard vessels of nonsignatory states.
But the reality is that the vast majority of nations in general, and flag states in
particular, have adopted them. A very few vessels flagged by nonsignatory states
do engage in international trade; it can certainly be argued, however, that many
of the provisions of the supplementary instruments are so widely adhered to
that they have acquired the status of customary international law, binding for
those states too, if they have not expressly “opted out.” This argument, coupled
with UNCLOS’s grant of authority to port/coastal states to ensure foreign vessel
adherence to “other rules of international law” and “generally accepted international rules or standards,” gives such states significant clout over vessels flagged
43
by states that have not specifically adopted those rules and standards.
The SOLAS Convention. The International Convention for the Safety of Life at
Sea, 1974, as amended, prescribes minimum standards for the construction,
equipment, and operation of ships. The genesis for the convention was the disastrous RMS Titanic sinking in 1912, which led to the first iteration of SOLAS in
44
1914. Since then it has been comprehensively revised several times. The most
recent version, that of 1974, entered into force on 25 May 1980; it has been
adopted by 159 nations, including the United States, which collectively represent
45
99.04 percent of world shipping tonnage. According to the IMO, “the SOLAS
Convention in its successive forms is generally regarded as the most important
46
of all international treaties concerning the safety of merchant ships.”
The real substance of SOLAS is in the annex, which is divided into twelve
chapters, as follows: chapter I, “General Provisions”; chapter II-1, “Construction
Subdivision and Stability, Machinery and Electrical Installations”; chapter II-2,
“Fire Protection, Fire Detection, and Fire Extinction”; chapter III, “Life-Saving
Appliances and Arrangements”; chapter IV, “Radiocommunications”; chapter
V, “Safety of Navigation”; chapter VI, “Carriage of Cargoes”; chapter VII, “Carriage of Dangerous Goods”; chapter VIII, “Nuclear Ships”; chapter IX, “Management for the Safe Operation of Ships”; chapter X, “Safety Measures for
High-Speed Craft”; chapter XI-1, “Special Measures to Enhance Maritime
Safety”; chapter XI-2, “Special Measures to Enhance Maritime Security”; and
chapter XII, “Additional Safety Measures for Bulk Carriers.”

Published by U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons, 2011

NWC_2011SummerReview.ps
\\data1\john.lanzieri.ctr$\msdata\Desktop\NavalWarCollege\NWC_2011SummerReview\NWC_2011SummerReview.vp
Tuesday, April 19, 2011 11:14:55 AM

91

Color profile: Disabled
Composite Default screen

86

Naval War College Review, Vol. 64 [2011], No. 3, Art. 21

NAVAL WAR COLLEGE REVIEW

Within each chapter are detailed standards that establish minimum performance benchmarks in each area. Flags states are responsible for their vessels’
compliance with these standards and for certifying compliance; examples include the Safety Construction Certificate, Safety Equipment Certificate, Safety
Radio Certificate, and Passenger Ship Safety Certificate. The convention permits
port states to inspect such certificates aboard foreign vessels and to conduct further examinations, and possibly take control measures, if onboard conditions
clearly do not comport with the certificates.
The ISM Code. The International Management Code for the Safe Operation of
Ships and for Pollution Prevention was adopted in 1993 in response to human
errors or omissions that had apparently played causal roles in significant marine
47
casualties during the 1980s. In 2002, IMO Resolution MSC.99(73) created a
new chapter IX (“Management for the Safe Operation of Ships”) in SOLAS incorporating the ISM Code into that convention; as a result, all SOLAS signatory
nations are also now bound by the code. To accomplish its goal of promoting
safety and environmental protection through the minimization of human error,
the ISM Code requires shipowners and other persons, such as managers or
bareboat charterers, who assume responsibility for operating the ship (we will
refer to them below, generically, as “the company”) to implement Safety Management Systems.48 These systems (mostly in the form of checklists) must be
documented and maintained in a Safety Management Manual to be kept on
board the vessel.
A Safety Management System should contain the following functional
elements:

• A safety and environmental-protection policy
• Instructions and procedures to ensure safe operation of ships and protection of the environment in compliance with relevant international and
flag-state legislation

• Defined levels of authority and lines of communication between, and
among, shore and shipboard personnel

• Procedures for reporting accidents and nonconformities with the provisions of the code

• Procedures to prepare for and respond to emergency situations
• Procedures for internal audits and management reviews.49
Examples of instructions and checklists required in the Safety Management
Manual are those that define various tasks and assign qualified personnel to
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carry out key shipboard operations that impact the safety of the ship and the
prevention of pollution; that establish procedures to identify, describe, and respond to potential emergency shipboard situations and establish a program for
drills and exercises to prepare for emergency actions; and that establish procedures to ensure that the ship is maintained in conformity with the provisions of
relevant rules and regulations and with any additional requirements that may be
established by the company.
Flag states are primarily responsible for ensuring their vessels’ compliance
with the ISM Code, since it is part of SOLAS. A signatory flag state attests to a
company’s compliance with ISM by issuing certificates, which include a Document of Compliance, issued to the operating company upon verification that it
meets ISM requirements, and a Safety Management Certificate, issued to a company’s vessels to attest their compliance with these same requirements. Again, as
with SOLAS, port states are permitted to inspect such certificates, conduct further examinations, and take control measures aboard foreign vessels as warranted if a vessel clearly does not meet the minimum standards that the
certificates are supposed to ensure.
The STCW Convention. Having safety, maintenance, and equipment operation
checklists in a Safety Management System is one thing; having qualified, proficient mariners to carry out important shipboard functions is quite another. The
International Convention on Standards of Training, Certification and Watchkeeping for Seafarers, which was adopted on 7 July 1978 and entered into force
on 28 April 1984, was devised to prescribe uniform international minimum
standards for the training and certification of, and watch keeping by, mariners.
One hundred fifty-four nations, which collectively flag 99.15 percent of global
50
shipping tonnage, have adopted the convention.
The STCW Convention comprises chapter I, “General Provisions”; chapter II,
“Master and Deck Department”; chapter III, “Engine Department”; chapter IV,
“Radiocommunication and Radio Personnel”; chapter V, “Special Training Requirements for Personnel on Certain Types of Ships”; chapter VI, “Emergency,
Occupational Safety, Medical Care and Survival Functions”; chapter VII, “Alternative Certification”; and chapter VIII, “Watchkeeping.” The basic requirements
of the convention are enlarged upon by the STCW Code, created as part of
amendments to the convention in 1995. The convention’s chapters and the code
provide specific training, experience, and other requirements that a mariner
must possess in order to be certified to serve in a particular capacity aboard a
vessel.
Unlike with most other IMO-sponsored international agreements, the main
onus for compliance with STCW rests not with the flag state but instead with the
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country (“administration”) certifying a particular mariner as being trained and
51
competent in accordance with international standards. This certification by
the administration is done through a statement of compliance in the credentials
(licenses, certificates of documentation, etc.) that are issued to merchant
mariners.
The MARPOL Convention. The International Convention for the Prevention of
Pollution from Ships “is the main international convention covering prevention
of pollution of the marine environment by ships from operational or accidental
52
causes.” It antedates UNCLOS, being a combination of two treaties adopted in
1973 and 1978, respectively. The convention contains five technical annexes; a
sixth annex was adopted via a protocol of 1997. These annexes prescribe, in significant detail, standards to minimize or prevent pollution from ships, whether
from accidental discharges or routine ship operations. Adherence to annex I
(“Prevention of Oil Pollution”) and annex II (“Prevention of Pollution by Noxious Liquid Substances in Bulk”) is mandatory for all MARPOL signatory states;
compliance with the remaining annexes, III–VI (respectively, “Prevention of
Pollution by Harmful Substances Carried by Sea in Packaged Form,” “Prevention of Pollution of the Sea by Sewage,” “Prevention of Pollution from Garbage,”
and “Prevention of Air Pollution from Ships”) is discretionary. One hundred
fifty nations, representing 99.14 percent of global shipping tonnage, have signed
on to annexes I and II; somewhat fewer, but in no case a number representing
53
less than 82 percent of global shipping tonnage, have signed the other annexes.
As with other such conventions, signatory flag states bear the principal onus
of ensuring that their vessels comply with MARPOL’s requirements, signifying
their vessels’ compliance by issuing certificates. These include, as appropriate, an
International Oil Pollution Prevention (IOPP) Certificate; an IMO Certificate
of Fitness for Ships Carrying Liquefied Gases in Bulk; an IMO Certificate of Fitness for Carriage of Dangerous Chemicals in Bulk; and an International Air Pollution Prevention Certificate. Such certificates are required to be carried by
vessels of signatory flag states.
One other point of significance in relation to MARPOL is that whereas under
UNCLOS a coastal/port state may enact pollution legislation that applies to foreign vessels in waters subject to its jurisdiction, a state party to MARPOL must
make that convention’s provisions applicable to vessels, even foreign ones, in
54
waters subject to its jurisdiction. The United States has codified MARPOL in
its domestic law through the Act to Prevent Pollution from Ships (Title 33,
United States Code, arts. 1901–15) and associated regulations.
The ISPS Code. The International Ship and Port Facility Security Code, a comprehensive set of measures to enhance the security of ships and port facilities,
https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol64/iss3/21
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was developed in response to the perceived threats to ships and port facilities in
the wake of the 9/11 attacks in the United States. It is implemented through
chapter XI-2, “Special Measures to Enhance Maritime Security,” of the SOLAS
Convention. The code, which entered into force on 1 July 2004, has two parts,
one mandatory and one recommendatory. The United States, as a SOLAS signatory, is bound by the ISPS Code, and has incorporated ISPS into its domestic
regulations in Title 33 of the Code of Federal Regulations, subchapter H.
ISPS prescribes complementary security measures to be taken both aboard
vessels and at port facilities. Contracting governments are required to conduct
security assessments of their port facilities and are responsible for ensuring that
shipping companies assess all vessels flying their flags. Each facility and vessel is
then required to create a security plan (Port Facility Security Plan or Ship Security Plan) outlining the operational and physical security measures the facility
or ship will have in place during normal operations and in heightened security
circumstances. Every ship is required to carry an International Ship Security
Certificate indicating that it complies with the requirements of SOLAS chapter
XI-2 and part A (the mandatory part) of the ISPS Code.
{LINE-SPACE}
There are many more conventions that support the UNCLOS framework, some
that further explain and supplement the five discussed here. For example, chapter VII of SOLAS, which makes mandatory the International Maritime Dangerous Goods Code, also variously refers to such supplementary doctrine as the
International Bulk Chemical Code, the International Gas Carrier Code, and the
International Code for the Safe Carriage of Packaged Irradiated Nuclear Fuel,
Plutonium and High-Level Radioactive Wastes on Board Ships.
These conventions—the five discussed and the others like them—do not apply to all vessels; in fact, each has complicated applicability provisions, involving
55
vessel type and tonnage. Nevertheless, it is fair to say that the conventions described above embody the most significant and comprehensive “other” law of
the sea, applicable to the vast majority of vessels involved in international commercial service. Such vessels are the principal focus of port states, which desire to
minimize the deleterious safety, pollution, and security effects of such vessels for
their sovereign territories. Port states protect their vital interests in such areas by
an inspection and control regime known as “port-state control.”
PORT-STATE CONTROL
Under this regime a port state may take measures that include boardings and inspections, followed by control actions as necessary in response to any identified
discrepancies. Collectively, for each port state these measures exist within a
comprehensive framework called the “port-state control” (PSC) program. The
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American PSC program, which is administered by the U.S. Coast Guard, will be
examined as representative of such programs worldwide.
The primary goal of the American PSC program is to eliminate substandard
vessels (those “whose hull, machinery, equipment, or operational safety is substantially below the minimum standards required by the relevant convention or
whose crew is not in conformance with the safe manning document”) from U.S.
56
waters. The first step is to board and inspect vessels for compliance with safety,
security, and environmental-protection standards. With thousands of foreign
vessels visiting American ports every year and inspection resources spread thin,
not every vessel can be boarded and inspected. Instead, the Coast Guard selects
vessels for boarding and inspection, by two methods: first, targeting specific vessels likely not to be in compliance, as indicated by their scores on a targeting matrix (discussed below); and second, randomly selecting other vessels, whatever
their targeting-matrix scores, just to keep everyone honest.
There are two targeting matrices, one for safety and one for security. The
safety matrix—officially called the “Safety and Environmental Protection Compliance Targeting Matrix”—looks at five aspects of a vessel and assigns points
57
based on its demonstrated performance with respect to each. The categories
examined are ship management (who the owner, operator, or charterer is); flag
state; recognized organization (i.e., classification society); vessel history; and
particulars (type of vessel, age, etc.). With respect to point assignment, and using the flag-state category as an example, vessels flagged by a state that has a detention ratio (discussed later) two or more times the average of all flag states will
be assigned seven points; if the flag state has a detention ratio above the average
but less than twice the average, the vessel is assigned two points; otherwise its
58
score in the “flag state” category is zero. Vessels assigned seventeen or more
points by the overall targeting matrix, that have been involved in marine casualties that may have affected seaworthiness, that Coast Guard Captains of the Port
determine to be potential hazards to the port or the environment, or whose classification societies have detention ratios of 2 percent or more are all deemed
59
“Priority I” vessels and will be boarded. Vessels that receive seven to sixteen
points on the matrix are “Priority II,” and those that score six points or lower are
considered nonpriority vessels. Priority II vessels may be boarded as resources
permit; any non–Priority I vessel may be selected for examination by the PSC
60
random-selection process but will typically otherwise not be examined.
The system is virtually identical on the security side, though the features examined in the security matrix—officially, the “ISPS/MTSA Security Compli61
ance Targeting Matrix”—are somewhat different. The ship-management and
flag-state categories examine the same features, though the point assignments
are somewhat different. “Recognized organization” in this case looks not at
https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol64/iss3/21
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classification societies but at recognized security organizations (that is, RSOs).
The other two categories are the vessel’s security-compliance history and its past
ports of call. Vessels that score seventeen points or higher, that have had more
than three RSO-related control actions in the last twelve months, that have been
denied entry to or expelled from a port for ISPS-related reasons in the past
twelve months, or whose last five ports of call include any listed in the Federal
Register as not compliant with the ISPS Code are considered “ISPS I” vessels and
62
are to be examined while still at sea. “ISPS II” vessels (with scores between
seven and sixteen points or having new owners or flag states since the last ISPS
exam) are examined in port. “ISPS III” vessels are usually not subject to security
63
examinations, unless selected randomly.
Once aboard a foreign vessel, PSC inspectors examine its documents for the
necessary certificates of compliance with safety/environmental and security requirements. The international conventions permit officials of the coastal/port
state not only to examine the certificates supplied but to determine their valid64
ity. For example, the inspectors may require crew members to conduct firefighting drills to demonstrate that they are in fact trained in that evolution, as
the Safety Management Certificate attests; to lower and raise a lifeboat to ensure
that the davit works properly and that the crew knows how to operate it; or to
demonstrate the operation of pollution-prevention equipment, such as the
oily-water separator (or OWS, a device that removes oil from a ship’s bilgewater
so the cleansed bilgewater can be discharged overboard).
If, as a result of the inspection, the PSC inspector determines there are “clear
grounds” to believe that the vessel has security violations or only a marginal level
of safety, the coastal/port state is authorized to impose control measures. The
“clear grounds” standard differs, depending on the nature of the problem. Any
65
security deficiency, regardless of nature, is sufficient. With respect to safety or
environmental issues, the deficiency has to pose a significant impact to the crew,
66
vessel, port, or environment.
If clear grounds do exist, the possible control measures include, in decreasing
order of severity:

• Denial of entry, or expulsion
• Detainment67
• Captain of the Port order68
• Customs hold69
• Restrictions of operation/vessel movement
• Delay
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• Comprehensive security inspection70
• Letter of deviation71
• Flag-state notification
• Lesser administrative/corrective measures.
Enforcement measures available to port states include judicial civil-penalty proceedings for major noncriminal violations, repeat violations, or minor violations not corrected before the vessel returns to an American port; administrative
civil penalties for lesser violations; or letters of warning. Also, of course, as discussed in the following section, criminal prosecution is possible in the most
egregious cases.
SOME STATISTICS AND A CRITICAL ANALYSIS THEREOF
The United States publishes PSC statistics annually. According to the 2009 report, in that year
a total of 8,557 individual vessels, from 86 different Flag Administrations [i.e., flag
states], made 75,902 port calls to the United States. The Coast Guard conducted
9,657 SOLAS safety exams, and 8,725 ISPS exams on these vessels. The total number
of ships detained in 2009 for environmental protection and safety related deficiencies
decreased [from the previous year] from 176 to 162. The total number of ships detained in 2009 for security related deficiencies decreased from 27 to 18. During calendar year 2009, we saw a drop in nearly all of the key tracking factors, likely owing to
the downturn of world economic conditions.72

The report tracks statistics from previous years in three-year groups. For the
three-year window ending in 1997, 6.64 percent of PSC inspections resulted in
vessel detentions for safety and environmental reasons. During the three years
ending in 2009, that ratio dropped to 1.92 percent. For security inspections the
statistics do not reach as far back, as the ISPS convention is of relatively recent
origin. Nonetheless, the 2009 report indicates that the three-year ISPS controlaction ratio has steadily declined, from 0.89 percent for the period ending in
73
2005 to 0.34 percent for the three years ending in 2009.
These statistics appear to indicate that flag states are taking seriously their responsibilities under the “other” law of the sea, which would obviously be a positive development. However, there are some grounds for skepticism. First of all,
these are statistics for vessels arriving in U.S. ports. The United States has been
very aggressive in the administration of its PSC program—in fact, in the eyes of
74
some, too aggressive. Whatever the truth of the latter assertion, the mere perception by operators of substandard vessels that their ships might be more stringently examined in the United States than in other nations’ ports, with expensive
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delays if detained, may make such operators reluctant to send them here. In
short, positive safety and security statistics in the United States do not necessarily mean that vessels are everywhere becoming more compliant; it just may
mean that problem vessels are going elsewhere.
Second, the numbers, while encouraging, suggest a compliance plateau in recent years, if not a marginal decrease. The three-year average detention ratios
(percentages) for environmental and safety noncompliance for the periods between 1997 and 2009 are as follows: in 1997, 6.64; in 1998, 6.02; in 1999, 5.08; in
2000, 3.55; in 2001, 2.69; in 2002, 2.40; in 2003, 2.22; in 2004, 2.30; in 2005, 2.00;
75
in 2006, 1.78; in 2007, 1.60; in 2008, 1.75; and in 2009, 1.92. As these statistics
indicate, performance improved dramatically between 1997 and 2001 and only
incrementally after that. In fact, in recent years there has been a slight decline in
compliance. While the overall numbers are much improved in the past decade,
the statistics appear to show that, for cost reasons or otherwise, a compliance
ceiling has been reached, upon which it may prove hard to improve.
Finally, there is the valid criticism that the PSC inspections largely focus on
documents issued by the flag state (IOPP Certificates, etc.), paperwork that may
not truly reflect the material or security conditions aboard the vessel—that may
even, as one author has put it, be “used as a façade behind which groups or com76
panies can do whatever they please.” A recent case in the United States demonstrates that such disconnects between documentary certification and actual
vessel conditions can and do occur. In United States v. Hugo Pena (et al.), a vessel
surveyor working for Universal Bureau Shipping (a recognized classification society) and acting on behalf of the government of Panama issued the Panamanian77
flagged vessel Island Express I an IOPP Certificate on 15 April 2010. This certificate attested that the vessel’s pollution-prevention equipment, including its
oily-water separator, was fully operable. On 4 May, nineteen days later, American
PSC inspectors boarded the vessel and discovered that its OWS was in fact out of
commission. Subsequent investigation revealed that the class surveyor, a Mr.
Pena, had known the OWS was not operable on 15 April but had issued the IOPP
Certificate anyway. This was a violation of MARPOL and U.S. law, and it resulted
in his felony prosecution and conviction in U.S. court—the first-ever MARPOL
conviction in an American court of a class inspector for issuing fraudulent
certificates.
Notwithstanding these potential grounds for criticism, it seems that the
safety, security, and environmental protection regimes beyond UNCLOS can be,
and have been, effective. Anecdotally, despite the construction and operation of
supertankers and the increasing quantities of petroleum products being
shipped worldwide, spectacular vessel breakups and spills have not occurred in
recent years in the numbers that the world experienced even a few decades
Published by U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons, 2011
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ago—Amoco Cadiz, Torrey Canyon, Exxon Valdez. Industry statistics back up
this impression. The average annual number of significant oil spills (over seven
hundred tons) from tankers in the 1970s was 25.4; in the 1980s, 9.3; in the 1990s,
78
7.9; and from 2000 to 2009, 3.3. The amount of cargo being shipped on the
world’s oceans is indeed vast and increasing—approximately thirty-three trillion ton-miles in 2009, up from approximately twenty-three trillion ton-miles
79
in 2000. Nonetheless, total ship losses of vessels five hundred gross tons and
above have been cut nearly in half during the same period—from nearly 150 in
80
2000 to fewer than seventy-five in 2009.
{LINE-SPACE}
There are many multilateral treaties that fill in the UNCLOS framework. These
instruments are widely accepted and implemented, and they promote order and
the free flow of commerce by prescribing universal standards for vessel construction, operation, and management, for the training and qualification of
mariners, and the like. In accordance with the 1982 United Nations Convention
on the Law of the Sea, they assign compliance responsibility to flag states. However, in the spirit of “trust but verify,” they contain real enforcement mechanisms that enable coastal and port states to safeguard their vital interests, even in
the face of occasionally lackadaisical flag-state oversight. Taken together, this
“other” law of the sea serves a valuable purpose, the promotion of vessel safety
and security and environmental stewardship. Statistics suggest that it is achieving its goals.

NOTES

1. Quotation from statement of SecretaryGeneral Javier Pérez de Cuéllar upon signing
UNCLOS in 1982.
2. It is widely acknowledged that the War of
1812 was caused in large part by American
resentment of England’s practice of stopping
U.S. vessels on the high seas and “impressing” sailors from those vessels into British naval service. More recently, a dispute between
Spain and Canada in 1995 over the turbot
fishery (known as the “Turbot War”) in the
North Atlantic threatened to devolve into
warfare when both nations deployed warships
to the disputed area.
3. UNCLOS adopts in large part, and builds
upon, maritime zone schemes that were less
comprehensively codified in earlier

international conventions, such as the 1958
Geneva Conventions on the Law of the Sea.
4. A nation’s baseline is typically the low-water
line on its shores; however, UNCLOS contains rules in part II (Territorial Sea and Contiguous Zone) that govern establishment of a
baseline when facing irregular shoreline features (bays, low tide elevations, etc.).
5. UNCLOS, arts. 2 and 3.
6. “International waters” is not a term of art under UNCLOS, but it is commonly used to describe the waters beyond the sovereign waters
of the world’s territorial seas.
7. UNCLOS, art. 33.
8. Ibid., art. 57.
9. Ibid., art. 86.
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10. Ibid., art. 91.
11. United States v. Marino-Garcia, 679 F.2d 1373
(11th Cir. 1982).
12. For example, 14 United States Code (hereafter
USC) § 89 authorizes designated Coast
Guard officials to go on board, at any time,
any vessel subject to the jurisdiction of the
United States; to address inquiries to those
on board, examine ship’s documents and papers, and examine, inspect, and search the
vessel; to arrest and seize as warranted; and to
use all necessary force to compel compliance
with orders.
13. UNCLOS, art. 94.
14. Ibid.
15. A flag state may, and typically does, contract
with a classification society (discussed in the
following section of this article) to assist it in
highly technical matters related to vessel design, construction, and maintenance.
16. Nations are free to enter into bilateral or
multilateral agreements that modify
UNCLOS’s general principles. The conventions comprising the “other” law of the sea
discussed later in this article are perfect examples of such agreements.
17. Jurisdiction over vessels includes jurisdiction
over persons aboard, as well as (often) vessel
owners, managers, agents, etc. It is important
to note that jurisdiction may not be exercised
against warships and other government vessels in noncommercial service. UNCLOS,
arts. 32, 95, and 96.
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another state without the consent of that
state to enter those waters and do so.
22. UNCLOS, art. 56(1).
23. Ibid., art. 73.
24. Ibid., arts. 58(1) and (2).
25. Ibid., art. 33.
26. Ibid., arts. 21(1) and 211.
27. Ibid., art. 21(2).
28. Ibid., arts. 24(1)(a), 211(4).
29. Ibid., arts. 17–19. The limited exception to
the “continuous and expeditious” passage requirement is that stopping and anchoring is
permitted if it is an incident of ordinary navigation; it is made necessary by some lifethreatening distress aboard the vessel; or it is
incident to a vessel’s rendering assistance to
another vessel or aircraft in distress.
30. U.S. Navy Dept. and U.S. Transportation
Dept., The Commander’s Handbook on the
Law of Naval Operations, Naval Warfare Publication 1-14M (Washington, D.C.: 2010
rev.), sec. 3.2.2. For example, the distressed
vessel or would-be rescuer would not be subject to the coastal state’s customs, notice of
entry, or other laws that regulate the means
and manner by which vessels may enter territorial waters. The distressed vessel or wouldbe rescuer, however, is not entitled to blanket
immunity from coastal-state enforcement of
its other (non–condition of entry) domestic
laws.
31. UNCLOS, art. 27(5).

18. Ibid., art. 87.

32. Ibid., art. 27(1).

19. Myres McDougal and William Burke, The
Public Order of the Oceans: A Contemporary
International Law of the Sea (New Haven,
Conn.: Yale Univ. Press, 1962), p. 869.

33. Non-innocent passage would include lingering, loitering, or engaging in an activity that
is prejudicial to the peace, good order, or security of the coastal state. UNCLOS, art. 19,
contains a list (in the U.S. view, an exclusive
list) of activities that are per se prejudicial to
the coastal state’s peace, good order, or security and that are thus inconsistent with
innocent passage.

20. Those exceptions include universal crimes
(e.g., piracy); flag-state consent, either standing or ad hoc; hot pursuit; constructive presence; right of visit; master consent; and,
conceivably, jurisdiction pursuant to a UN
Security Council resolution.
21. It should be noted that although a flag state
retains full jurisdiction over its vessels wherever they are, the reality is that the flag state
will be unable to exercise its jurisdictional
rights over a vessel in the territorial waters of

95

34. As in the territorial sea, a port state may, as a
matter of international comity, decline to exercise its enforcement jurisdiction over a foreign vessel in its internal waters if a crime or
incident aboard the vessel does not disturb
the “peace of the port” and instead “hand
off” disposition of the matter to the flag state.
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But see note 21 concerning a flag state’s ability to take enforcement action while its vessel
is in the territorial waters of another nation.
35. UNCLOS, art. 27(2).

52. “International Convention for the Prevention
of Pollution from Ships (MARPOL),” IMO:
International Maritime Organization, www
.imo.org/.

36. Ibid., art. 25(2).

53. “Status of Conventions Summary.”

37. Ibid., art. 21(1).

54. MARPOL, art. 4(2).

38. Ibid., art. 21(2).

55. U.S. Homeland Security Dept., “Coast Guard
Port State Control Targeting and Examination Policy for Vessel Security and Safety,”
Navigation and Vessel Inspection Circular
[hereafter NVIC] 06-03, Commandant
United States Coast Guard Publication [hereafter COMDTPUB] P16700.4, change 2
(Washington, D.C.: 27 March 2007), encl. 4,
table 4.

39. R. R. Churchill and A. V. Lowe, The Law of
the Sea, 3rd ed. (Dover, N.H.: Manchester
Univ. Press 1999), p. 23.
40. IMO: International Maritime Organization,
www.imo.org/.
41. “Classification Societies: What, Why and
How?” International Association of Classification Societies, www.iacs.org.uk/. IMO Resolution A.739(18) prescribes minimum
performance standards for classification
societies.

56. Ibid., encl. 4, p. 1.
57. U.S. Homeland Security Dept., Port State
Control in the United States: Annual Report
2009 (Washington, D.C.: 2009), p. 8.

42. ISPS Code, B/4.3.

58. Ibid.

43. See, generally, Anna Mihneva-Natova, The
Relationship between United Nations Convention of the Sea and the IMO Conventions (New
York: United Nations and Nippon Foundation of Japan, [2005]), available at www.un
.org/.

59. Each U.S. port has a designated federal Captain of the Port (COTP), who is the senior
Coast Guard officer with responsibility for
enforcing, within that port, “port safety and
security and marine environmental protection regulations, including, without limitation, regulations for the protection and
security of vessels, harbors, and waterfront
facilities; anchorages; security zones; safety
zones; regulated navigation areas; deepwater
ports; water pollution; and ports and waterways safety” (Code of Federal Regulations, Title 33 [hereafter 33 CFR], § 1.01-30).

44. There have been many less comprehensive
amendments and additional protocols since
then.
45. “Status of Conventions Summary,” IMO: International Maritime Organization, www.imo
.org/.
46. “International Convention for the Safety of
Life at Sea (SOLAS), 1974,” IMO: International Maritime Organization, www.imo.org/.
47. Adopted through IMO Resolution A.741(18).
48. A “Safety Management System” is a structured and documented system enabling company personnel to implement effectively
the company’s safety and environmentalprotection policy. ISM Code, sec. 1.1.4.
49. ISM Code, sec. 1.4.
50. See note 45 above.
51. This reflects the reality that in the global
shipping world, vessels flagged in one state
are frequently crewed by mariners from one
or more other states.

60. U.S. Homeland Security Dept., Port State
Control in the United States, p. 8.
61. Ibid., p. 18. The MTSA, or Maritime Transportation and Security Act, is the U.S. law
that implements ISPS domestically. MTSA is
codified at 46 USC § 70101 et seq.
62. U.S. Homeland Security Dept., Port State
Control in the United States. For the Federal
Register, see www.federalregister.gov/.
63. Ibid.
64. See, for example, SOLAS, chap. I, regulation
19, and chap. XI-2, regulation 9 (with respect
to ISPS verification); also MARPOL, art. 5(2).
65. NVIC 06-03, encl. 4 note l, p. 5.
66. Ibid.
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67. A “detention” is a significant control action
that triggers, among other things, notification
of the vessel’s flag state and of the classification society or recognized organization that
issued the certificates relating to the subject
of the detention; see U.S. Homeland Security
Dept., “Port State Control Guidelines for the
Enforcement of Management for the Safe
Operation of Ships (ISM Code),” NVIC
04-05, COMDTPUB P16700.4 (Washington,
D.C.: 1 August 2005), p. 9. NVIC 06-03, encl.
4, app. A provides examples of detainable deficiencies for both safety and security.
68. 33 CFR § 160.111 grants the COTP authority
to order a vessel to anchor or to operate in
the manner directed when, inter alia, he or
she has reasonable cause to believe that the
vessel is not in compliance with any law, regulation, or treaty.
69. 46 USC § 60105 requires foreign vessels to
obtain customs clearance before departing a
U.S. port for another American port or a foreign port. Various authorities permit the U.S.
Customs and Border Protection Service to
withhold customs clearance of a foreign vessel at the request of the Coast Guard to ensure, for example, that the vessel posts a letter
of undertaking or surety bond to guarantee
payment of civil penalties assessed or likely to
be assessed. See, for example, 46 USC § 70121
and 33 CFR § 160.115.
70. A “comprehensive security inspection” is
similar to an expanded vessel examination in
the safety/environmental-protection realm; it
involves a detailed review of the vessel’s
security program.
71. 33 CFR § 164.55 authorizes the COTP to permit a vessel to deviate from the equipment
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and operational requirements of 33 CFR Part
164 if he or she deems the deviation will not
impair the safe navigation of the vessel under
anticipated operating conditions.
72. U.S. Homeland Security Dept., Port State
Control in the United States, p. 2.
73. Ibid., p. 5.
74. Foreign crew members have received felony
convictions in U.S. federal court for violating
American environmental statutes; see, for example, United States v. Jho, 534 F.3d 398 (5th
Cir. 2008). The United States has been criticized at the IMO and elsewhere for overreaching in this and related cases.
75. U.S. Homeland Security Dept., Port State
Control in the United States, p. 5.
76. William Langewiesche, The Outlaw Sea (New
York: North Point, 2004), p. 33.
77. United States v. Hugo Pena (et al.), U.S. District Court, Southern District of Florida, case
no. 10-60158-CR-WPD(S), decided on 20
December 2010.
78. “Data and Statistics,” International Tanker
Owners Pollution Federation Limited, www
.itopf.com/.
79. “Fearnresearch,” Astrup Fearnley, www
.fearnleys.com. Total seaborne trade during
the same period rose from 5,595 million metric tons in 2000 to 7,636 million metric tons
(estimated) in 2009.
80. “Hull Spring Statistics as of December 31,
2009,” International Union of Marine Insurance, iumi.com/. The total loss figure was
much worse in the 1980s, with over two hundred vessels of five hundred gross tons or
larger being lost every year during the first
half of the decade.
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SIX AMAZING YEARS
RAGs, NATOPS, and More
Vice Admiral Robert F. Dunn, U.S. Navy (Retired)

I

n the early 1950s the U.S. Navy and Marine Corps were suffering near-catastrophic
accident rates. In 1954 alone the Navy/Marine Corps accident rate was almost
fifty-five major mishaps per hundred thousand flight hours, meaning that 776
aircraft and 535 aviators were lost. This was unsustainable. Two British inventions, the angled flight deck and the optical landing system, ameliorated the
problems of flying jet aircraft at sea, but widespread safety problems persisted,
not only in carrier operations but in shore-based operations as well. It was apparent that beyond carrier modifications and other technological fixes, there
were institutional changes that needed to be made. This article chronicles several of these changes at a critical period in the service’s history.
Between the start of 1958 and the end of 1963 the Navy and Marines logged a
remarkable achievement in aviation safety. In a period of only six years that included intensive operations with some of the most difficult aircraft in the
fleet—Crusaders, Demons, Skyrays, Tigers, Phantoms, Vigilantes, and
Skywarriors—the Navy-wide major mishap rate was reduced by more than half
1
and was launched on a downward trajectory that continues to this day. In those
six years were established replacement air group
Vice Admiral Dunn’s last active-duty assignment was as
(RAG) training, a system of “level readiness,” a Naval
Deputy Chief of Naval Operations for Air Warfare. He
is a carrier pilot with combat service over North VietAviation Training and Operations Procedures Stannam. His first flag assignment was Commander, Naval
dardization (NATOPS) program, an improved system
Safety Center, in Norfolk, Virginia. This article is a
for selection and assignment of personnel, a more reproduct of his yearlong effort as a Ramsey Fellow at the
Smithsonian Air and Space Museum, where he investisponsive system for maintenance and supply support,
gated the history of Naval Aviation safety, 1950–2000.
and more. Several of these programs go hand in glove
Naval War College Review, Summer 2011, Vol. 64, No. 3
and need to be discussed together.
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REPLACEMENT AIR GROUP TRAINING
Replacement training was the first of the concepts developed in that six-year period, but once adopted it led into others, especially level readiness and NATOPS.
Formerly, before replacement training was institutionalized, newly designated aviators or those being reassigned from other duty had reported directly
to fleet squadrons, usually while the squadrons were between deployment regroup and “workup” status. It was up to the squadron to check out the “nugget,”
or “newbie,” in whatever aircraft the squadron happened to be flying. For aviators who had flown similar aircraft in the training command or at previous duty
stations, there was no great difficulty; however, those going to jet squadrons who
had never before flown a jet had a real problem. In some ways it was even harder
for the more senior pilots, likely to be coming from shipboard or shore duty
where they had flown little but twin-engine Beech SNB-5s four hours each
month, to maintain general proficiency and qualifications; they were now expected not only to master a new kind of airplane but to lead as well.
A related issue particularly pertinent to carrier squadrons manifested itself
when, later in the training cycle, it was time to work at the scale of an air group
—that is, the aviation units that would be assigned, under an overall commander,
to an aircraft carrier. Normally, there were no more than casual exchanges among
the squadrons within an air group. This was a special problem with the “air task
2
groups” left over from the Korean War and with the various detachments needed
3
to flesh out an air group’s capabilities. Leaders did not know one another, and junior pilots did not know the senior officers of other squadrons or on the air group
staff. No one knew much about working with other types of aircraft in the air, as
they would have to once air-group operations began—usually during workups at
the naval air stations at, say, Guantanamo Bay (Cuba) or Fallon (Nevada), or upon
4
embarkation on board the assigned carrier.
A third group of issues for carrier air groups had to do with specialty training,
maintenance, and supply. Except for air task groups an attempt was made to base
all squadrons of an air group at the same naval air station in order to facilitate air
group command and control, but the resulting need to distribute such facilities
among several air stations exacerbated problems of training, maintenance, and
supply generally. For example, if each air group had a squadron of F9F-6 Cougars, a squadron of F9F-5 Panthers, another of FJ-4 Furies, and one of AD
Skyraiders, each host naval air station had to maintain the aircraft simulators
5
and a fleet air support squadron (FASRON). The same applied to the aviation
supply office at each naval air station. For instrument training, pilots often had
to be sent away to other stations on temporary duty, at great expense in money
and time. Thus, for carrier squadrons on the West Coast, services had to be duplicated at NAS (Naval Air Station) Alameda, Miramar, Moffett Field, and North
Published by U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons, 2011
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Island, California, and on the East Coast at NAS Oceana and Norfolk (in Vir6
ginia), and Cecil Field, Jacksonville, and Key West (in Florida). Not only did
such a system place unneeded demands on test equipment and highly trained
maintainers and stretch the spare-parts inventories in the supply system, but it
was also expensive and terribly wasteful of manpower and did little to enhance
either readiness or safety.
By the late 1950s the situation cried out for some sort of consolidation, and the
Navy found models in its own backyard. In World War II, a pilot ordered to an air
group would first go through an Advanced Carrier Training Group, where he
mastered the plane he would fly before he reached the carrier. In other words, he
7
was combat ready when he reported to his squadron. That process was dropped
soon after the war ended, but the idea remained in institutional memory.
As early as May 1952, the commander of the Naval Air Force, Pacific Fleet had
8
established the Fleet Air Gunnery Unit (FAGU) at NAS El Centro, California. Atlantic Fleet squadrons took advantage of FAGU’s training some years later, establishing in effect a Navy-wide system of gunnery, bombing, and ordnance-system
maintenance.
In the Naval Air Training Command too, instructors were already receiving
standardized preparation, in special instructors’ schools, before ever taking on a
student; one was the Instructors’ Basic Training Unit in Pensacola, Florida. In
April 1955 the Jet Transitional Training Unit (JTTU) had been established at
9
Olathe, Kansas, to orient erstwhile deskbound pilots to jets.
Even earlier, with the arrival of even more demanding jet aircraft into the
fleet, Vice Admiral William Martin, then Commander, Naval Air Force, Pacific
Fleet, directed that Commander James D. “Jig Dog” Ramage, commanding officer of Composite Squadron 3 (VC-3) at Moffett Field, establish a transitional
training unit there to train both pilots and maintenance personnel in standardized procedures for operating and maintaining the high-performance aircraft
then entering the fleet. Project CHECKOUT (then colloquially “Cougar College”)
was organized to train for the swept-wing F9F-6 and later the FJ-4; it was com10
bined later with Project CUTLASS to set up training for the F7U. Training for
11
the Douglas A-4D Skyhawk, the Demon, and the Skyray followed.
With these examples before them, it was easy for planners to visualize the establishment of replacement training squadrons, starting with replacement
training air groups—or “RAGs,” as they have long been called—and leading ultimately to the graduate training program we know today as the RAG system.
A catalyst for a replacement training program may have been an 18 December
1957 letter from Vice Admiral Robert Goldthwaite, then Chief of Naval Air
Training (CNATRA), to Vice Admiral William V. Davis, Jr., the Deputy Chief of
Naval Operations (Air Warfare)—that is, “Op-05.” The letter compared the
https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol64/iss3/21
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introduction by the U.S. Air Force of its “Century Series” fighters, with its program of carefully organized training, and the Navy’s much worse experience
with relatively unsupervised checkout in its own new jets. He went on to suggest
that the CNATRA-supervised training at the JTTU, in Olathe, might be a model
for the Navy. Further, he suggested that the issue be put on the agenda for a General Aviation Training Conference to be held the following February.
Whether Admiral Goldthwaite’s suggested discussion made the agenda or not
is unknown, but on 10 March 1958 the Chief of Naval Operations approved
a reorganization of carrier aviation that would create uniform air groups, provide a
more permanent group assignment to ships, and permit a reduction of assigned units
and aircraft without also reducing combat readiness. The new organization also provided for a permanent replacement Air Group to be established on each coast and
made responsible for the indoctrination of key maintenance personnel, the tactical
training of aviators, and conducting special programs required for the introduction
of new models of combat aircraft.12

Hand in hand with the RAG approach, the Navy instituted what was then
known as the “base loading” system. Basically, all aircraft of a given type were
now consolidated at one station on each coast, colocated with the RAG for that
type, thereby facilitating instrument, simulator, and maintenance training, as
well as intermediate maintenance and supply. It also did wonders for tactics, as
pilots met, passed the word, and discussed the best way to carry out missions
—sometimes in semiformal classrooms, sometimes at “Happy Hours” at officers’ clubs.
About a year later, in May 1959, FASRONs were disestablished. Maintenance
devolved to units having custody of aircraft, although new aircraft intermediate
maintenance departments on carriers and at naval air stations assumed the
13
FASRONs’ former role.
The first two replacement air groups were regular carrier air groups, one from
14
each coast, redesignated in 1958 as RAGs and given new missions. One,
CVG-4, sometimes called “CAG-4,” was renamed RCVG-4 and based at NAS
15
Cecil Field for East Coast carrier squadrons. The other, CVG-12 (or
16
“CAG-12”), at NAS Miramar, became the West Coast training group. Later, in
April 1962, to bring their generic titles in line with their functions, RAGs were
categorized as “combat readiness air groups” (CRAGs)—though they were still
17
referred to individually as RCVGs (e.g., RCVG-4). Many of the squadrons assigned to them retained their original names and numbers, but the RCVGs eventually absorbed a mixture of squadrons and aircraft types, with new training
missions. RAG squadrons dedicated to instrument training were also established to train and refresh pilots in instrument work, using two-place aircraft,
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and to administer the required written examinations. Early on, FAGU was absorbed into the RAGs. At the outset, though the RCVG commanders and their
staffs were in Cecil Field and Miramar, their squadrons were distributed among
Oceana, Jacksonville, Cecil Field, and Key West on the East Coast and Alameda,
Moffett Field, and Miramar on the west. On the Marine Corps side, Marine
Training Squadron 1 (VMT-1) was established at Marine Corps Air Station
(MCAS) Cherry Point, North Carolina, in July 1958, with a three-element curriculum: a Swept-Wing Jet Transitional and Refresher Course and two instrument courses. There was a similar organization at MCAS El Toro, California, for
West Coast Marines. Later, replacement patrol air wings were established, especially important as the maritime patrol (VP) community began its transition to
the P-3 Orion aircraft. Sometime later, RAGs were established on both coasts for
heavy attack, reconnaissance attack, airborne early warning (the E-1 Tracer and
E-2 Hawkeye), and helicopters. Today we have RAGs for each major type of aircraft and mission in the inventory. Still later, the two RCVG commanders and
staffs were seen as redundant and replaced by other supervisory organizations.
RAGs not only familiarized and trained newly reported pilots, and soon naval
flight officers (or NFOs, specializing in weapon and sensor systems), in the systems and flight characteristics of their new aircraft but also trained enlisted
maintenance personnel in the particulars of their aircraft. The latter took the
place of the former on-the-job training provided recent graduates of specialized
technical training activities (known as “A” and “B” schools) by fleet squadrons
and FASRONs, thus simultaneously improving maintenance readiness and reducing costs.
Most importantly, the RAGs had a tremendously positive influence on accident prevention.
July 1959 marked the end of the first year of Replacement Carrier Air Group operation. RCVG-trained pilots represented 28 percent of the average number of fleet pilots flying A4D, F4D, F11F, F3H, FJ-4 and F8U aircraft during fiscal year 1959.
A study of their safety record as opposed to squadron trained pilots showed only 1 in
24 RCVG trained pilots were involved in a pilot factor accident as contrasted to 1 in 9
for squadron trained pilots.
The RCVG program was estimated to have saved the Navy approximately 40 million
dollars to date [1959].18

LEVEL READINESS
RAGs also facilitated readiness. Previously, as noted, squadrons would reconstitute between deployments. The more experienced pilots would depart for other
duty soon after a cruise, to be replaced by a combination of pilots from shore
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duty and “nuggets” directly from the training command. It was up to the squadron leadership to mold this new group into a cohesive and talented fighting unit.
As expected, results were mixed, depending almost solely on the leadership (or
lack of it) of the commanding officer, executive officer, and operations officer.
“Level readiness” was a response to this unevenness: the RAG would train the replacement pilots, and later NFOs, making them ready to blend in with any
squadron flying similar aircraft without any further indoctrination. Squadrons
would not be totally reconstituted between cruises but have individuals rotate in
and out in accordance with optimum career planning and the needs of the service. The theory was that every two months, each fleet squadron, regardless of
where it might be in a deployment cycle, would lose one full-tour pilot and gain
a replacement pilot of equivalent rank. In this way the squadron would maintain
continually its level of combat readiness.19
The Atlantic Fleet adopted the practice of level readiness, but the Pacific Fleet
did not, and even in the Atlantic Fleet not everyone was happy with the arrangement. Among other things, there was suspicion that it was simply a scheme concocted by the Bureau of Naval Personnel to stretch limited personnel resources.
Squadron commanding officers objected to losing experienced pilots in the
20
middle of a deployment, to be replaced by unknown quantities. Some years
later the level-readiness concept was somewhat modified to enable squadrons
about to deploy to work up as units with all personnel on board. Yet level readiness paid off any number of times, even in the Pacific Fleet, when an individual
lost to accident or in combat had to be replaced on short notice and the RAG system was able to do that.
NATOPS
As the RAGs got started, familiar questions about what the best way was to do
certain things emerged with new urgency. At first, as had been the case in squadrons before RAGs, operations officers or commanding officers of RAG squadrons dictated as they thought best. Soon, however, after a few exchanges between
coasts, it became obvious that there had to be one best way. Thus came the first
glimmers of standardization. Eventually they led to what is known today as
NATOPS, Naval Aviation Training and Operations Procedures Standardization.
How that happened and why is quite a story.
In 2010 a retired Marine aviator recalled how it had been before NATOPS
—in his case, in 1956.
What the flying did not include in those days was a fully-fledged standardization program and a mature Naval Aviation Safety program. The result, predictably obvious
21
by today’s standards, was a horrific accident rate. You see, the folks who led us back
then were all wily, steely-eyed veterans of World War II and Korea and knew no fear.
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They trained us the same way they had been trained—by launching us into the hostile sky largely unsupervised with the hope that the more promising among us would
return alive. Surprisingly, some of us did. It was a training system Charles Darwin
22
would have been proud of.

While the remark about merely hoping that “nuggets” would stay alive might
be an exaggeration, it is true that there was little supervision. Orientation to fleet
aircraft often consisted of a reading of the handbook, a blindfold cockpit check,
a brief on how to start the engine, and a “good luck.” More than one novice was
told something like, “Meet me over the San Mateo Bridge at 5,000 feet,” only to
find that the rendezvous was for an air-to-air test of his skill and mettle.
Not all was chaos before NATOPS, however. Standardization was the rule in
many aspects of Naval Aviation. In the training command, students preflighted,
started, taxied, and flew their training aircraft in standard ways. Takeoff procedures, landing approach patterns, and flight procedures—including a variety of
maneuvers, both acrobatic and nonacrobatic—were performed according to
strict standards. Flight grades were predicated on those standards. Instructors,
as we have seen, were prepared in standardized ways.
Then there was instrument flight training, but before 1950, not all Naval Aviators were qualified to fly on instruments, only those with special training. Everyone else flew according to visual flight rules. With increased emphasis on
flying at night and growing need for flying near high-traffic metropolitan areas
and in airways, the Chief of Naval Operations directed that instrument flight
boards be established at each squadron, air group, and station and that by the
23
middle of 1952 all Naval Aviators have and maintain valid instrument ratings.
That, of course, required increased training in instrument flying and airways
procedures, which was in itself a kind of standardization. Much of that learning and subsequent practice was codified in the All-Weather Flight Manual, a
sort of precursor to NATOPS for flying at night and in bad weather on
instruments.
Meanwhile, in the training command and in the fleet, takeoff and landing
patterns had long been standardized. Air Force, Navy, and Marine pilots flew
identical patterns at airfields, and all aircraft carriers had the same launch and
landing pattern. In fact, there was a United States Fleet directive, and later a Naval Warfare Publication (NWP), that stipulated the patterns. Also, in the fleet,
each organization had a standard operating procedure (SOP), important if for
no other reason than it was on the checklist for every administrative inspection.
The problem was that even if the squadron followed it, the SOP changed every time the commanding officer or the operations officer changed. At the same
time, lurking in the background and impeding progress toward standardization
generally, was the question, “Why standardize and shut down initiative?” It
https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol64/iss3/21
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seemed to one observer at the time, “Some people view the idea of everyone in
Naval Aviation doing everything, ‘the one best way’ with some misgivings. They
fear that general use of standardized procedures, while it may reduce the accident rate, will result in a reduction of a pilot’s ability ‘to think on his feet’ and
24
deal flexibly with emergencies and combat situations.”
That is, standardization was not necessarily looked upon as a safety factor. After all, all the Navy’s propeller-driven aircraft were so similar in cockpit configuration that an experienced pilot could easily step from one type to another
without any special training, and many did. Even going from single-engine to
multiengine was not especially hard. Every cockpit had a stick (or a yoke), a
throttle (or two or four), propeller and mixture control(s), magneto switches,
perhaps a supercharger lever, flaps, and landing-gear controls. All these were in
similar positions in every aircraft; the only thing an experienced pilot needed to
learn to fly a new airplane was how to start it and what airspeeds were recommended for maneuvers and landing. Tactics varied from fighters to bombers to
patrol and transport, but that did not matter to people who cared only about the
flying. Then came the jets.
The first jets were not much different from reciprocating-engine, propellerdriven aircraft. Of course, the takeoff roll was longer, engine response to throttle
movement was quite a bit more sluggish, fuel was used up a lot quicker, and
there was less time to correct a bad landing approach, but then, that messy throttle quadrant—with mixture, prop, and supercharger levers—was gone, and
there were no magnetos. Problems began to develop only when older pilots tried
flying jets with habits they had picked up in “props,” jets began flying from ships,
and even-higher-performance jets, with new capabilities, came along. It was
then, with fleet accident rates at a new high, that perceptive leaders recognized
that something had to be done.
It was natural to look to examples already established—JTTU, “Cougar College,” FAGU, and others. Thus even before NATOPS there was a framework for
establishing a methodology to ensure that newly indoctrinated pilots were exposed to the best possible training and procedures, training and procedures that
would improve the mishap performance, and therefore readiness, of all fleet
aircraft.
Still, the Pacific Fleet, the Atlantic Fleet, and the Naval Air Training Command all had different ideas as to what the best system might be. One example,
perhaps apocryphal, was that A-4 pilots from one fleet made approaches with
speed brakes out, in the other with speed brakes in. There was a difference of
opinion as to the best way to recover from a poststall gyration in an F7U Cutlass.
Still other differences abounded as well. At that point Vice Admiral Robert Pirie,
USN, Deputy Chief of Naval Operations (Air Warfare)—that is, DCNO (Air),
Published by U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons, 2011
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Op-05—stepped in. Sources vary as to what caused him to act, but act he did,
25
setting the tone for what NATOPS is today: a manual for the users.
First, he made the basic decision that there must be one best way to, say, make
an approach in an A-4, recover from a Cutlass poststall gyration, or whatever the
case might be. He put a team together to find, for each situation, that best way.
Second, he had to choose between letting his staff, all experienced aviators, decide the best way and asking the fleet—that is, the current users of the aircraft.
He came down on the side of the current users: they would be the subject-matter
experts, they would write what became NATOPS, and they continue to write and
modify it to this day. Naval Aviators who were actually flying the aircraft in the
fleet, lieutenants and lieutenant commanders, wrote the books, using as a guide
a June 1961 Naval Training Device Center publication, Improvement of Flight
Handbooks. Agreement had to be reached from squadron to squadron and fleet
to fleet and up the chain of command before any NATOPS manual was approved. Approval came via wing commanders and type commanders (to DCNO
26
[Air]); only after that entire command chain approved did Admiral Pirie and
his successors put their signatures to each volume. The end result was a manual
that stipulated the best method of performing every function in a given aircraft,
thus contributing to safe and efficient flight operations.
All NATOPS manuals were similar in format. Each had eight chapters: “Indoctrination,” “Shore-Based Procedures,” “Carrier-Based Procedures,” “Flight
Procedures,” “Emergency Procedures,” “Communications,” “Special Mission,”
and “Miscellaneous.” Over the long term, the introductions were probably most
important, because they invited every reader and every user to recommend
changes and modifications. All such inputs were reviewed, and all were considered, and they still are. Thus, through an iterative process, the best procedures
and practices were distilled, combat readiness and operational effectiveness
were significantly raised, and aircraft accident rates were significantly reduced.
One very experienced Naval Aviator would write, “[NATOPS] is designed as a
means of providing the best and safest aircraft training and operating procedures in an easy to use manual for each type of plane we fly, to enable such a
manual to be attentive to the needs of the operating forces, and to provide a
training tool for Squadron Commanders’ use in determining areas of weakness
27
in his training program or in an individual.”
In May 1961 the NATOPS program was adopted and made authoritative by
the Chief of Naval Operations, through the promulgation of OpNav Instruction
3510.9, a series still effective today. Of course, manuals for every aircraft type did
not spring up the day the instruction was signed; it took a great deal of work and
coordination to bring out each one. The helicopter community, with its Sikorsky
HSS-1N Seabat (later the SH-34) NATOPS, was first “out of the chocks,” that
https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol64/iss3/21
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very same May 1961. Other aircraft types soon followed, and within the year
manuals for forty-seven aircraft had been issued. It was as if everyone had
thought, “It’s about time!” Gone were arguments with newly arrived operations
officers about the “right way.” Down went the mishap rate. Almost everyone
pronounced NATOPS to be “good,” though diehards continued to grumble
about lost opportunities for initiative.
NATOPS continued to develop, of course. In the beginning, NATOPS was just
one of a trilogy of books to be used by Naval Aviators. There were still the Flight
Manual, which had long been around and covered the mechanics of the airplane
—the “systems,” in today’s vernacular; the NWP series, which addressed tactics;
and now NATOPS, covering techniques. In December 1963 an F9F-8T (two-seat
Cougar trainer) manual appeared, consolidating all three; handbook information with flight and operating procedures was promulgated. Although its covers
28
were not blue at first, the “Blue Sleeping Pill” had been born. More—many
more—editions were to follow. (There were also, of course, manuals and technical orders, to which, though they were kept in maintenance spaces, pilots seeking
answers to special problems often referred.) Frequent and regular NATOPS conferences under the auspices of the air type commanders helped to keep the manuals current and useful. One of the best summaries of NATOPS available was
published in the August 1961 issue of Approach, the Naval Safety Center’s universally read aviation safety magazine: “The new NATOPS program was developed by the users for the users. It will be modified as we go along by these same
individuals. New tricks of the trade will be passed around quickly for expert
evaluation and, if sound, for use by all hands. The end result will be increased
operational readiness through increased safety brought about by improved pilot
techniques.”
An interesting and important milestone on the road to adoption of NATOPS
was cooperation among all the many Navy aviation communities, among fleets,
and with the Air Force. The latter cooperation in particular was remarkable, in
that most Navy people are reluctant to learn anything from their brethren in
light blue. Nevertheless, the Air Force had operated a standardization and evaluation (“Stan/Eval”) program for many years, and the first Navy standardization
evaluators actually took the Air Force course, learned that service’s philosophy
and methodology, and brought them back to the Navy, albeit somewhat modified. Along with the NATOPS manual came the aforementioned standardization
instructors and evaluators, who visited squadrons to make sure that their normal flight and emergency procedures were in conformance, systems knowledge
was adequate, and more. The NATOPS framework was implemented quickly,
but its scope broadened gradually, until, type by aircraft type and unit by unit, it
was incorporated in every Navy and Marine squadron and wing, afloat and
Published by U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons, 2011
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ashore. Later, the system was expanded to landing signal officers and aircraft carriers and other aviation ships. NATOPS is used as a teaching guide in ground
school and as a guide for both standard and emergency procedures in simulators, in trainers, and in the air. It is also the common denominator for readiness
across fleets, type commanders, ships, and stations.
{LINE-SPACE}
Today it would be hard to conceive of aviation in the Navy without replacement
air groups and Naval Aviation Training and Operations Procedures Standardization, but in the beginning it was equally hard to conceive that Naval Aviation
could have standardized to such an extent without destroying the spirit of innovation that in fact persists until this day. Nor could it have been conceived that,
thanks largely to farseeing souls who believed that dedicated training and standardization just might help, the Navy-wide mishap rate could be improved from
1,106 major accidents, 613 destroyed aircraft, and 358 people killed the year before RAGs were first begun and NATOPS was first considered to only eleven major mishaps in 2009. At the same time it is hard to detect any decrease in either
individual or squadron initiative.
Very often, when old-timers are told that today’s accident rate is only about
one every hundred thousand flying hours, they are at first incredulous. Then
they ask, “How? What made the difference?” The answer might be better leadership, better selection, better personnel management, improved integration of
aviation medicine, better aircraft and systems, better maintenance and supply,
angled decks and landing-approach mirrors on carriers, the replacement train29
ing concept, or NATOPS. The answer is not singular, all these helped—but central among the reasons are most certainly the adoption of the RAG concept and
the implementation and effective use of NATOPS.
These were indeed six amazing years.

NOTES

1. The Vought F8U Crusader, McDonnell F3H
Demon, Douglas F4D Skyray, Grumman
F11F Tiger, McDonnell F4H Phantom, North
American A5A (later RA-5C) Vigilante, and
the Douglas A3D Skywarrior.
2. In order to fill out the decks of aircraft carriers mobilized during the Korean War, “air
task groups” were formed, taking one squadron from each of several already formed air
groups. For example, Air Task Group 1 consisted of VF-111 from Air Group 11, VF-52

from Air Group 5, VF-151 from Air Group
15, and VF-194 from Air Group 19.
3. Customarily each air group took with it on
deployment detachments of aircraft and personnel for photo reconnaissance, airborne
early warning, and night and all-weather attack, as well as helicopters.
4. One perhaps extreme example of the difficulties attendant to such an arrangement comes
from the author’s first cruise. The ship had
been to sea about six weeks when a strange
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commander came into the ready room,
looked around, and left. All looked at one another and asked, “Who was that?” It turned
out to have been the air group commander.
5. The FASRON was the intermediate level of
maintenance between overhaul and repair
depots staffed mostly by long-term Navy civilians and the organizational level staffed by
sailors in each squadron. The FASRON was
manned by both permanent–duty station
Navy personnel and specialists on temporary
duty from parent squadrons. When the
squadron deployed its FASRON-assigned
personnel would rejoin the squadron. The
FASRON owned difficult-to-transport test
equipment and repair benches, expensive
spares, and, often, spare aircraft.

DUNN

just as the squadron began training with the
Cutlass.
12. Grossnick, United States Naval Aviation,
1910–1995 (as republished in Roy A.
Grossnick, Dictionary of American Naval Aviation Squadrons [Washington, D.C.: Naval
Historical Center, 1997], vol. 2, CD-ROM).
13. Grossnick, Dictionary of American Naval Aviation Squadrons.

6. Marines apparently had fewer problems, being based primarily at Cherry Point, North
Carolina, and El Toro, California.

14. For the Atlantic Fleet, the mission of Carrier
Air Group 4 was defined as the indoctrination, familiarization, and basic training of
Naval Aviators and key maintenance personnel, as well as the establishment of fleet introduction programs for new models of carrier
combat aircraft. For Pacific Fleet squadrons,
the mission was to provide indoctrination
and flight training to fleet replacement pilots,
as well as indoctrination and on-the-job
training for replacement enlisted personnel.

7. “A Revolution in Readiness,” Naval Aviation
News, January 1959, pp. 7–11.

15. The original RCVG-4 squadrons were
VF-101, VF-174, VF-21, VA-44, and VF-22.

8. A six-week course at El Centro for Navy and
Marine fighter and attack squadrons was
meant to establish a cadre of excellence in
ordnance and gunnery within each squadron.
Established initially for West Coast squadrons, it expanded later to offer training to
those on the East Coast as well.

16. The original RCVG-12 squadrons were
VF-121, VF-124, VA-125, and VA-126.

9. Roy A. Grossnick, United States Naval Aviation, 1910–1995 (Washington, D.C.: Naval
Historical Center, 1997), p. 206.

19. Capt. R. G. Dosé, USN, “Professional Note:
The Replacement Air Group Concept,” U.S.
Naval Institute Proceedings (April 1960), pp.
135–38.

10. “Supersonic Checkout,” Naval Aviation
News, April 1955, pp. 1–5.
11. “Crusader College Carries On,” Naval Aviation News, June 1958, pp. 22–23. VF(AW)-3,
formerly VC-3, had actually operated as a
transitional training unit since 1954. Initially
it was a small unit at Moffett Field, California, operating under the aegis of the Naval
Air Test Center as an adjunct to a fleet indoctrination program for new aircraft. At first,
four pilots from each transitioning squadron
completed a forty-hour flight syllabus at
VF(AW)-3 in all phases of flight. Later a
cadre of enlisted maintenance people was
added, the idea being that, for each squadron,
the four pilots and the small group of
maintainers would form the core of a training effort. Ramage took command in 1955

109

17. Grossnick, Dictionary of American Naval Aviation Squadrons.
18. Approach, August 1959. Referring to the A4D
(later A-4D) Skyhawk.

20. Donald D. Engen, Wings and Warriors: My
Life as a Naval Aviator (Washington, D.C.:
Smithsonian Institution, 1997), pp. 236–37.
21. The fiscal year 1956 Navy-Marine accident
rate was 33.5 major accidents for each hundred thousand hours flown, with 574 aircraft
destroyed and 406 people killed.
22. Col. William T. Hewes, USMC (Ret.), “The
High Dive,” Naval Aviation Museum Foundation 31, no. 1 (Spring 2010), p. 96. For another look at generally the same experience,
see Robert C. Rubel, “The U.S. Navy’s Transition to Jets,” Naval War College Review 63,
no. 2 (Spring 2010), pp. 49–59.
23. Grossnick, United States Naval Aviation,
1910–1995, p. 188.
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24. “The One Best Way: A New Standard for
Navy Air,” Naval Aviation News, August
1961, p. 6, available at www.history.navy.mil/.

27. Approach, October 1962; quoting Captain R.
J. Selmer, Commander, Fleet Air, Alameda,
California.

25. In his Aircraft Carriers at War (Annapolis,
Md.: Naval Institute Press, 2007), Adm.
James L. Holloway III, who had been executive assistant to Vice Admiral Pirie, gives his
version (pp. 149–51). Vice Adm. Donald
Engen, an air wing commander at the time of
NATOPS introduction, gives a different view
in his Wings and Warriors, p. 245.

28. Today’s manuals are thick volumes, some
even produced in more that one volume for a
single aircraft type, but all characterized by
blue covers. There is so much material that
anyone attempting to read the whole book
from cover to cover in one sitting would be
prone to falling asleep—thus, “Blue Sleeping
Pill.”

26. Air wing commanders oversee the training,
manning, maintenance, and administration
of groups of squadrons of mixed types that, at
least ideally, embark together on aircraft carriers. Type commanders performed the same
functions for all naval aircraft in the Atlantic
or Pacific Fleet (today combined in one headquarters in San Diego, California).

29. For the introduction of the angled flight deck
and mirror landing aid, see Thomas C. Hone,
Norman Friedman, and Mark C. Mandeles,
“The Development of the Angled-Deck Aircraft Carrier: Innovation and Adaptation,”
Naval War College Review 64, no. 2 (Spring
2011), pp. 63–78, available at www.usnwc
.edu/press/.
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WHY WARGAMING WORKS
Peter P. Perla and ED McGrady

W

argaming has a long history as an important tool for military training,
1
education, and research. In its broader application to nonmilitary conflict situations (see, for example, the recent books Wargaming for Leaders and
Business War Games), the technique is increasing in popularity, particularly
2
among businesses seeking strategic advantages. (As a result, we will sometimes
use the terms “wargaming” and “gaming” interchangeably; in the latter case,
however, we mean what is called “serious gaming,” not the more general sense,
3
like gambling.) Despite that history and popularity, however, wargaming’s record of success is uneven. Some games seem to succeed very well in preparing important decision makers for real-world environments
Dr. Perla earned a PhD in statistics from CarnegieMellon University. He has more than thirty years’ expein which they later find themselves. A prime example
rience as an analyst, project director, and research manis the U.S. Navy’s series of games during the 1920s and
ager at the Center for Naval Analyses (CNA), in
1930s, which helped train the commanders who won
Alexandria, Virginia. He has directed more than thirty
research projects and has led, supported, or consulted on
the Second World War in the Pacific. Other games do
many gaming efforts for the military and other agencies.
not do so well; for example, the game played by the
He is the author of The Art of Wargaming and of
Federal Emergency Management Agency in July 2004
numerous articles and is the designer of three commercially published simulation games.
did not seem to help that agency respond effectively to
Dr. McGrady, also of CNA, holds a PhD in chemical
Hurricane Katrina’s landfall only two years later.
engineering from the University of Michigan. He develThe reasons for the successes and failures of
ops games and conducts studies on a wide range of topics
from force structure and planning to operational dewargames of all types are as varied as the games themployment of medical forces and the analytic reconstrucselves. Sometimes success stems from particular cirtion of real-world operations. He has deployed as an
cumstances of subject matter and participants;
analyst with U.S. forces in combat and counternarcotics
operations.
sometimes failure flows from poor design or faulty
facts. When it works, wargaming can appear almost
© 2011 by Peter P. Perla and ED McGrady
Naval War College Review, Summer 2011, Vol. 64, No. 3
magical in its power to inform and instruct; when it
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doesn’t work, it can appear almost childish in its oversimplifications and
abstractions.
We believe that wargaming’s power and success (as well as its danger) derive
from its ability to enable individual participants to transform themselves by
making them more open to internalizing their experiences in a game—for good
or ill. The particulars of individual wargames are important to their relative success, yet there is an undercurrent of something less tangible than facts or models
that affects fundamentally the ability of a wargame to transform its participants.
This article explores that undercurrent. We characterize it in terms of the relationships among wargaming (in its broadest sense), narrative storytelling, and
the inner workings of the human brain. We propose the idea that gaming’s
transformative power grows out of its particular connections to storytelling; we
find in a combination of elements from traditional narrative theory and contemporary neuroscience the germ of our thesis—that gaming, as a story-living
experience, engages the human brain, and hence the human being participating
in a game, in ways more akin to real-life experience than to reading a novel or
watching a video. By creating for its participants a synthetic experience, gaming
gives them palpable and powerful insights that help them prepare better for
dealing with complex and uncertain situations in the future. We contend that
the use of gaming to transform individual participants—in particular, key decision makers—is an important, indeed essential, source of successful organizational and societal adaptation to that uncertain future.
We find inspiration and support for this position in an intriguing book by the
4
German psychologist Dietrich Dörner, The Logic of Failure. In this work,
Dörner argues that “geniuses are geniuses by birth, whereas the wise gain their
wisdom through experience. And it seems to me that the ability to deal with
problems in the most appropriate way is the hallmark of wisdom rather than ge5
nius.” In simplest terms, Dörner believes that we need to “learn to deal with different situations that place different demands on us. And we can teach this skill,
too—by putting people into one situation, then into another, and discussing
with them their behavior and, most important, their mistakes. The real world
gives us no chance to do this.” But games do. The need to explore, repeat, and reflect on decisions made in the context of games is critical to what we must do to
learn better how to cope with a world rapidly moving beyond our range of real
experiences. Improving the ability of our games to help us do this, in turn, demands that we improve our understanding of why wargaming works.
NARRATIVE AND GAMING
We begin our exploration by considering the relationships between narrative
and gaming. Throughout human history, narrative—storytelling—has been a
https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol64/iss3/21
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fundamental way to understand events we did not or cannot experience. Narratives take many forms, but the best ones succeed in placing those who experience
them into the flow of events and activities they describe. A suspension of disbelief occurs as readers, watchers, or listeners experience the vicarious emotions
and actions brought out by the narrative. Exploring this idea further, we will discuss research—literary, psychological, and neurological—that has illuminated
the processes by which this suspension of disbelief occurs.
Games are participatory narrative experiences. There are many different types
of games, from the board games of our childhood to modern computer and online games, and to that mainstay of military games, the tabletop or seminar game
(or even the derisively named BOGSAT—Bunch of Guys Sitting around the Table).6 Although this article applies to games in general, much of our default perspective derives from this latter class of games, so familiar to the denizens of
McCarty Little Hall, in Newport. At their most intense level, which we call
“high-engagement games,” games draw players into both participating in and
constructing their narratives; they literally place the players inside the narratives.
In fact, gaming is an even more powerful way to experience narrative than reading
a book or watching a film. Like literature and film, high-engagement games give
players a taste of the emotional and empathetic challenges they may face during
situations like those presented in the game. Unlike literature and film, games give
players active responsibility for their decisions, similar to what they would experience in the real world, and force them to bear many of the same consequences of
those decisions, both positive and negative.
Those consequences include not only the physical changes to the decisionmaking environment (such as the loss in battle of an important warship) but
also the psychological effects of both making those decisions and dealing with
their effects. For example, during a large-scale real-world disaster, decision makers will face emotional and psychological stresses as well as operational challenges. Strictly intellectual exercises, including simple, scenario-based planning,
seldom create emotional or psychological stress. Indeed, no planning system or
training tool can cover every possible contingency or produce the same stresses
experienced in reality. Real people do not die in wargames. Nevertheless, effective high-engagement games can equip leaders better to confront whatever contingency they must actually face, regardless of its similarity in detail to the game
actually played. Leaders responsible for making crisis decisions and living with
their consequences will benefit from the synthetic experience derived from playing high-engagement games—as well as from the additional mental tools they
can develop through that experience—to help ready themselves for confronting
those challenges. At the very least, these synthetic experiences will help prepare
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them to ask the critical questions during planning and preparation for the un7
predictable range of possible futures.
Synthetic Experience through Stories
Literature and cinema are ways in which nearly everyone has experienced real
situations and events synthetically. An example of literature affecting policy is the
story of how Richard Preston’s novel The Cobra Event influenced then-president
8
William Clinton. As Tom Mangold and Jeff Goldberg report in their own book
Plague Wars, “Ironically, everything that Clinton had previously learned about
biological terrorism from official sources did not have as much effect on him as
the Preston novel. The book found a curious resonance within Clinton, which
led to a profound interest and concern about the threat. Indeed, Clinton was so
alarmed by what he read that he asked U.S. intelligence experts to assess the
9
book’s credibility.”
At about the same time, in March 1998, the White House ran a wargame on
biological terrorism. These events combined to cause the president to call a special cabinet meeting on bioterrorism on 10 April 1998. As a result of this meeting, Mangold and Goldberg report, President Clinton asked Congress to add
10
$294 million to the counterterrorism budget.
The dramatization of the narrative in The Cobra Event (and the reinforcement of that experience in the game) seemed to access parts of President
Clinton’s imagination and attention that other sources of information could
not. By showing him the consequences, including the political and social dangers, of such an event, the narrative became a powerful warning of what he himself would face in the event of a biological incident.
But what does narrative do that is different from other forms of discourse?
After all, plenty of words had been written in the open-source and intelligence
literature about the threat of biological weapons before President Clinton read
The Cobra Event. What makes telling a good story more powerful than other
forms of communication?
The Power of Prose
To explore this question more fully, we turn now to literary theory. Let’s begin by
delving into the meaning of prose.
“Prose” is a generic term that can mean any writing that is designed to mimic
everyday speech in its rhythms and word choice (i.e., prose is not verse). Prose
can be divided further into whether it concerns facts (nonfiction) or is imaginative (fiction). Prose can also be divided according to the mode of writing: exposition, argumentation, description, or narrative. At its most basic level, prose is
simply words with meaning that are written on a page or spoken. This literalist,
or factual, aspect of prose would mean that the words “he picked up the gun and
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shot” both are the actual words and letters (hepickedupthegunandshot) and
convey the everyday meaning that we would ascribe to them (the act of obtaining possession of a particular weapon and firing it).
Prose that tells a story (the narrative form) creates meanings that go beyond
the effect of simply presenting facts; the narrative forms an image in the reader’s
mind of the thing being described. Likewise, narrative can cause the reader to react emotionally to the information being presented—to laugh, cry, feel afraid.
These emotions are not contained in the facts presented on the page or in the literal meaning of the words. Rather, they are created in the reader’s mind by the
interaction between the reader and the words on the page. Here the meaning of
“he picked up the gun and shot” may invoke a range of emotions or empathetic
feelings, depending on its context in the overall story line.
Between the literal presentation of words on the page and the reader’s reaction to them, there is a place that does not exist in the real world but that has real
effects on the reader’s mind. In literary theory this is called the l’entre deux, the
“between place.” It is in this in-between world, where narrative is real and everyday reality has retreated into the deep background, that the reader engages in
what we all learned about in high school, the suspension of disbelief. The l’entre
deux is real for the reader, even if it is nowhere to be found on the page. It is neither on the page nor absent from the world. It is not in the world as constructed
in the literal meaning of the words on the page. It is between the real and the unreal, between the reader and the page.
Samuel Taylor Coleridge first used the term “suspension of disbelief ” to
mean “transfer from our [the author’s] inward nature [of] a human interest and
a semblance of truth sufficient to procure for these shadows of imagination that
11
willing suspension of disbelief for the moment, which constitutes poetic faith.”
In other words, the author creates a fantasy or fictional narrative that is sufficiently engaging (the author’s responsibility to the reader being itself a major
theme of literary theory) to cause the reader to believe in what is not there—that
is, to have “poetic faith.”
If you parse Coleridge’s statement carefully, you will see that the focus is on
the author’s ability to create the suspension of disbelief. It does not refer to the
reader’s giving the author the benefit of the doubt, as is sometimes meant when
the term is applied to games. Here we use Coleridge’s sense, one that places the
requirement squarely on the author (or game designer) to affect the reader (or
player). All the reader has to do is enter honestly into the narrative; suspension
of disbelief will happen if the author has constructed a believable story world
populated by believable characters.
There are, in fact, several different ways of looking at suspension of disbelief:
from the literary perspective, as a phenomenon created by the author and
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entered into by the reader; from the philosophical perspective, understanding
what is real and what claim imaginary realities have on being real; from the psychological and cognitive-science perspective, which views thought and belief as
interrelated processes of perception and understanding; and, finally, from the
neuroscience perspective, where imagination becomes a sequence of neural and
perceptive processes that occur, starting with raw perception and leading to belief about the nature of the world. This intersection of literature, philosophy,
cognitive science, and neurology gives us a number of independent perspectives
on how this phenomenon works and how we should consider it.
A View from Neuroscience
Now let’s take a step beyond literary theory into the realms of the biological and
psychological study of the human brain. Neuroscientists and psychologists
studying belief and perception model the suspension of disbelief as a multistep
process. When suspension of disbelief occurs, the reader enters into a half-real
state where all of the information provided at the time of reading is believed, but
12
upon almost immediate reflection some of it is discounted as fiction. That is,
before any higher thought processes are engaged, at the initial moment of perceiving the words on the page readers will believe all of what they read, but upon
further consideration they dismiss some of its elements as “fiction” and accept
other elements as “real.” The process used to determine whether or not we believe what we read is known as the “systematic” system; it is slower to react than
the “automatic” system that first processes the work of fiction. What determines
the extent to which a narrative or other piece of prose invokes the systematic system and at what intensity is the extent to which we can take real action on the ba13
sis of that information. Without the need to take real action, the systematic
system may be invoked at a lesser intensity or not invoked at all.
Neurological experiments suggest that this dual process of understanding is
at work when we consume any sort of fiction or art. For example, scientists conducted a test with students by giving them two text passages to read. One factually described the process by which George Washington became the first
president; the other used dramaturgical techniques to create some uncertainty
as to whether he would be elected. Depending on which passage they had read,
students had different reaction times to the subsequent question, “Was George
Washington the first president?” The students reading the less cut-and-dried
passage took longer to answer, even though they “knew perfectly well that in fact
14
George Washington was elected the first president.” This suggested to the experimenters that the answer came more slowly due to the lack of clarity in the
narrative, which made students believe, even if temporarily or fleetingly, that
15
Washington may not have become president. This effect is called “anomalous
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16

suspense.” As we read a narrative we briefly believe both the truth of the world
as we know or believe it to be and the untruth that is presented by the narrative.
It is only afterward that the slower process of sorting out fact from fiction occurs. That sorting process is driven by our analysis of whether we can or must act
on the information presented.
This experiment and its conclusions seem a bit odd, even to us, and it doesn’t
prove much. It is, however, suggestive and agrees with our own sense of that
brief resetting of reality that sometimes occurs after reading a good novel, seeing
a great film, or playing a powerful game.
This dependence on the possibility of action is an important component of a
neurological understanding of the human mind. Perception and understanding
are both tangled up with the problem of acting in the world, because the brain is
designed not only to work within itself in some abstract intellectual environ17
ment but also to move our whole organism physically through the real world.
“Reality checking involves a continual assessment of the relation between be18
havior and the environment.” Thus, while we are suspending our disbelief in a
narrative, we are also not yet engaged in the practical process of deciding
whether we can use the information we perceive from that narrative to act in the
real world. Ultimately we get around to making this decision, even if some of the
blurriness of the difference stays with us.
Cognitive-theoretical attempts to distinguish between imagination and belief have constructed a concept similar to the l’entre deux. Scientists define a
“pretense box,” where pretenses (or imaginative flights) are distinguished from
beliefs or desires by the function they perform. Pretenses, beliefs, and desires are
functionally different, but one hypothesis holds that all three are processed by
the same code within the mind, resulting in effects for a pretense similar to those
for a belief. The pretense for belief activates our response to a situation, but it is
19
tempered by the separate and contrary pretense that the situation is fictional.
Games as Constructed Narrative
So what does all of the preceding discussion of narrative and cognition have to
do with wargaming? Wargames, particularly what we call high-engagement
games, extend the imaginative work of art or literature into the physical world
and place the participants in control of some portion of the narratives. Players
are participants, not merely spectators. As a result, high-engagement games embody two types of narrative: the “presented narrative,” which is what we call the
written or given narrative, created by the game’s designers; and the “constructed
narrative,” which is developed through the actions, statements, and decisions of
the game’s participants. The overall game narrative comprises both the presented narrative and the constructed narrative.
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The concept of constructed narrative implies that the players are confronted
by active choices and that in response to those choices—and consequent to their
physical presence in the narrative—they must construct responses to the game’s
presented narrative. This response is a separate discourse of the players, which
merges with the presented narrative of the game to create a synthetic product
that is not exclusively that of the players or of the game designers. Players in a
high-engagement game not only make choices but also speak and act to explain
to other participants their choices—as well as their reactions to the choices of
the game designer and the other players. This creates a conversation among everyone involved in the game, one that creates a unique narrative.
In the same way that traditional narratives can invoke emotional or suspenseful responses in their viewers, the narrative arc of a game can invoke a range of
emotions in its participants. Players can become excited at the expectation of a
significant victory or apprehensive at the possibility that an opponent will exploit a weakness. Likewise, games can present unpleasant information or place
players in upsetting situations, resulting in arguments or heated exchanges.
These emotions are equivalent to the normal sense of suspension of disbelief,
whereby an inanimate and abstract narrative brings about a real-world reaction
in the viewers.
As narratives, then, games can create the same reaction as any story. But
high-engagement games are more than simple narratives; they employ ranges of
physical cues, as do movies or stage plays. The latter rely on visual, auditory, and
symbolic cues (cues with social meaning beyond their meanings as everyday objects); a game extends the range of cues to include the physical venue where the
game takes place, the control of game play, the physical actions of the players
(kinesthetic cues), the social interactions among the players, and dramaturgical
effects revolving around those social interactions. These elements are unique to
games, and in particular they are most powerfully present in live-action role
20
playing—the quintessential high-engagement games.
The Venue. Although visual and auditory cues from the game designers make
up the basis for the game—they are the way the overall scenario and narrative
are presented to the players—they in no way make up all of the game. The most
basic element of the game experience is the venue, the physical space in which
the players act during the game. The venue could be as simple as a tabletop with
a map on it or as elaborate as a multimedia, multiroom environment where players interact with each other, with technology, and with a wide range of services
during the course of the game. The venue creates among the players and the
game controllers spatial and temporal relationships in a way most similar to the
role that the physical stage and set play in live theater. These physical
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relationships can reflect and help organize hierarchical or communications relationships. The venue also organizes players and their interactions into groupings that depend on the size and layout of the physical area (or perhaps even the
computer network) used. One often-overlooked aspect of game design is, in
fact, adapting the game concept and design to the physical plant that is available.
Game Control. The aspect of a wargame that is most noticeably different from
other narrative forms, including a stage play, is the concept of “control.” There
are two broad classes of control, which are found in different measure according
to the game’s design. “Active control” relies on human game controllers, who
closely follow player actions and respond to those actions in real time to drive
the game forward. “Passive control” relies on a predefined rules set that the players interact with instead of human controllers. In this latter case, computer consoles, game map, or other displays and player aids help the players visualize the
game’s universe, encode the rules, and spatially organize player actions and
options.
Kinesthetic Cues. What is not controlled by the game designers is how the players participate in the world the designers have created and how they interact
with each other. Kinesthetic cues occur as players take action and move through
space during the game. Cues could be as simple as players walking over to someone to talk, or they could involve actual manipulation of objects, such as miniature representations of the world—for example, maps, telephones, briefing
slides, or even physical or conceptual and mathematical models. Unlike the
other ways in which the game designer’s narrative influences the player’s experience, the movement of the players within the game space is (usually) entirely up
to the players. The venue and game structure (rules and scenario, for example)
can influence how a player acts in a game, but players’ actions are ultimately separate, uncontrolled elements of the game, distinct from the presented game
narrative.
Social Interactions. The social and cultural interactions that occur in the game
create new ways of presenting and changing the narrative experience of the players. The social element of the game affects the way in which players present
themselves to the game world and the other players. Because human social perceptions are attuned to understanding the intentions and behavior of people
and groups, this self-presentation adds a significant amount of information to
the experience.
In a high-engagement game two sets of social relationships are present, those
of the real world and those of the game world. These relationships play off one
another; often the people experiencing the game have social or organizational
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relationships in the real world. These relationships affect the type and nature of
acceptable behavior in the game. On the other hand, the game also enables behaviors that might not occur in the real world—because, after all, “it’s only a
game.” This interplay between real-world and game-world relationships can be
exploited by the game designer to create a dynamic tension that can allow players to identify and work through real-world organizational conflicts using the
mechanism of role playing in the game.
Dramaturgical Effects. Dramaturgical effects are signals that people send in social situations to establish both their identities and the overall social relation21
ship. Business scholarship, in attempting to understand all of the elements that
go into organizational relationships and decision making, hypothesizes that
within the context of a social situation people do things to present themselves to
others in a way that resembles theater more than it does rational organizational
processes. An example is the way charismatic leaders treat their subordinates
(think of General George S. Patton’s famous statement that his staff didn’t need
to know when he was acting, as long as he did himself) or how they frame themselves as respected in their fields, as intelligent or powerful (think of theme music, such as “Hail to the Chief ”). All of the various elements of self-presentation
—what you say (scripting), where you say it (staging), how you act (performing), and how you “spin” it (framing)—go into creating the “dramaturgical
22
presence.” People’s identities, both their views of themselves and how others
view them, come from the social interactions they experience. They are not
fixed, through some internal function.
In a game, as in real life, players must present themselves to others in such a
way as to reinforce the social identities they have constructed. By extension,
players also represent or present their parent organizations’ identities to others
in the context of the game. When required to represent functions different from
their normal personae or to embody types of persons different from their normal selves, players face an unusual social situation. Because they know their
roles in games are constructed ones, they can enter into them in ways that differ
from how they might normally present themselves in real social situations. Likewise, their play in a game is different from performing in a stage play, because on
stage the actor is interpreting the script and director’s instructions, not (usually)
making it all up on the spot.
The l’Entre Deux of Games
As a result of those considerations discussed above, the players enter into a
game’s l’entre deux in a way entirely different from the reader’s process of suspending disbelief in a traditional narrative. The combination of venue, kinesthetic actions, social interactions, and dramaturgical effects—all moderated and
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responded to via active or passive control—allows the players to come closer to
entering literally into the world of the game than they ever could in a watched or
read narrative. For the game, the l’entre deux does, in some ways, actually exist
outside of the players’ minds—in their actions and their interactions with other
players. Because they are dramaturgical actors in the game, the players occupy a
“between place” far closer to reality for them than do passive spectators or readers of other narrative forms.
If we consider the cognitive-neuroscience model we discussed previously, the
normal narrative disbelief that arises from a reader’s inability to act on the information presented in a text narrative is foiled in a game, because the player actually can (and must) act on the narrative information the game presents.
Likewise, because they occupy a constructed narrative (the game) as well as constructed dramaturgical identities (their roles in the game), the players need to
think as if they are in a real world in order to maintain their game identities
—further working against disbelief. In games, then, disbelief is suspended twice,
once when the players enter into their roles and again when they use their new
(game) identities to construct the game’s narrative.
Thus, games can be divided into narrative elements (those things that the designers present to advance the story) and dramaturgical elements (those that require the players to take some action in the real world). Visual, auditory,
symbolic, and venue cues form the backbone of the narrative elements in a
game; the players construct the rest of the narrative through their kinesthetic actions, their social interactions, and dramaturgical effects. All of this means that
players invest in the game more of their own identities—as well as their conceptions of what is real and fictional—than they do in a prosaic narrative. Because
of the stronger l’entre deux that the players enter during the game, that investment can have a more substantial effect on the participants than would a traditional narrative. The players own the between world, and for them it becomes
less fictional and more real.
GAMING AND REALITY
Games have their rhetorical modes, and, just as other narratives do, games can
have effects in the real world. However, a game is also a trick, a sleight of hand
that makes the players believe, if only temporarily, that they are someone else
doing something else. As with any fictitious narrative, at the end of the game the
players will recognize that the events they experienced in it were not real experiences; that the roles they occupied were not their real jobs and lives; and that the
narrative they helped create did not happen in the real world. However, any
compelling narrative that has affected its readers or viewers emotionally leaves
an effect even after the suspended disbelief in the narrative’s reality has worn off.
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After games, because of their stronger l’entre deux, players carry with them even
more of the conflict between reality and fiction that the games created. The
game’s narrative is the player’s narrative as much as it is the designer’s or the
controller’s (or the sponsor’s). It is created by the players and owned by them, in
a joint effort with the designers and controllers.
The l’entre deux the players enter through a game’s narrative forces them to
assume responsibility for the actions and events that occur as a result. It places
the consequences of their decisions and actions before the players, and in fact it
places those consequences directly on the players. Having to assume responsibility for the consequences of their own actions (as well as of those events beyond
their control) gives the players insight about the emotional, psychological, and
personal consequences that a real event would have for the actual decision makers whose roles they assumed during the game. The game creates empathy in the
players for the roles they are playing, through the suspension of disbelief. Further, because the players are more inclined to see a role-playing game acted in
the real world as part of both the l’entre deux and the real world, they bring these
emotional and psychological states with them back into the real world after the
game ends.
Prosaic writing limits itself to accepted signs and meanings in order to convey
its facts. Great prose and great games capture meanings that have never been
said—meanings that have not yet been recorded as narratives—and make them
23
accessible to readers or players. High-engagement games dealing with speculative or future events capture those new meanings and make them accessible.
Those new meanings created within the players and brought with them out of
the game—out of the l’entre deux and into the real world—affect how the players will act not only during events of the kinds considered in the game but also
during any future events they may encounter.
What does this mean? It means that in high-engagement role-playing games
we have a powerful tool that can be used to help players learn how better to balance the equation between the cost of preparing for the uncertain future and
the risk of not doing so; can help enlighten players about the fact that unexpected and unpredictable events, including embarrassing ones, do happen and
that there are real consequences when they do. Without that synthetic experience, it’s all too easy to dismiss the most challenging of possible events, particularly when the conventional wisdom presumes that it is simply not worth the
cost of preparing for the emotional, psychological, and cultural consequences
of contingencies so unlikely. When players have experienced both the personal
and organizational costs of such Black Swan events—if only during a
24
game—they develop new perspectives on them. Probabilities affect budgets
and lines of authority; consequences affect emotions, relationships, and values.
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High-engagement games mask the pressures of the former and so give the players unique opportunities to experience the challenges of the latter.
CAUTIONS
Of course, wise practitioners must be as cautious when using high-engagement
games as must be any wise user of power tools. Games can use the power of narrative persuasion to manipulate players into false beliefs and assumptions in any
number of ways. For that reason, game designers have a responsibility to avoid
many of the common mistakes that organizations make when they consider future challenges. These errors include both presenting mistaken information or
under- or overstating the dangers involved in these events (i.e., just getting it
wrong) and also what we call “the sanitary fantasy”—assuming that nothing can
ever possibly go wrong and no one will ever misbehave.
Just Getting It Wrong
Games that make this error embed the players in a narrative that creates a false
impression about the danger and consequences of a future event or situation.
This can cut either way—minimizing the consequences or exaggerating them
beyond what is reasonable. In both cases the game has lied to the players, which
will result either in their learning incorrect lessons or in their disbelieving the
outcomes and recommendations that flow from the game—even the most reasonable and applicable ones, least affected by the lies.
A good example of just getting it wrong is the Dark Winter game. Dark Winter
was a high-level decision-making game about smallpox response held from 22
to 23 June 2001 by the Johns Hopkins Center for Civilian Biodefense Strategies
and the Center for Strategic and International Studies. The game involved many
people who at one time or another in their careers actually would have been involved in a response to smallpox. They included former governors, senior leaders of the public health and homeland security communities, and a former
senator, Sam Nunn, playing the role of president of the United States. The game
got it wrong in positing a 1:10 transmission rate for smallpox, a very large incidence that would result in a widespread and virtually unstoppable catastrophe.25
Of course, using too low a rate might have produced an equally exaggerated result in the other direction.
Given that games such as these affect the emotional and psychological relationship of the players with the subject matter, it could be argued that a more
emotionally compelling but less physically severe outbreak could have created
similar stresses on the players without overestimating the physical threat of the
disease. For example, the victim population could have been smaller but more
emotionally affecting, such as immuno-compromised individuals or pregnant
women. Or the threat of the unknown, represented by only one or two cases,
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could have been played against the players’ imaginations, letting them feel the
impending doom of a worst-case scenario but without predicting large numbers
of downstream casualties.
The exercise received considerable official and media attention at the time,
reflecting the emotional reactions that many of the senior-level participants had
to confronting a serious disease outbreak that they had little or no capability to
stop. Senator Nunn’s testimony is interesting in his use of emotional language;
for example, referring to the two days of play by the team representing the National Security Council, he stated, “I will skip the agonizing details. . . . [O]ur
NSC ‘war gamers’ dealt with three weeks of simulated shock, stress, and hor26
ror.” However, the exercise also received considerable criticism for overstating
the danger and for presenting a biological attack as an apocalyptic threat that
27
could be overcome only by herculean effort. Even more disturbing, some of the
assumptions made in Dark Winter have been applied to other biological agents
28
in other exercises. In his testimony before Congress after the game, Senator
Nunn stated, “I determined from our wargame that public health has become a
national security issue, but that we are unprepared. . . . The members of our simulated NSC, as well as state and local officials, were desperate.” Creating such
desperation testified to the power of the gaming narrative; in this case, however,
doing so by overstating the physical transmissibility of the disease illustrated
how easily wrong (or at least questionable) facts can skew the experience in ways
that can distort the insights the game creates.
The Sanitary Fantasy
The sanitary fantasy is much more difficult to detect (and so to correct) than
simply getting it wrong. It is not about what is included in the game but rather
what is left out. The effect can be illustrated by a quick example: design a game to
capture the strategic decisions faced by the United States over the course of the
war in Iraq. Elements such as the challenges of building an alliance, the ability to
engage and destroy insurgents, and the restoration of services to the population
all would be obvious pieces to include in the design.
But there is a Black Swan, one that circles above the design of any game of
modern irregular conflict. How do you deal with those things you cannot expect
or anticipate, because they are so at odds with how you see the world that you
cannot possibly, either emotionally or politically, imagine their happening?
29
Things that violate your fundamental worldview, like Abu Ghraib? If it does
not include factors like Abu Ghraib, and its subsequent effect on how the United
States was viewed in the Arab world, it is unlikely that any game architecture
could present an effective, realistic scenario, particularly on the emotional and
political levels. Military wargames can sometimes reduce the likelihood of such
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failures by incorporating freely acting adversaries (Red teams). But even expert
military Red teams are slaves to their own worldviews—and all players are subject to the sometimes insidious preconceptions of the controllers and assessors.
If Black Swans are truly unpredictable, much of that unpredictability literally is
due to the inability of people to imagine what is to them the unimaginable.
Contingencies like the abhorrent behavior at Abu Ghraib or the confusion of
the federal response to Hurricane Katrina, and the resulting, respective media
firestorms, are Black Swans—unpredictable because they exist in a realm of possibilities where we do not want to go or where our cultures, life experiences,
30
imaginations, and worldviews block us from going. They are examples of the
unsanitary and unsavory set of problems that reflect badly on us, on those who
are designing and playing the games. Whether it’s our weapons systems not
working as promised, our contractors going over budget or time limits, or our
colleagues advancing their individual agendas at the expense of the overall organization, we too often don’t want to admit that such things happen. But they do.
And they often become the very things that decision makers have the hardest
time grappling with.
SO WHERE DID WE END UP?
Wargames are synthetic experiences; to make the most of them, we need to integrate them with all the other tools (analysis, exercises, history, real-world experience) that we have available to help us make sense of what we can and should do
in the present and the future.31 Wargames derive their power (for good or ill)
from their nature as constructed narrative; they have a more powerful effect on
participants than do other narrative forms, because their participants not only
are spectators but must act, engaging parts of their intellect and emotions not
accessed during simple storytelling. Games are story-living experiences. By engaging their players in ways more similar to acting in the real world than reading
a novel or watching a film can be, games affect their players in ways more deeply
remembered and more transformative of their personae than other techniques
for entertainment and learning. As a result, wargaming, gaming, serious gaming
—whatever we call it—is a powerful tool for affecting how people think, feel,
and behave.
In military environments, wargames have been important for at least two
centuries. In nonmilitary environments they have become more important and
more widely applied over the past fifty years. They offer us a promising means to
prepare decision makers for the complex and uncertain environments that the
pace and depth of change in global dynamics are driving, at ever more breathtaking speeds and in ever more surprising directions.
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To deal effectively with the Black Swans lurking in our future—including
those unsanitary ones that too often drive the most serious effects of events but
that we prefer not to think about—our leaders need to develop synthetic experience, best available to them through such games. Those games need to move
away from our traditional approach to dealing with the uncertainties of the future by trying to predict events based on assessment of relative probabilities. Instead, we need to focus on exploring events on the basis of their relative
consequences, less to prepare for specific consequences than to prepare our human decision-making apparatus for the physical, intellectual, and emotional
environments—full of complexity and uncertainty as they will be—in which
32
our leaders will have to decide, whatever specific events they confront.
Games can do that, but only if their designers and those who sponsor and
fund them reverse their own internal priorities about what is important (stressing tangible consequences rather than abstract probabilities) and what is true
(human reality rather than bureaucratic convenience). Games are powerful
tools that can create synthetic experiences even more powerful than some real
ones. Game designers, in turn, have a responsibility to ensure that their games
reflect the truth. We can help our players learn and internalize that truth only by
incorporating in our games not just our best understanding of the facts, as does
the best physical science, but also a fundamentally honest assessment of human
nature, like that found in the best literature.
In particular, high-engagement, role-playing games allow participants to interact with other human beings in situations involving competition, conflict,
and cooperation—a great and necessary opportunity. But they are not without
their limitations:

• It is difficult to play such games in other than real time. Although accelerated
clock speeds and time jumps are possible, actual decision making cannot take
place in anything other than real time, no matter how we try to convince
ourselves otherwise, for the simple reason that humans can live and act only
in real time.

• It is difficult to record what happens and why with enough fidelity and
completeness to make it profitable and instructive to review and reflect
upon events and decisions.

• It is difficult to explore variations in the decisions made and what the outcomes of those decisions might have been, especially to explore all the mistakes that we make.

• It is difficult to repeat an in-person, multiplayer game like a highengagement game and impossible to “replicate” it in the sense of a Monte
Carlo simulation experiment.
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As a result, high-engagement role-playing games can represent one crucial element of the learning process, but they cannot be the only element. No one form
of wargame can meet all our needs.

• We need high-engagement role-playing games to help decision makers experience interactions with other humans and also the emotional and psychological effects of those interactions.

• We need board-game-like tools (that is, manually managed open systems)
to allow players to see (and even change) how elements of the game’s models work to translate decisions into effects and events, so as to calibrate both
those models and the insights the players derive from them and the play of
the game.

• We need computer-embodied games to allow for ease of recording, ease of
repeating, and ease of reflecting on experiences to assist in developing our
“commonsense” approaches to dealing with uncertain and complex situations, as Dietrich Dörner argues so effectively in The Logic of Failure.
Ultimately, to make better games we need to tell better stories. We need to
help our audiences learn better how to learn from those stories. Just as games,
analysis, exercises, and real-world experience are all important tools that we
need to integrate in a synergistic process, different types and modes of games
play their own distinct roles (pun fully intended). Yet all games derive their
power from the same source—their ability to open up their participants to
self-transformation through the power of shared and constructed narrative.
But while recognizing the power and utility of games, we must simultaneously remain aware of their potential for mischief, a potential they share with
all narrative forms. As our colleague and Naval War College professor Stephen
Downes-Martin pointed out in his comments on an early draft of this article, it’s
hard to beat Hitler’s Mein Kampf as an example of a narrative that exerted powerful influence on its audience. Its narrative played on the reader’s emotions directly even while at times appearing to engage their intellects. Stephen has
argued repeatedly—and, with us, directly—about the need for wargaming to be
more than just an art form, to move into the realm of science. Artistic, narrative
truth is one thing; scientific truth (true facts?) another. How do we best combine
and balance them in our games?
This issue is one we hope to think about and explore farther in the future. For
now, however, we propose the following concluding thoughts, optimistic and
even triumphalist as they are.
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THE BOTTOM LINE
Wargames cannot escape their narrative nature, nor should we want them to.
But the use of wargames, the discipline we call “wargaming,” must adapt the tool
to the purpose. Like a film or a book, no game is purely entertainment; by creating an experience, albeit a synthetic one, all these narrative forms inform and
educate us to one extent or another. If we wargamers—we who create and employ these tools—are to fulfill our responsibility to our agencies, our companies,
our nation, and yes, our species, we must first recognize why wargaming works
and then apply its power in constructive and helpful ways to address the complex and uncertain issues that we face now and will face in the future.
As a final postscript, we offer an even more expansive view of how gaming can
affect the real world and real people for the better—a prophetic vision from Jane
McGonigal, the director of game research and development at the Institute for
33
the Future:
Reality doesn’t motivate us as effectively [as games do]. Reality isn’t engineered to
maximize our potential or to make us happy. . . .
When we play, we also have a sense of urgent optimism. We believe wholeheartedly
that we are up to any challenge, and we become remarkably resilient in the face of
failure. Research shows that gamers spend on average 80% of their time failing in
game worlds, but instead of giving up, they stick with the difficult challenge and use
the feedback of the game to get better. With some effort, we can learn to apply this
resilience to the real-world challenges we face. . . .
We can harness the power of game design to tackle real-world problems. We can empower gamers to use their virtual-world strengths to accomplish real feats. Indeed,
when game communities have been matched with challenging real-world problems,
they have already proven themselves capable of producing tangible, potentially
world-changing results. . . .
Those who understand this power will be the people who invent our future. We can
create rewarding, transformative games for ourselves and our families; for our
schools, businesses and neighborhoods; for an entire industry or an entirely new
movement.
We can play any games we want. We can create any future we can imagine. Let the
games begin.
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COMMENTARY

THE LAST TIME WE WERE AT “GLOBAL ZERO”

George H. Quester

Skeptics of a total elimination of nuclear weapons often point to a “prisoner’s dilemma” situation that might emerge, where everyone suspects everyone else of
cheating by secretly retaining or manufacturing atomic bombs. Advocates of
“global zero” sometimes then respond that this is all too theoretical and hypothetical, as we have no way of knowing whether such suspicions would be so
all-powerful in a disarmed world.
Yet one can point out a real-life example of such a global-zero situation, in the
last decades before Hiroshima, where the world’s knowledge of the possibilities
of a nuclear chain reaction was emerging and where the result was a “race” to
build the bomb, with the United States “winning” this race in the Manhattan
Project, Nazi Germany having done very little to produce such weapons.
An attempt will be made here to sort out the similarities and differences between the world from 1900 to 1945 and a future world where an attempt would
be made to get us back to a total absence of nuclear weapons. If the similarities
are too strong, the outlook for total, or even substantial, nuclear disarmament
might be quite bleak. If the differences are more imGeorge Quester is a professor emeritus of government
portant, the pessimistic lessons here of preemption
and politics at the University of Maryland, and is now
and distrust might not be so compelling.

serving as the Shapiro Visiting Professor at the Elliott
School of International Affairs of George Washington
University. He has taught at Harvard, Cornell, and
Stanford Universities, as well as at the National War
College and the U.S. Naval Academy. His most recent
book is Preemption: Preventive War and Proliferation (Transaction, 2009).
© 2011 by George H. Quester
Naval War College Review, Summer 2011, Vol. 64, No. 3

COMPARATIVE UNCERTAINTIES ON
CAPABILITY
In the years after 1939, the last theoretical uncertainties about whether nuclear weapons were even possible had basically been eliminated, but there was great
doubt on all sides as to whether the sheer task of
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generating fissionable uranium-235, or plutonium, was industrially feasible. As
the German, British, American, and Soviet (as well as Japanese) leaderships were
briefed on the possibilities, the questions were always whether their respective
countries could produce such bombs in a reasonable time at a manageable allocation of resources and whether opposing countries could do so.
In a future world, the analogous problems would instead be whether one’s
own country could successfully cheat on the system of international controls
and inspections and whether other countries might be able to do so.
At various stages of the 1939–45 process, the industrial task of producing
such fissionable materials seemed so huge that some British strategists actually
suggested leaking rumors that Britain was entering this race, in order to trick
1
Nazi Germany into wasting its resources on similar projects. (Winston Churchill apparently rejected this option but worried that rumors of a Nazi bomb
2
project might similarly be a trick to get Britain to waste its resources.) A bit later,
after Britain and the United States had concluded that the bomb was indeed
worth pursuing, the Soviet secret police chief, Lavrenty Beria, apparently feared
that espionage reports of British and American activities were also intended
3
simply to mislead the Soviet Union.
We live now unavoidably in a world where it is well established that nuclear
weapons can be made and where fissionable materials are indeed plentiful as
by-products of the generation of electrical power in nuclear reactors. The barrier now would be not the projected industrial difficulty of separating uranium
or reprocessing plutonium but the difficulty of evading inspection.
The Presence or Absence of Conventional War
At a first look we might conclude that the Manhattan Project (and nuclear weapons) would not have emerged except for World War II. It is indeed a historical
fact that the British MAUD project (otherwise code-named TUBE ALLOYS) and
the American Manhattan Project (into which the British project was to be
merged) did not emerge until Nazi Germany had invaded Poland. (Admittedly,
something of a go-ahead on the Manhattan Project was given before 7 December
1941, when the United States entered the war.)
Will there be conventional wars in the future that exacerbate international
hatreds and spur resumed pursuit of nuclear weapons? Some advocates of global
nuclear disarmament indeed are assuming that ordinary conventional wars will
now be rare, while others would advocate nuclear zero even if ordinary wars periodically occurred.
Yet there are some interesting paradoxes to be noted in the 1939–45 experience. One reason that the British were willing to merge their own nuclear weapons work into that of the Manhattan Project was that the sheer burden of
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continuing the conventional war against Hitler, amid the risks of German
bomber and missile attacks, made it unlikely that Britain could produce atomic
4
bombs before World War II had ended.
On the Nazi side, decisions again and again to avoid a major nuclear effort were
based on estimates that no bomb could be produced in time for use in the current
war, given the industrial burdens of all the other weapons projects under way and
5
the intensity of Allied aerial attack. Similar decisions, based on the existence of
the ongoing war, played a role in Japan and the Soviet Union. It was only in the
United States, endowed with major industrial capabilities and a basic immunity to
enemy aerial attack, that the bomb was seen as relevant and feasible.
What if World War II had not begun? What if Hitler had been once again appeased when he attacked Poland or had been content for the time being with occupying Czechoslovakia? In a continuation of the 1938 theme of “peace in our
time,” would there have been too little enmity and hatred to stimulate the pursuit of nuclear weapons? Or would the very absence of bombing and a lowered
drain on resources instead have energized German nuclear physicists, and their
British and American opposite numbers, to seek this “wonder weapon”?
The Role of Dictatorial Regimes
The preemptive fear that drove the Manhattan Project was that Nazi Germany
was seeking the bomb. Dictatorships are more capable of secrecy than are democracies (although the difference here is not absolute and should not be overstated) and are less sympathetic to other peoples, less committed to peace.
Will all the nuclear-capable powers of the future be democracies, or will some
be relatively opaque and internationally unreliable dictatorships? The current
examples of North Korea and Iran would seem to answer the question.
Nazi Germany came into being as a totalitarian dictatorship in part on a platform of anti-Semitism and intolerance of liberal academic standards. The ironic
price was that a significant number of highly competent nuclear scientists were
thus driven out of Germany because they were too liberal or too Jewish to be tolerated, and many of these people were to become key players in the Manhattan
6
Project.
It is thus interesting to speculate about a Germany where the Nazis did not
come to power (the Nazi takeover in 1933 was indeed far from inevitable) and
the Weimar Republic survived. The majority of physicists around the world who
could have been involved in the design of nuclear weapons had studied or otherwise spent time at German universities in the 1920s, particularly at Göttingen.
Some of the Hungarian physicists who, like Edward Teller, later worked in the
Manhattan Project had been the victims of anti-Semitism in Hungary and came
to Weimar Germany to escape this. Would not the loyalties of such people have
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leaned toward Germany in such a world, as in fact they later leaned toward the
United States?
If there had ever been a “race” to build atomic bombs between a democratic
Weimar Republic and democratic Britain or the United States, Germany might
have had a clear advantage. But we might all assume today that no such race
would have been run among democracies. Would the advantage in a secret race
for the atomic bomb then have passed to fascist Italy or Soviet Russia? Or would
the enormous industrial investment required and the destructive enormity of
the bombs that could be produced have held everyone back, in the absence of as
frightening a totalitarian state as Nazi Germany and of the war that Hitler
launched?
Or given the secrecy that Joseph Stalin’s USSR and Benito Mussolini’s Italy
could impose, might not some of the same fears and preemptive drives have
driven Britain, the United States, and a still democratic Germany to set up a
MAUD or Manhattan Project?
The Presence of Genocidal Motives
Aside from being secretive and militarily aggressive, Hitler’s Germany was particularly threatening because it proved to be spectacularly homicidal, killing
millions of people not simply in the process of trying to win a war and conquer
territory but because it wanted to kill them, simply because of their ethnicities.
While the full extent of this was not clear until the German defeat in 1945, there
were many reasons to guess before then that the Nazis were bent on genocide;
rumors and reports emerged after 1933, especially after the Nazi conquest of Poland in 1939. It was thus widely assumed that Hitler might use the destructive
power of nuclear weapons if he were ever to acquire them, perhaps to destroy
London, perhaps Paris (after local German commanders ignored his orders that
the French capital be destroyed by conventional means), perhaps Tel Aviv.
Are we truly free of all such genocidal motives in today’s world? One might
note some of the sermons and statements issued by Iranian clergymen declaring
that nuclear weapons might be used to “kill” Israel, statements of motivation
that have no parallel in the strategic pronouncements since 1945 of the other
nuclear-weapons states. If we were thus asked to explain why it was “of course”
necessary to beat Nazi Germany in a race to the atomic bomb, this willingness of
the Nazis to kill people might loom up as an obvious factor, with or without
parallels to the present.
Well short of Hitler’s penchant for genocide, one also might have feared that
Hitler would use the bomb to dictate an Allied surrender to his demands. There
is also speculation that the Nazi bomb would have been used to head off surrender to Allied occupation and, thereafter, regime change. Stalin is reported to
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have commented immediately after Hiroshima to the American ambassador,
Averell Harriman, that if Hitler had gotten the bomb he would never have had to
7
surrender. In such a case, even had the advancing Soviet forces been successful
in conventional combat and the British and American forces approaching from
the west equally so, would a Nazi nuclear threat directed at Moscow and London
have been sufficient to force the Allies to stop short of Germany?
Yet we might not have had to encounter so deliberately homicidal a regime as
Nazi Germany to see bombs used to destroy cities—certainly if some state came
uniquely to possess them. The United States used nuclear weapons on Hiroshima and Nagasaki not because it wished to kill Japanese city dwellers but because it wanted to end the war by forcing a surrender by the new threat to
Japanese cities. German physicists who knew of the possibility of nuclear fission
and (quite correctly) suspected the United States had a nuclear weapons project
under way feared that such bombs would be used on German cities for just such
a reason.8 If there was no other reason for this assumption, one had the level of
destruction that had been inflicted in the conventional air raids on Hamburg and
Dresden.
A nuclear monopoly in Hitler’s hands would thus have been particularly worrisome in the years after 1939. But such a monopoly in anyone’s hands would
also have been worrisome, and it would be so again in the future.
The Role of Opacity
In the world of nuclear physics of the 1930s and 1940s, all the major players
knew each other quite well. Werner Heisenberg, the likely head of any German
nuclear weapons program, had been a sort of academic mentor to Hans Bethe, a
major figure in the Manhattan Project, and this was typical of relationships
around the globe. Heisenberg’s mentor, in turn, had been Niels Bohr, who escaped from Denmark in 1943 to come to Britain and America to give advice on
the Manhattan Project and to brief the Allies on what he knew of German
nuclear efforts.
By comparison, the global population of physicists and nuclear engineers
who would be relevant to nuclear weapons projects today is very much larger, so
the links of personal trust or distrust are generally weaker.
As noted above, dictatorships can keep secrets, but democracies can do so too.
In 1941, at the urging of Leo Szilard, American scientific journals had ceased
publishing articles about nuclear fission, lest this alert and help the Germans.
Some German physicists, noting the absence of new articles, came to the worrisome conclusion that the Americans might be embarked on bomb projects; this
was in fact only about to be the case—people like Szilard were still alarmed that
the United States had not yet decided to commit enough resources to the project.
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Slightly later, Soviet nuclear physicists similarly became alarmed about the absence of new articles on nuclear fission in American journals, thus urging Stalin
9
to initiate a bomb project.
In the atmosphere of less-than-total openness here, even in democracies, the
world saw a situation of fears and preemptive motives emerging no matter what
one did. If American journals had continued publishing the relevant articles,
fears would have been instilled. When the journals stopped publishing such articles, fears were instilled all the same.
One sees a similar inevitable opacity and fear in the much-discussed meeting
between Werner Heisenberg and Niels Bohr in 1941 in which Heisenberg’s men10
tion of the generic possibility of bomb projects alarmed and angered Bohr. In
retrospect, it is difficult to see how Heisenberg could have reassured Bohr (and
the Allies with whom Bohr was able to communicate) that Nazi Germany would
not, could not, make the atomic bomb, because the mere raising of the possibility aroused suspicion. Was Heisenberg simply pumping Bohr on what the Americans and British might be doing? Was he trying to trick the outside world into
missing that the Nazis were out to get the bomb? Or was he saber-rattling to intimidate Bohr and his friends?
One sees the same “damned if you do, damned if you don’t” in postwar debates about whether Heisenberg and his colleagues deliberately slowed their
work toward a bomb. The lack of German progress is typically dismissed as German incompetence, as the “Aryan” physicists sorely missed the expertise of the
Jewish and other liberal physicists who had been driven out. Heisenberg and his
remaining partners are accused of being intent on producing bombs but not
knowing how to do it.
When it is pointed out that Heisenberg and other Germans indeed understood a fair amount about how atomic bombs could be made (as illustrated in a
brilliant lecture that Heisenberg gave for his fellow internees at Farm Hall immediately after the news of Hiroshima outlining exactly how the Americans had
done it, a lecture recorded by British listening devices), this is seized on as proof
11
that the Germans were intent on making such bombs themselves.
Looking ahead to any future world without nuclear weapons, all concerned
will agree that verification, safeguards, and general transparency would be crucial to avoiding the worst-case interpretations of adversary motives illustrated
by the above examples. To repeat, one quick comparison of the cases might give a
very pessimistic impression: the opposing camps of nuclear physicists in 1940
knew each other so extremely well, in the still-small world of people who understood nuclear fission, whereas today there may be thousands of similarly aware
and competent nuclear physicists around the world, hardly enjoying first-name,
student-to-mentor relationships.
https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol64/iss3/21
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The Role of Assumptions about Military Impact
For a host of very good reasons, we are inclined today to think of nuclear weapons not as military instruments relevant to battlefields but as weapons of mass
destruction, relevant to intimidation and deterrence. The Cold War saw periods
of enthusiasm for “tactical” and other more clearly military uses of nuclear
weapons, but this may to some extent have been a device to make American nuclear escalation more credible, as extended nuclear deterrence required that
ways be found to counter the supposed Soviet advantage in conventional forces.
Military professionals perhaps are always inclined to look for more traditional
“battlefield” uses for any new weapon. Also, Western morality disapproves of deliberate attacks on civilian targets, while it approves of attempts by navies to sink
opposing navies, or air forces to destroy opposing air forces, etc.
Looking back to our first “race to produce nuclear weapons,” some of the urgency, as noted, was the perception that Hitler would want to use atomic bombs
(if he got them first) to destroy cities and massacre civilians, or at least to
threaten such destruction and massacre. But other concerns pertained to
whether the Germans might use such big bombs on battlefields, perhaps making
them able to cripple a Normandy invasion or the like.
One role of General Leslie Groves as head of the Manhattan Project was to
designate research-related targets in Germany to be attacked with conventional
bombs, and strategic bombing in general played an important role in dampening any Nazi enthusiasm for a nuclear weapons program. But the question, very
relevant to the future, then emerged of whether the rest of the Manhattan Project was therefore necessary. Were American atomic bombs needed to dig out
German nuclear facilities, or would conventional bombing suffice?
President Roosevelt’s response to the letter signed by Einstein warning of
possible German nuclear efforts was to endorse the future Manhattan Project as
12
a way “to keep the Germans from blowing us up.” But is the military linkage
here so clear? Several analogies emerge, in today’s discussions of how to respond
to Iranian and North Korean nuclear efforts. If these facilities are to be attacked
(tomorrow, or in some future world where other states have given up their nuclear weapons), will nuclear weapons be necessary and appropriate for the purpose? Many would argue that conventional attacks would be much better, to
hold down collateral damage to those not guilty in the matter.
Even if a future Tehran or Pyongyang sneaks into possession of nuclear weapons and actually uses them, there is an argument even now for a “nuclear pacifism,” whereby the response of the United States and the other responsible major
powers would be to impose retaliatory punishment by substantial conventional
attacks.
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Our fears in the early 1940s with regard to Nazi Germany might thus actually
suggest two models for the future. How terrible would it have been if the Germans got the atomic bomb while they were still doing well on the conventional
battlefield, their armies deep into Russia and occupying France, or during the
post-Stalingrad and post–Normandy invasion when the conventional defeat of
the Nazis was fairly certain? Would they have been able to brandish nuclear
weapons to keep the Americans west of the Rhine and the Russians east of the
Oder? This points to how in a future “global zero” world we would feel about a
conventionally weak, but otherwise obnoxious, adversary sneaking into the possession of nuclear weapons, perhaps to reinsure itself against the regime change
and internationally imposed punishment that it deserved.
The clear question posed here is thus: Will either a strong or a weak conventional adversary, suspected of reaching for nuclear weapons, drive and force the
responsible states quickly to renounce a “nuclear zero” international system and
to race to make nuclear weapons for themselves once again?
SOME VERY TENTATIVE CONCLUSIONS
It is surely too early to conclude that “prisoner’s dilemma” mutual fears will doom
any attempt to eliminate nuclear weapons. Yet any exhaustive review of the reasoning behind the British TUBE ALLOYS venture and the American Manhattan
Project encounters assumptions about strategy that might seem perfect templates
for the worst-case scenarios of a future nuclear-weapons-free world.
As suggested, the political background of the first “race” to acquire such
weapons may have to be examined much more closely, to sort out the analogies
with the future, to sort out whether “nuclear zero” has any chance of being
achieved and adhered to.

NOTES

This essay is an early product of a booklength study supported by a grant from the
Smith Richardson Foundation, which is not
responsible for any of the conclusions or
opinions presented.
1. Thomas Powers, Heisenberg’s War (New
York: Knopf, 1993), p. 69.

4. On the British decision, see Margaret
Gowing, Britain and Atomic Energy (New
York: St. Martin’s, 1964).
5. Richard Rhoes, The Making of the Atomic
Bomb (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1986),
pp. 404–405.

2. Malcolm MacPherson, Time Bomb (New
York: E. P. Dutton, 1986), pp. 110–13.

6. This pattern is outlined at length in J. S.
Medawar and David Pyke, Hitler’s Gift (New
York: Arcade, 2001).

3. David Holloway, Stalin and the Bomb (New
Haven, Conn.: Yale Univ. Press), p. 115.

7. The comment is noted in Holloway, Stalin
and the Bomb, p. 128.
8. See MacPherson, Time Bomb, p. 191.
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9. See Holloway, Stalin and the Bomb, p. 78.
10. This interaction is much discussed in the literature. Quite sympathetic to Heisenberg is
Powers, Heisenberg’s War, pp. 113–18. Much
less sympathetic is Paul Lawrence Rose,
Heisenberg and the Nazi Atomic Bomb Project
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(Berkeley: Univ. of California Press, 1998),
pp. 154–58.
11. See Powers, Heisenberg’s War, p. 451, for
Hans Bethe’s evaluation of the transcript of
Heisenberg’s lecture.
12. The Roosevelt quote can be found in MacPherson, Time Bomb, p. 95.
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THINK AGAIN: SECURITY ISSUES FOR A NEW CENTURY
Reveron, Derek S., and Kathleen A. Mahoney-Norris. Human Security in a Borderless World. Boulder,
Colo.: Westview, 2011. 255pp. $30

The authors, professors in professional
military education in the U.S. Navy
(Reveron) and the U.S. Air Force
(Mahoney-Norris), bring more than
sixty years of collective expertise as military officers and educators to their
subject—“human security,” which they
define as “a people-centered approach
focused on individual human beings
and their rights and needs.” The authors’ purpose is to transcend the traditional national-security model rooted
in the so-called realist school of international relations and offer a broader
construct that examines a continuum of
interrelated issue areas that affect individuals and groups in ways that cumulatively influence and shape regional
and international security.
The authors argue that transnational issues in the twenty-first century have
less to do with threats to territory than
with threats to people and more to do
with human development than with
state-on-state competition and conflict.
They aver that additional perspectives
on security are necessary to grapple
with contemporary challenges and
threats that are neither constrained by

nor dictated exclusively by states. They
begin their examination by assessing
global civic security, people’s physical
safety and integrity, noting that human
development is often hampered by oppressive governments, while in other
states it is impeded because weak governments cannot protect their people
from predation by nonstate actors
(criminal gangs, drug cartels, and
smugglers) increasingly empowered by
the tools of globalization. Importantly,
throughout their book Reveron and
Mahoney-Norris stake a position on
globalization midway between Thomas
Friedman’s optimism and Moisés
Naím’s pessimism.
The authors identify and discuss economic security, people’s capacity to
provide food and shelter for themselves
and their families, as a key component
of human security. They note how inequitable development and severe poverty
around the world imperil civic security
by making weak states more susceptible
to criminality, terrorism, and other
forms of extremism. As a part of this
discussion, Reveron and MahoneyNorris delve into issues related to
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sustainable development and the rising
role of women in human security. They
link civic and economic security to environmental security, pointing out how
climate change will have implications
for access to clean water and food, as
well as for stable health conditions and
ecosystem stability. The authors believe
that climate change will weaken already
feeble states and contribute to regional
and global insecurity in ways not seen
heretofore.
They offer a new focus on maritime security because new challenges and
threats could manifest themselves on
and below the world’s oceans. Fisheries
depletion and pollution could threaten
a vital food source for a growing world
population, while piracy and competing
claims for sea routes and seabed hydrocarbons could contribute to forms of
conflict not seen previously. Reveron
and Mahoney-Norris also highlight two
other areas often neglected by traditional security studies: health security
and cyber security. They illustrate how
in a more interconnected world infectious diseases carried inadvertently by
modern air and sea travel could have
deleterious effects on human security.
Cyber security receives attention because both state and nonstate actors
possess growing capabilities to disrupt
the global population’s increasing interconnectedness and mounting dependence on the virtual world.
This highly accessible book offers a
novel approach to security studies, including insightful inserts (“Think
Again”) to stimulate readers’ thinking
about security issues for a new century.
Human Security in a Borderless World
should prove invaluable to a wide audience ranging from civilian and military
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students to policy makers and those
who advise them.
CHARLES E. COSTANZO

Air Command and Staff College

Murphy, Martin N. Somalia, the New Barbary?
Piracy and Islam in the Horn of Africa. New York:
Columbia Univ. Press, 2011. 176pp. $26.50

Within the sea services, allusion to the
Barbary pirates and the “shores of Tripoli” continues to resonate. Readers of
Martin Murphy’s detailed and thoughtful book Somalia may come away wishing that a solution to the situation our
mariners and fleet forces now face in
those inhospitable waters were as
straightforward as storming the
beaches.
Murphy’s previous works include Small
Boats, Weak States, Dirty Money: Piracy
and Maritime Terrorism in the Modern
World (2009). He introduces the current volume with this caution: “The
purpose of this book is to examine
whether or not state failure is a useful
and accurate explanation of Somali piracy. . . . It will ask if there are links between Somali pirates and international
or regional terrorist groups. Even if
these links are tenuous, it will ask why
and how the terrorist groups that operate within Somalia might exploit the
maritime dimension in the future. Finally, it will review whether or not naval action, in the absence of political
engagement with entities within Somalia, will provide solutions to either
problem, and if, perversely, achieving
the political stability that may reduce or
eliminate piracy might provide violent
Islamist groups with the secure sanctuary within Somalia they are seeking.” In
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posing these questions Murphy takes
the story forward from that told in
Small Boats, which looked at maritime
crime worldwide. Although this work,
like his earlier book, finds no direct link
between terrorism and crime, despite
circumstances conducive to both, the
question remains how long the international maritime community can tolerate the effects of such an expensive
absence of the rule of law.
The current volume treats Somali piracy as it should be treated, sui generis.
Piracy as experienced today off Somalia,
and emanating from that nonstate, cannot be compared to contemporary experiences in the Gulf of Guinea or those
in the Strait of Malacca or among the
islands of the Indonesian archipelago.
As dangerous as those waters are, the
crimes they record are mostly of the
“smash and grab” variety, perpetrated
against ships in port, maneuvering
slowly in restricted waters, or at anchor.
Virtually all these crimes have occurred
in territorial waters and thus within local or national law-enforcement jurisdictions, rather than on the high seas, a
point that is critical to the legally actionable definition of the internationally recognized crime of piracy.
Many archipelagic and littoral states
lack the will or effective capacity to exercise their maritime sovereignty and to
combat crime uniformly throughout
their maritime territories. However,
only Somalia among today’s community of nations so lacks a sense of unitary statehood that pirate bands may
function as if they governed a ministate
within its borders. Yet these pirate
“strongholds” are virtual only, without
the centers of gravity that even a ministate would possess. In that sense, they
are not in reality the New Barbary but

something more ephemeral and even
more difficult to call to account.
How difficult is amply demonstrated in
Murphy’s detailed history of modern
Somalia and the forces that continue to
conspire to keep it ungoverned and, so
far, ungovernable. Somalia, the New
Barbary? not only takes us through the
history of Somalia’s failure to gel into
stable statehood but illustrates at each
turn how these continuing failures contributed to the ongoing pirate dramas
playing out in the waters off the Horn
of Africa.
There are few heroes in this story, and
the international community, insisting
on support for the minimally effective
Transitional Federal Government as its
sole interlocutor in combating piracy
and explaining away the lack of progress
despite huge sums spent on counterpiracy patrols and escort duties, bears a
large part of the burden. As Murphy
demonstrates, a large part of this inability on the part of the international community lies in the legitimate fear of
creating an even more intractable
problem should the extremists, currently characterized by the Islamist
al-Shabaab, form a governmental shield
behind which piracy could both thrive
and marry itself to extremism. However, as Murphy pointed out in Small
Boats and now refines in Somalia, these
fears have no basis in evidence. In fact,
there is ample evidence that the moneydriven pirates continue to hold political
influences of all stripes at arm’s length,
fearing restriction on their operations
and heavy taxation of their ill-gotten
gains.
Where the above has caused many observers to throw up their hands, resignedly calling down a plague on all their
houses, Murphy carefully outlines how
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Puntland, which is largely self-governing
and (by Somali standards) governed,
but which also hosts the vast majority
of pirate operations, could be a key either to combating piracy or to being
held accountable for not doing so.
However, either way, the international
community needs to extend tacit recognition to Puntland’s capabilities, if not
its sovereignty, in order to harness any
sense of responsibility to that international community.

CHARLES N. DRAGONETTE

The bigger challenge to the United
States and to its navy may come from
the appearance of a power vacuum that
continued Somali pirate success offers.
Many nations have joined the counterpiracy coalition off the Horn of Africa,
but as Murphy points out, not all forces
are equally effective, except perhaps in
demonstrating their nations’ right to be
there. As long ago as 1809 the Royal
Navy, operating with armed ships of the
Honourable East India Company, engaged pirates who were operating in the
Strait of Hormuz with the benign neglect of local rulers along the littoral.
After protracted combat, culminating
in the battle of Ras al-Khaimah, that left
the waters relatively safe, the Royal
Navy remained as the international
guarantor of the safety of trade, and
Britain enjoyed a century of military,
political, and economic preeminence.
Britain would not be the last to seek to
do so.

For the better part of the last ten years,
the word “terrorism,” in some shape or
form, has become an integral part of the
world’s vocabulary. Whether in regard
to military operations, air or sea transportation, law enforcement, cyber communications, or even the environment,
responses to perceived or actual threats
almost always include some form of
counterterrorist activity. With each response, various legal rights, and regimes
that society and individuals rely upon
and often take for granted, are time and
again directly impacted. Whether such
impacts are experienced as good or bad
depends in great part on one’s ability to
understand clearly the issues, which is
where Legal Issues in the Struggle against
Terror comes in.

Somalia, the New Barbary? thus takes
the reader beyond the breakers, which
may be all of Somalia that most analysts
of the current maritime scene have examined, and returns us to essential
questions on the water. It is an experience every reader with an interest in
matters that impel naval operations
ought to embrace.

143

Senior Commercial Maritime Operations Analyst
Nimitz Operational Intelligence Center
(The views expressed here are purely the author’s
and do not necessarily reflect the position of the U.S.
Navy or of the Office of Naval Intelligence.)

Moore, John Norton, and Robert F. Turner, eds.
Legal Issues in the Struggle against Terror. Durham, N.C.: Carolina Academic, 2010. 565pp. $70

This book of essays is essential reading
for anyone looking to understand the
many significant and complex issues regarding responses to terrorism since
9/11. The essays, written by legal experts and scholars, put into context, using words that are easy to read and
understand, some of the most hotly
contested international and domestic
legal issues. The editors state in the
preface that this work is an important
collection of essays that cover topics
considered integral to the “struggle
against al Qaeda and its terrorist allies.”
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However, the topics the editors chose to
cover in this book also include detailed
insight and analysis that transcends the
struggle with al-Qa‘ida and undoubtedly will be debated and revisited in
many venues for years to come.
While it is impractical to review in detail each individual author and chapter,
a brief synopsis of the discussions presented is essential for assessing this
book’s value within the scope of current
events. Detailed yet readable analyses of
the issues and challenges involving detainees and military commissions, U.S.
constitutional issues, national security
concerns, intelligence efforts, the law of
war, and civil-military relations provide
a broad overview of the legal concerns
and challenges the government faces
when confronting terrorists. A chapter
discussing civil liberties provides an integral counterbalance and reminds
readers of the human impacts that efforts to counter terrorism often create.
Collectively, these essays represent a
well reasoned and researched look into
the role of executive power and the
challenges that confronting terrorism
on a global scale presents to those
tasked with applying (or even developing) domestic and international law. To
their credit, the editors clearly note that
many of the issues addressed by the authors are “so new or so unsettled that
no one can draw bright legal lines with
great confidence.” If the book does not
offer any bright legal lines, it does help
focus readers on where those bright
lines might better fit within the various
issues discussed.
This book’s worth is reflected in the
quality of authors whom Moore and
Turner selected. Arguably, their diverse
and notable backgrounds make this
book a uniquely authoritative

compilation. From a law-school dean to
several law professors, as well as current
and former senior CIA, military, and
homeland-security legal professionals,
the authors are recognized and tested
experts within their areas of expertise.
Undoubtedly, John Norton Moore and
Robert F. Turner’s own extensive backgrounds and reputations in international law have enabled them to bring
together individuals who clearly were
up to the challenge. The reader is much
better off for the results.
Overall, Legal Issues in the Struggle
against Terror is an important work that
should be considered an integral resource for anyone interested in the legal, ethical, and moral issues that efforts
to counter terrorism raise in the twentyfirst century.
ERIC YOUNG

Naval War College

Coram, Robert. Brute: The Life of Victor Krulak,
U.S. Marine. New York: Little, Brown, 2010.
374pp. $27.99

Victor “Brute” Krulak is a legend within
the U.S. Marine Corps. That may be a
cliché, but it is true. This reviewer personally witnessed this phenomenon at
the Naval War College, in Newport,
Rhode Island, nearly four decades after
Krulak left the service. While delivering
a lecture at the College, I flashed a picture of Krulak on the screen. Instantly,
audience members began to call out
Krulak’s nickname—“Brute! Brute!”
The fact that Krulak’s son became
Commandant of the Corps only enhanced his reputation. The funny thing
about Krulak’s being so admired is that
he never held a major combat command
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as a general officer. He was brave, and
he won hero medals in World War II,
including the Navy Cross, but as a general during the Vietnam War he was in
Hawaii instead of in country. Flag and
general officers usually need to be combat leaders during a war to reach iconic
status.
As a result, this biography of Krulak by
Robert Coram is an all the more worthy
contribution to the historical literature
on the American military. Coram was
trained as a journalist and has written
two biographies of Air Force colonels,
John Boyd and Bud Day. This background proved important, because
Krulak had a powerful military intellect
and could think well on how to employ
military power in all three mediums,
air, land, and sea.
Coram makes a strength out of a weakness when he starts the biography off in
what seems a vague fashion. Krulak was
a brilliant self-promoter who often distorted the historical record to bolster
his reputation. This tendency included
lying about his early years growing up
in Wyoming. Born and raised a Jew,
Krulak decided sometime after his arrival at the U.S. Naval Academy that he
was an Episcopalian. He also hid the
fact that he had married as a teenager.
Although his deception regarding his
ethnic and religious identity could be
understood as a consequence of the bigotry of the time, it continued for the
rest of his life. One of his biggest claims
was for a wartime association with Lieutenant (junior grade) John F. Kennedy
—there was none. Krulak’s assignment
to the Kennedy White House had nothing to do with old ties of wartime
comradeship.
As Coram notes, what is important
about Krulak is his military career, not

BOOK REVIEWS

145

so much his personal character. With
that point made, Coram—in a testament to his skills as a reporter—does a
good job of letting the man’s personality come through. The biography grows
in strength as Krulak moves through his
career. In the days before World War II
he made major, truly important contributions to the development of amphibious warfare. After the war he helped
develop doctrine for the use of the helicopter. In the 1960s he turned his intellect toward counterinsurgency. The
section on counterinsurgency is the best
part of the book, though specialists will
want to see more than is there. Krulak
had good ideas that are still extremely
relevant. In all of this, Krulak was a
constant defender of the institutional
interests of the U.S. Marine Corps, including in the acrimonious debates on
military unification in the late 1940s.
In short, after reading this book it is
easy to see why Krulak is such an icon.
Marines and others will enjoy the read.
NICHOLAS EVAN SARANTAKES

Naval War College

Peattie, Mark, Edward Drea, and Hans van de
Ven, eds. The Battle for China: Essays on the Military History of the Sino-Japanese War of 1937–
1945. Stanford, Calif.: Stanford Univ. Press, 2010.
614 pp. $65

The title of this book appropriately suggests a degree of ambiguity regarding
the actors fighting over the territorial
integrity and cultural identity of China.
The interplay of imperial Japan, Nationalist and Communist Chinese,
Great Britain, Germany, Russia, France,
and the United States from 1937 through
1945 creates a terrain challenging to
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navigate with historical accuracy and
objective truth. The conflicting viewpoints on these contentious events have
proved difficult, and perhaps impossible, material from which to develop a
definitive narrative. Consequently, the
editors have chosen to avoid illusions of
defining the “facts” of the matter, instead offering a number of exploratory
essays from opposing viewpoints. In
order to offer this multisource assessment, the editors coordinated the efforts
of scholars from China, Taiwan, Japan,
and the United States.
Editors Mark Peattie (a research fellow
at the Hoover Institution), Edward
Drea (former chief of the Research and
Analysis Division of the U.S. Army
Center of Military History), and Hans
van de Ven (a professor of modern Chinese history at Cambridge University)
stand apart as leading authorities on the
Pacific War. The other seventeen contributors range from unknown doctoral
candidates to heavyweight historians
like Ronald Spector. Despite the pitfalls
of bringing together authors of multiple
disciplinary backgrounds, varying languages, and competing cultures and
ideologies, the editors have maintained
a surprisingly well organized text,
firmly grounded in analysis of events
from the perspective of military affairs.
The book is organized in six parts: the
overview; opposing armies’ organization, training, and equipment; initial
hostilities (1937–38); a “stalemate in
strategies” (1938–42); the Burma and
Ichigo campaigns (1943–45); and conclusions. Each section begins with valuable information provided by the
editors, furnishing continuity between
thematic essays. The essays themselves
are insightful, if not groundbreaking,
offering milestones for future study and

debate. One innovative and striking
theme is the attention to and appreciation for the challenges facing Chiang
Kai-shek and the Nationalist Party, the
Kuomintang (KMT). While not excusing any failures, the authors make it
easy to understand the KMT’s weak position in an agrarian society with undeveloped state organization in the face of
a growing communist insurgency, tepid
allied support, and a vicious campaign
of destruction by an industrialized opponent. The deprivations endured and
the sacrifices made by the Chinese
through seven long years of the most
brutal warfare does much to explain the
KMT’s precarious situation at the war’s
end. At the end of the book, Ronald
Spector provides excellent context to
these essays on the Sino-Japanese War,
placing the scholarship within the
framework of the Pacific War, World
War II, and the history of warfare.
For military officers, I think, this book
provides a number of important insights. For one, it imparts valuable lessons regarding the success of and shortcomings in the Imperial Japanese Army.
At a tactical and operational level, the
Sino-Japanese War validates the Japanese emphasis on offensive tactics and
aggressive spirit to overcome numerical
superiority of opponents—a technique
proven successful in this case against
the Chinese rather than the Russians,
for whom the Japanese had prepared.
My only criticism of The Battle for
China derives from the inadequacy of
the maps. Those not intimate with Chinese, Japanese, and Burmese geography
will find places described difficult to locate. For instance, the prominent province of Chahar in Inner Mongolia finds
its name nowhere on the fourteen
maps, including that given for the battle
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of Pingxingguan Pass, which took place
in Chahar. The Burmese map shows
fewer than half the important locations
discussed and no indications of the
Burma Road, for which the forces were
fighting. The Japanese province of
_ _
Kyushu was certainly an important
place for recruiting, but one will have to
look elsewhere to find its location. The
political instability of the period exacerbates the situation in terms of geography. Many locations have Japanese,
Chinese, and European names. For instance, the Japanese refer to Tianjin,
near the city of Peking (modern-day
Beijing), as Tientsin. This situation is
compounded by the fact that provincial
boundaries and place-names of what
we now call China, especially in the
north, changed frequently in the midtwentieth century. Although the political and geographic landscapes of the
Sino-Japanese War admittedly pose a
challenge, the maps could have better
illustrated the events described.
As I am not certain that Chinese or Japanese audiences (those most interested
in this topic) will gravitate to this English work, The Battle for China must be
presumed to target a small niche market of Sino-Japanese War military history enthusiasts in North America and
Europe. To offset what may be limited
interest in its subject, I feel compelled
to praise in the strongest terms the efforts of Peattie, Drea, and Van de Ven
in organizing, editing, translating, and
publishing this important book. Without these distinguished professionals,
Western students of the Pacific War
would not have access to this important
Chinese and Japanese research, mediated by celebrated Western scholars.
The Battle for China is a rare treasure
that will likely renew interest in an
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underdeveloped field of Western scholarship. I highly recommend it to those
interested in the Pacific War or greater
insight into modern Chinese history.
MAJ. ROBERT BURRELL, U.S. MARINE CORPS

U.S. Special Operations Command

Mort, Terry. The Hemingway Patrols: Ernest
Hemingway and His Hunt for U-boats. New York:
Scribner’s, 2009. 272pp. $26

The Battle of the Atlantic has been
thoroughly researched and exhaustively
studied, especially by students attending
the Naval War College. However, rarely
has the epic campaign to defeat the
German U-boat menace been viewed
through the lens of the life and personality of one of America’s greatest literary figures. In The Hemingway Patrols,
Terry Mort offers a well researched account of this great campaign, one that
reads almost like an actual Hemingway
novel.
For students of military history, Mort’s
account of the titanic struggle between
the Allied navies and German U-boats
in the early months of 1942 will be
somewhat familiar. It is the juxtaposition with Hemingway’s decision to participate in the campaign that provides
the strength of this narrative. Mort depicts Hemingway in 1942 as at the zenith of both his life and his professional
career. Likewise, the German U-boat
campaign would reach its zenith during
this year: American shipping suffered
grievous losses at the hands of only a
dozen or so U-boats in the early months.
Why would Hemingway, living in luxury in Cuba at the time, risk everything,
with his drinking buddies, to hunt
U-boats in his wooden fishing trawl
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Pilar? Having studied at Princeton with
Hemingway biographer Carlos Baker,
Mort provides one of the most convincing explanations yet offered for Hemingway’s decision to place himself in
harm’s way.
It would be easy simply to ascribe Hemingway’s decision to that of a writer living out the life that he had illustrated in
his art. Mort takes a more scholarly approach, however. One of the most interesting elements of this book is its
description of the three stages through
which each of Hemingway’s characters
pass in his novels—the stage of innocence, then suffering, and finally an existential stage, in which the hero creates
meaning out of nothingness. It is certainly possible to see Hemingway himself following this trajectory. In the
imaginative mind of a writer, the
U-boat appeared as a multifaceted
menace, not only a threat to merchant
vessels but a stealthy craft that could
deliver spies to the many coves and inlets of Caribbean islands like Cuba.
Hunting down and attacking these
modern weapons of war would require
a dedicated band of ardent antifascists,
the likes of whom Hemingway had consorted with in Spain in the late thirties,
and whom he would lead into action
again, as his small fishing vessel sought
valiantly for the elusive U-boats
throughout the Caribbean and the Gulf
of Mexico. Many elements of Hemingway’s complex personality combined to
compel him to sail Pilar into action,
and Mort gives each of these factors due
treatment.
A former naval officer himself, Mort is
familiar with life at sea. The many accounts of Hemingway leading his crew
on these dangerous missions benefit
from Mort’s having participated in

patrols in some of the same waters. In
summing up this work, one phrase
stands above the rest as a testament to
the sweeping panorama of Mort’s ambitious attempt to tie together a great
naval campaign and the life of an
American literary giant: “It was action
and artistry combined. It was also fun,
most of the time, especially when there
was enough gin.” Mort has provided us
with a fascinating book, and students of
both military and literary history will
definitely want to put The Hemingway
Patrols on their reading list.
JEFF SHAW

Naval War College

Stoker, Donald. The Grand Design: Strategy and
the U.S. Civil War. New York: Oxford Univ.
Press, 2010. 498pp. $27.95

It is difficult to imagine historical
ground that has been more thoroughly
mined than that of the American Civil
War. Biographies, battle studies, sweeping histories, and all manner of specialized analyses dot the literary landscape.
However, rather than turning away
from a potentially saturated market,
our collective interest in this sanguinary
conflict has kept publishers and authors
delivering a steady stream of material
year after year after year.
It is nonetheless a brave author who
claims to offer something truly original
to our understanding of the war. Although some scholars may quibble over
whether or not Stoker has succeeded in
this effort, his Grand Design, a onevolume history that examines the role
of strategy in the Civil War, is something of a rara avis. More to the point,
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it is both a useful and thoughtprovoking addition to any library.
Surprisingly, Stoker is at his weakest
when discussing just what he means by
strategy. The term is admittedly somewhat slippery, and competing definitions abound. In the end, Stoker settles,
by his own admission, for examining
the linkage of political policy objectives
and subsequent military operations.
As a result, the two most important
personages in the book are Abraham
Lincoln and Jefferson Davis. As political
leaders of their respective sides, it was
they who were responsible for setting
and approving political policy and objectives. Lincoln emerges as a political
leader who, having once determined the
political objectives of the United States,
was forced time and again to intervene
in the running of the war because his
generals failed to gain those objectives
through military operations. In doing
so, Lincoln gradually gained a distinct
appreciation for the military art and
sharpened his ability to see clearly
which courses of action would likely
produce successful results. Davis, in
contrast, saw himself as the Confederacy’s general in chief and would persist
in that notion to the detriment of the
Confederate war effort until 1865.
Stoker naturally examines the military
men on the other side of the politicalmilitary equation. Perhaps no one
should have expected strategically gifted
senior officers to be found in the ranks
of the U.S. officer corps in 1860, and
Stoker confirms that such men were
then lacking, with the possible exception of the aged Winfield Scott. The
U.S. Army was small, its garrisons were
small, and with the exception of the
brief war with Mexico, its units had always been small. The only big things
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about the Army were its theater of operations and the egos of some of its
more famous personalities. Yet individuals with a broader expanse of vision
did emerge. The best of these wore
Union blue, and Stoker makes a convincing argument that the best of the
best was Ulysses S. Grant, a man notable in his ability to complement the
president’s policies and objectives with
effective military operations. Stoker argues that Grant’s success was not just a
question of superior resources. Grant
saw beyond his theater of operations.
He understood the tools available to
him, and he worked in harness with his
political leader. William T. Sherman is
also given credit for being a general in
strategic alignment with national policy
and objectives. In contrast, however,
Stoker reasonably judges George B.
McClellan as a general with strategic insight and imagination but woefully incompetent when it came to battlefield
leadership, without which strategic objectives cannot be realized.
Stoker is far from being an unabashed
fan of the Union’s strategists; his biggest censure on its generals’ performance is that they were slow. He
convincingly claims that a Union victory was possible much earlier than the
spring of 1865; however, he does not regard that victory as inevitable. In contrast, he faults Confederate counterparts with never getting it right at all.
His criticisms of Jefferson Davis’s fixation on forward defense and the waste
of trying to preserve and protect the
Confederacy west of the Mississippi are
well argued indeed. Stoker gives credit
to Robert E. Lee for his capability to be
as good as Grant but notes that he was
nearly always confined to theater operations. General P. G. T. Beauregard, a
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self-proclaimed Southern strategist, is
simply and reasonably dismissed as a
fantasist.
Given the number of bad books that
have been written about the Civil War,
it is a pleasure to find a good one.
Stoker is a solid, competent author who
makes his points in clear convincing
prose. Written from a refreshing viewpoint, The Grand Design is a book
worth reading.
RICHARD NORTON

Naval War College

McMeekin, Sean. The Berlin–Baghdad Express:
The Ottoman Empire and Germany’s Bid for
World Power, 1898–1918. Cambridge, Mass.:
Harvard Univ. Press, 2010. 496pp. $29.95

If ever there was a story of epic unintended consequences and “might have
beens,” Sean McMeekin’s The Berlin–
Baghdad Express is it. Approaching the
First World War in the Middle East
from the German and Ottoman perspectives, McMeekin expands our
Anglo-centric understanding of the
conflict. In doing so, he unveils a
breathtaking catalogue of misunderstandings, miscalculations, simple mistakes, and missed opportunities that
would be comic if not so horribly
tragic.
While the title conjures images of the
fabled Orient Express, the book is a
first-rate history of the diplomatic jockeying of the German and Ottoman Empires to gain advantage over their
respective archrivals, Britain and Russia. The railway would be a tool to enable Germany’s Drang nach Osten
(drive to the East) while strengthening
the Turks (bitter enemies of Germany’s

Russian rivals) by linking the farthest
reaches of the Ottoman Empire with
the seat of power in Istanbul. The completion of the railway, first to Baghdad
and then extended on to Basra, would
have profound political, economic, and
strategic importance.
To achieve this end Germany designed
a strategy to undermine the cohesion of
the British Empire through Islamic holy
war. That strategy was an outgrowth of
Kaiser Wilhelm II’s reckless and amateurish meddling in Oriental affairs.
The kaiser believed that his affinity for
Sultan Abdulhamid II, Caliph of the
Faithful, and for all things Islamic
would enable him to engineer a jihad
against the hated British, targeting the
empire’s large Muslim populations in
India, Egypt, and beyond. The kaiser, in
league with the sultan and later the
Young Turks, embarked on ambitious
propaganda and military campaigns designed to rally Muslims to the sultan’s
call for jihad, despite the facts that most
educated Muslims had long given up
the idea of the caliphate; that there was
no distinction in Islamic jurisprudence
or practice between a bad infidel (British, French) and good one (German,
Austrian, American, or maybe Italian);
that Sunni and Shia Muslims had vastly
different views of jihad; and that the
British had for years controlled access
to Mecca for the hajj. McMeekin also
points out the oddness of German
support for jihad juxtaposed with the
German-based Zionist movement,
which actually anticipated Britain’s
Balfour Declaration to establish a Jewish homeland in Palestine.
The cast of characters includes soldiers,
statesmen, adventurers, charlatans, humanitarians, and thugs from across Europe, the Caucasus, Africa, and the

https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol64/iss3/21

NWC_2011SummerReview.ps
\\data1\john.lanzieri.ctr$\msdata\Desktop\NavalWarCollege\NWC_2011SummerReview\NWC_2011SummerReview.vp
Tuesday, April 19, 2011 11:14:59 AM

156

Color profile: Disabled
Composite Default screen

War College: Summer 2011 Review

Middle East. Many are familiar, such as
Kaiser Wilhelm, Abdulhamid II, and T.
E. Lawrence. Still more are rather obscure. Central among this group are
“Baron” Max von Oppenheim, a Jewish
scion of the famous banking family,
and Curt Prufer, a scholar assigned to
the German embassy in Cairo. Both
were Orientalists, both were devotees of
Kaiser Wilhelm, and both shared the
kaiser’s vision of jihad. Together they
worked to foment holy war from Libya
in the west through Egypt, Abyssinia,
Sudan, Arabia, Iran, Afghanistan, and
India. After the war they emerged in the
forefront of Nazi anti-Semitism and the
atrocities that it produced.
A common theme found throughout
the narrative is that of miscalculation
born of ignorance or misunderstanding
of basic historical, cultural, political,
and religious truths. A prime example is
Germany’s tendency to see the Muslim
world as either for the Germans or
against them, while missing the vast
range of options in between, a problem
that persists in varying degrees today.
Another is the complexity of the region
that breeds such miscalculations.
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McMeekin’s treatment of the struggle
for control of Baku in August 1918 provides a brief but illuminating example
of just how complex that corner of the
world can be. With British, German,
Russian, Turkish, Armenian, Azeri, and
other factions vying for control of the
city (and its oil), fighting was not only
savage but included intramural attacks
upon allies. As we look at Afghanistan,
Pakistan, the Caucasus, and other tribal
regions today, we can see that the same
elements of complexity and confusion
that bedeviled earlier Western strategists is ours to deal with again, and
again.
Sean McMeekin is assistant professor of
international relations at Bilkent University, in Ankara, Turkey. His work is
based on German, Turkish, Austrian,
Russian, and American archives, as well
as secondary sources. It is carefully researched, well documented, and presented with a lively style that combines
analysis, insight, and a mix of irony and
wry humor that makes the book as
readable as it is informative.
COL. THOMAS E. SEAL, U.S. MARINE CORPS, RETIRED

Stafford, Virginia
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OF SPECIAL INTEREST
THE ESSENTIAL CIVIL WAR CURRICULUM
The Essential Civil War Curriculum website, a Sesquicentennial Project of the
Virginia Center for Civil War Studies and the History Department of Virginia
Polytechnic Institute and State University (Virginia Tech), was launched on 4
March 2011 at www.essentialcivilwarcurriculum.com/.
What do those interested in the Civil War need to know to increase their
knowledge and understanding of this important event in American history? The
Essential Civil War Curriculum, overseen by professional Civil War historians,
guides the reader to the important topics and sources that every student of the
war, amateur or professional, needs to understand.
The Essential Curriculum is owned by the Virginia Center for Civil War Studies, “a formal entity for studying and sharing knowledge” (as described by its
mission statement) about the Civil War with “both academic and public audiences.” The site is sponsored by Professor William C. Davis and Dr. James I. Robertson, Jr.; Mr. Laurie Woodruff conceived, financed, and now manages and
edits it. The site operates under a wiki model; a Board of Historians composed of
the country’s most eminent Civil War scholars invites contributions and approves all postings and content. Eventually the website will offer information on
over four hundred topics.
Contact Laurie Woodruff, executive director and editor, Essential Civil War
Curriculum, essentialcivilwarcurriculum@hotmail.com.
WINNER OF FIRST HATTENDORF PRIZE
Professor N. A. M. Rodger has been named as the inaugural recipient of the Naval War College’s Hattendorf Prize. Rodger, a leading British naval historian and
senior research fellow at Oxford University, is a fellow of both All Souls College
and the British Academy.
The prize is meant to express appreciation for distinguished work in the field
of maritime history, specifically on the roles, contributions, limitations, and
uses of the sea services. It was established in recognition of the scholarship and
service of the College’s Ernest J. King Professor of Maritime History, Dr. John
Hattendorf. It is made possible with the support of the Naval War College Foundation, through the generosity of Pamela Ribbey, in honor of her late
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grandfather, Capt. Charles H. Maddox (1886–1964), a pre–World War II Naval
War College graduate and faculty member.
The award, which is to be given generally at two-year intervals, includes a
bronze medal, a citation, a monetary gift of $10,000, and the opportunity to deliver a lecture (to be published in this journal) at the Naval War College.
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REFLECTIONS ON READING

Professor John E. Jackson is the Naval War College’s manager for the
CNO’s Navy Professional Reading Program.
Complex social behavior such as leadership can be taught by calling attention to more experienced leaders in action.
HOWARD PRINCE

W

hen you enter the word “leadership” into the Google search engine, you
get 285 million hits, which is one indication of the volume of material
available on the complex issue of how individuals motivate and direct the behavior of others. No single theory of leadership development is universally accepted. Opinions range from that of writers who claim that leadership is an
inherent trait that exists in some people since birth (and cannot be taught) to the
view of Professor Howard Prince, whose quote above expresses his belief that
studying the actions of experienced leaders can improve the skills of those desiring to be more successful in leading others. The Navy Professional Reading Program (NPRP) subscribes to the notion that exposure to the experiences of
notable leaders can be instructive, and the ten books in the “Leadership” category provide a good starting point for study. Here are some examples.
Lincoln on Leadership: Executive Strategies for Tough Times, by Donald T.
Phillips, is a quick read by a best-selling author who is a great storyteller. He uses
the life of one of the nation’s most effective presidents to illustrate how good
leaders succeed in the most demanding of times and situations. Chapters on getting to know your people, setting clear goals, leading by example, and skillfully
communicating are as relevant in the twenty-first century as they would have
been to Lincoln in the mid-1800s. Notre Dame football coaching legend Lou
Holtz has written, “For anyone whose job is motivating and inspiring others,
this book is indispensable.”
Shackleton’s Way: Leadership Lessons from the Great Antarctic Explorer, by
Margot Morrell and Stephanie Capparell, tells the story of British explorer Sir
Ernest Shackleton, who used unparalleled leadership skills to save the lives of
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twenty-seven men stranded with him in the Antarctic for almost two years. After
his sailing ship Endurance was frozen into an ice pack and ultimately crushed
and sunk, he kept his crew alive in almost unbelievable conditions. While the
book reads at times like an adventure novel, the two veteran business writers
skillfully translate Shackleton’s leadership genius into lessons specifically applicable to today’s military professionals. Some of the chapter titles—like “Creating a Spirit of Camaraderie,” “Getting the Best from Each Individual,” and
“Leading Effectively in a Crisis”—provide a hint of the breadth of topics contained in this widely praised book.
Leadership: The Warrior’s Art, edited by Christopher Kolenda, is a remarkable
collection of nineteen essays written by scholars, military leaders, and business
executives. The book is divided into three sections: “Ancient and Modern Concepts of Leadership,” “Historical Case Studies,” and “Contemporary Experiences
and Reflections on Leadership.” The anthology covers leadership from the classical to the modern, from Alexander the Great to the Gulf wars. While many of the
essays have an “Army-centric” viewpoint, careful reading discloses the applicability of many concepts to Navy scenarios and to the business world. Noted author Wess Roberts calls this book “a robust collection of thought-provoking
essays written by an extraordinary group of accomplished thinkers and leaders.”
The chapter “Unleashing Human Potential” is particularly enlightening.
The Good Shepherd, by C. S. Forester, is the story, originally published in 1955,
of a U.S. Navy officer commanding a small group of destroyers on escort duty in
the North Atlantic during the early days of the Second World War. Forester, best
known for his Horatio Hornblower novels, does a marvelous job in describing
the human side of the commander, forced to make life-and-death decisions on
the basis of limited and flawed data. The book’s protagonist is not superhuman;
he is in many ways a flawed individual, with many self-doubts. As such, he is not
unlike many of the men and women who serve in uniform today. Though set
more than a half-century ago, the challenges faced by the men of USS Keeling are
similar to those of mariners of today. The angry sea, bone-chilling cold, and the
loneliness of command have changed little across the decades. While readers
cannot actually serve under Commander Krause, they can observe and learn
from the successes and failures of this poetic hero.
The other six books in the leadership category also allow readers to observe
vicariously leaders in action, and they illuminate traits and characteristics that
may help readers shape their own leadership styles. Reading about great leaders
is obviously less effective than seeing them in action, but it does at least provide a
window into the minds of leaders like Winston Churchill and Abraham Lincoln.
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The ten leadership books in the primary NPRP library and the two dozen titles
on the Supplemental Reading list on the program website at www.navyreading
.navy.mil are great places to continue your leadership-development process.
Remember, the motto of the Navy Professional Reading Program is: “Making
Leaders . . . One Book at a Time.”

JOHN E. JACKSON
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